



**“Wir sind dem Schutz unserer Heimat Österreich;”  
The ‘Boundaries’ of ‘Heimat’ in the FPÖ’s  
National Identity Discourse**

**Submitted in Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree of  
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**by**

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## Abstract

This thesis examines the use of the term *Heimat* in the political discourse of Austria's *Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs* (FPÖ). The concept of *Heimat* has long described the collective identity and cultural rapport between German-speaking groups, as well as the strong feelings of affection one has for their 'home' and native environment. With the advent of European nationalism during the nineteenth century, however, *Heimat* gained a political dimension through which it was possible to dictate normative features of national identity. *Heimat* is therefore explored in this dissertation as a pre-established concept that has been appropriated by the FPÖ in order to discursively construct an Austrian national identity narrative that suits its anti-immigration policies and Right-Wing populist parochialisms. Right-Wing Austrian political parties are well known for using emotive imagery in an inflammatory way to polarize opinion, and a deconstruction of their materials through the lens of *Heimat* provides an original and substantial contribution to cultural studies. Central to my investigation is an analysis of the FPÖ's Right-Wing populist *Heimat* imaginary, which is used by the party to outline its definition of the Austrian nation, community, culture, and identity. A recurring theme in the FPÖ's *Heimat* discourse is the notion of a 'homeland' that positions 'the people' as a central native community. This dissertation accordingly attempts to discover how Right-Wing populist *Heimat* discourse can affect perceptions of Austria's character as a nation. These perceptions influence the way Austria should look and feel, which collective identities and cultural manifestations are considered to be normative in the national identity narrative, and which physical landscapes typify the topography of the nation.

The final objective of this dissertation is to investigate these features of *Heimat* as examples of an idealised sense of community that is constructed around ethnocentric nationalism and monoculturalism. The dissertation consequently provides empirical evidence to demonstrate how the term *Heimat* is used by the FPÖ to construct a national identity narrative that gains voter support while also contesting the increased foreign migration to Austria and Europe. This thesis examines how the FPÖ uses the term *Heimat* to counter what the party identifies as a rupture of community, the diminishing sense of an identity of place, and loss of collective national identity, all of which has supposedly arisen from a sense of alienation caused by modern globalisation and the resultant push for cultural and societal diversification

and pluralism in Western democracies. As an important identity concept in the FPÖ's rhetoric, *Heimat* is explored in this thesis through the dominant lenses of landscape, language, history and mythology. These categories of analysis are integral to understanding the FPÖ's definition of *Heimat*, and therefore require thematic examination in individual chapters. My study draws on the FPÖ's political programmes, literature, speeches, photographs, websites, and social media. The inquiries that are addressed in the thesis are motivated by three overarching research questions:

- (1) How is the physical landscape of *Heimat* defined in Right-Wing populist discourse, and how does it resonate with the native Austrian population?
- (2) Which demographic is 'at home' in this image of *Heimat*, and how is their identity defined?
- (3) Which social groups are either marginalised or denied membership in this narrative?

A resolution to these inquiries offers a unique insight into what it means to be Austrian from a contemporary Right-Wing populist perspective.

To date, no systematic investigation has considered the role of national identity politics in Austria while also taking into account the current refugee and migrant crisis facing modern Europe. The political dominance of the Centre-Leftist parties continues to wane throughout Western democracies, and with it comes the resurgence of Far Right attitudes and the rising popularity of Right-Wing populist political blocs. This thesis examines how the FPÖ's populist *Heimat* discourse targets the fear many Austrian citizens hold about the preservation of their traditional national identity and image of the nation. It shows how the party then exploits these anxieties in order to question the validity of the governing multiculturalism narrative by attempting to discredit the idea that one can import large numbers of foreign cultural groups and have no societal problems as a result. This thesis thus discovers how the concept of '*Heimat*' functions as an imaginary cultural border that enforces a frontier between a national 'us' and a foreign 'them' in the FPÖ's political strategy.

## **Introduction**

This thesis investigates the FPÖ's *Heimat* discourse as a discursive construction of Austrian national identity. The thesis attempts to further understand what it means to be a 'genuine' Austrian from the perspective of the nation's most powerful Right-Wing populist party. The principal 'features' that establish the FPÖ's *Heimat* discourse are separated into the categories of physical and human landscapes, which in synthesis demonstrate the party's national identity narrative. As with any national identity formula, the FPÖ's espousal of a divisive 'Us' and 'Them' dichotomy is simultaneously investigated as a result of the party's *Heimat* rhetoric. The dissertation therefore draws additional attention to the FPÖ's exclusion of minorities, asylum seekers, or Islamic migrants, as well as their belief that Austrian society is in peril from the agents of globalisation and the conflation of too many foreign cultural groups and ethnicities. In a social climate where the populations of European nations are beginning to feel anxiety towards the intensified fluctuations of migrants and asylum seekers to the continent, this thesis attempts to gain insight into how native Austrians are defined by the FPÖ, and how that national identity is allegedly jeopardised by outside groups. The intent of this dissertation is to therefore deconstruct the FPÖ's definition of *Heimat*, and investigate its individual features as part of a distinct political strategy to perpetuate localised nativism alongside a policy of foreign exclusion.

The party's *Heimat* platform, it will be argued, allows the FPÖ to define the Austrian homeland and collective national identity through an allegory of shared cultural features and natural landscapes that are claimed to be unique to the Austrian people and their homeland. This insular view of identity and homeland, it will be shown, is largely inaccessible to other socio-cultural groups, or is in fact largely denied them by the FPÖ. This thesis aims to show that by its very design, the FPÖ's anti-immigration strategy seeks to strengthen the borders of the nation from 'outsiders', while also reinforcing a strict view on Austrian identity that is informed by a compendium of culture, traditions, and other features of identity that are believed to be pure, autochthonous, and in peril from the forces of globalisation and the increasing number of migrants to both the frontiers of Europe and in Austria itself.

To investigate the general negative reaction to increased migration fluxes and globalisation in Austria, this thesis draws on Right-Wing populist parochialisms as

the inspiration behind the FPÖ's anti-globalist, anti-foreigner *Heimat* message. The parochial interests that inform the FPÖ's *Heimat* discourse, it will be argued, are presented to the Austrian public in the guise of a celebration of the perceived native cultural characteristics of the population, all of which are linked to quintessential Austrian landscapes and settings. A simultaneous analysis of what features of identity are conversely deemed by the FPÖ to be contradictory to the sense of *Heimat*, and therefore prerequisites for exclusion or marginalisation, will also be provided. In an attempt to decipher the features of 'Austrianness' from a Right-Wing populist perspective, the thesis may at times appear to reject the legitimacy of a collective Austrian identity narrative. This is by no means the author's intent. The line between the celebration of one's culture and a descent into parochialism or notions of cultural or ethnic superiority is indeed ambiguous. Rather, the aim of this thesis is to critically analyse this fine line and identify if, or where, the FPÖ stray into a more dangerous exclusionary narrative. This dissertation therefore approaches *Heimat* as both a cultural construct and a politically charged concept, through which the FPÖ's monocultural vision for Austria can be openly discussed and, theoretically, realised. The thesis is designed to demonstrate the gradual return of Right-Wing parochialisms into the mainstream of Western democracies, which, in the case of Austria, have been carefully disguised as a celebration of nativism, traditionalism, and *Heimat*.

### **Review of relevant studies in the area**

While previous studies have parenthetically noted the emotive power of the term *Heimat* in Austrian Right-Wing populist discourse, there has been, as yet, no deeper analysis of how the FPÖ actually defines the features of *Heimat*. Some of the primary sources analysed in this study, furthermore, are as recent as 2016, and this provides added strength and relevance to the research. The prevailing refugee crisis in the West, and the increasing political strength of parties like the FPÖ, only further compound the necessity of this study. The thesis does, however, draw upon the authority of previous research where appropriate. For example, Ruth Wodak provides valuable investigations within this area, and offers some insightful judgements on the FPÖ's use of the *Heimat* concept. For example, Wodak explains in *The Politics of Fear: What Right-Wing Populist Discourses Mean* that Right-Wing populist parties often refer to a collective homeland, which along with notions of kinship relating to blood and ethnicity, has to be protected against 'dangerous' outsiders who threaten

the stability of the national 'in' group.<sup>1</sup> Wodak further contests that the Austrian Right-Wing populist definition of *Heimat* is linked to the emotionally charged concept of fatherland, while the nation is subsequently viewed as the vessel which contains the extended family (the native people) who belong there by birth.<sup>2</sup> Due to Right-Wing populist parties' lengthy references to a singular people and the autochthonous cultural origins of the nation or homeland, Wodak also notes the expediency of the concept of *Heimat* in nationalist discourses. Wodak accordingly attests that Austrian Right-Wing populist parties target nationalist and conservative voters through the use of the *Heimat* concept, because this demographic responds favourably to the patriotic feeling of 'togetherness', the sense of local community, and the observance to the traditional or rural values of Austria that the concept evokes.<sup>3</sup> Wodak further contests in '*Anything Goes!*' – *The Haiderization of Europe* that Far Right parties have moved away from neo-fascist discourse, and refer instead to "the protection of – seemingly homogeneous - national identities or a 'mythical' homeland (*Heimat*)" while also engaging in discriminatory and exclusionary rhetoric towards foreign groups.<sup>4</sup>

In his paper *Identifikationsangebote für Bürgerinnen und Bürger zweier Welten Bilder von der "Heimat" im Wahlkampf zum österreichischen Nationalrat*, Pier-Paolo Pasqualoni notes that in the 2006 *Nationalrat* campaign *Heimatrhetorik* played an important role, with slogans like "Lust auf Heimat" and "Mut zu Heimat" adorning FPÖ billboards.<sup>5</sup> Pasqualoni shows that the party's use of *Heimat* allowed it to seize considerable political capital by politicising the term as a concept that included 'all' Austrians, while paradoxically also excluding others. Pasqualoni consequently attempts to define the concept of *Heimat* as a utility to facilitate

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<sup>1</sup> Wodak, Ruth. *The Politics of Fear: What Right-Wing Populist Discourses Mean*. UK: Sage, 2015. Print. 66.

<sup>2</sup> Wodak *The Politics of Fear*, 77.

<sup>3</sup> Wodak *The Politics of Fear*, 146.

<sup>4</sup> Wodak, Ruth. "'Anything Goes!' – the Haiderization of Europe " *Right Wing Populism in Europe: Politics and Discourse*. Eds. Wodak, Ruth, Majid KhosravNik and Brigitte Mral. London: Bloomsbury, 2013. 23 - 38. Print. 25.

<sup>5</sup> Pasqualoni, Pier-Paolo. "Identifikationsangebote für Bürgerinnen und Bürger zweier Welten Bilder von der "Heimat" im Wahlkampf zum österreichischen Nationalrat." *Globalisierung und Gerechtigkeit : Eine transdisziplinäre Annäherung*. Innsbruck: Innsbruck University Press, 2007. 183 - 209. Print. 183.

inclusion within, as well as sanction exclusion from, a group, through active political agitation, and this explains much about the importance of the word in Right-Wing populist nomenclature. To state his case, Pasqualoni refers to group identity in order to demonstrate that the *Heimat* idea has similarities with the sociological theory of *positioning*.<sup>6</sup> When individuals, for example, empathise with their *Heimat*, they also allocate themselves a personal identity that is influenced by social collaboration within their group, thus ‘positioning’ in order to formulate that identity. One theory put forward by Pasqualoni, for example, defines personal identity as such a process:

Personal identity is one’s sense of being located in space and having a position in the moral order of the little group with which one is conversing. [...] Selfhood is discursively produced for others by the use of the first person pronoun, and at the same time is discursively produced for ourselves.<sup>7</sup>

Selfhood in the concept of *Heimat* references the space where the subject was born or has been located for many years. That space is then distinguished through the discursive arrangement of identity features that are usually derived from the ethnography that relates directly to the group. Pasqualoni explores the FPÖ’s *Heimatrhetorik* as a conversation about national identity and selfhood that is manipulated by Right-Wing populist politicians. This is seen in slogans such as “WIR für Österreich” which utilise personal pronouns alongside calls for “Heimat”, implying that the FPÖ are there to defend their own target demographic: native Austrians. The emotive power of the *Heimat* concept in personal and group identity formulas means the term is extremely effective in the FPÖ’s divisive brand of politics. As Pasqualoni notes, the FPÖ consistently warns the population to keep the *Heimat* ‘pure’, and to eternally guard it from foreign infiltration, such as from migration flows or hostile takeovers from globalist corporations.<sup>8</sup> This ‘inclusion/exclusion’ schema allows Right-Wing populists to exemplify the

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<sup>6</sup> For a detailed account of positioning theory as a discursive process of identity formation see Davies, Bronwyn, and Rom Harre. "Positioning: The Discursive Production of Selves." *Journal for the Theory of Social Behavior* 20.1 (1990). Print.

<sup>7</sup> Cited in Pasqualoni 185.

<sup>8</sup> Pasqualoni 187.

uniqueness of Austrians and attract an empathetic public by stressing that only the politicians in the FPÖ dutifully concern themselves with the local affairs of the people. It is also a strategy to claim either indifference for, or hostility towards, the interests of other groups, who are excluded by design. This thesis builds upon the conclusions of Pasqualoni by providing further detailed analysis of the features of *Heimat* according to the FPÖ. It will do so by providing a greater depth of primary sources for investigation, which will extend beyond the use of billboards and political slogans.

In their book *The Discursive Construction of National Identity*, Ruth Wodak, Rudolf de Cillia, Martin Reisigl and Karin Liebhart further cite the visceral patriotism the *Heimat* concept evokes, and its subsequent efficacy in the context of forging national identities. In the study, *Heimat* is described as a discursive concept that can help to facilitate a specific national identity, and is argued to be greatly important to ‘pan-Austrian’ national identity and self-perception.<sup>9</sup> Wodak *et al* quote a survey of what being ‘Austrian’ means, where the subjects’ close emotional relationship to Austria was usually formed around their understanding of Austria as ‘*Heimat*’.<sup>10</sup> In the case study, it was found that many of those surveyed referred to their sense of *Heimat* in either a rural and traditional manner (whether in a local or national sense), and always with a particular reference to the deictic ‘We’ and the concept of *Volk*.<sup>11</sup> Wodak *et al.* also cite Jörg Haider’s persistent use of the term *Heimat* in reference to both his local Carinthia and greater Austrian national identity as a commonly held home that must be preserved and protected.<sup>12</sup> This thesis also draws upon the relevance of *Heimat* as a concept that facilitates feelings of group solidarity, collective identity, and an inherent sense of place that is rooted to the land. However, while much groundwork has been laid by preceding studies, this dissertation focuses primarily on the features of the FPÖ’s *Heimat* concept, where previous research included the *Heimat* topic alongside a more general field of political inquiry.

Due to the efficacy of *Heimat* in the formation of group self-awareness and solidarity, previous research has also cited the concept’s use in the facilitation of anti-

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<sup>9</sup> Wodak, Ruth, *et al.* *The Discursive Construction of National Identity*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009. Print. 191.

<sup>10</sup> Wodak *et al.* *The Discursive*, 116.

<sup>11</sup> Wodak *et al.* *The Discursive*, 155.

<sup>12</sup> Wodak *et al.* *The Discursive*, 82.

foreign sentiments. There have been various relevant studies of the anti-foreigner message that can confound the reader regarding the innocence of the FPÖ's *Heimat* message and the subsequent patriotism expressed by the party. Onus Kar, for example, argues in his study of Right-Wing populism in Austria that the FPÖ often use the term *Heimat* to encourage a sense of 'fear' or 'anxiety' directed towards outsiders, seen for example with the interchangeable use of "Recht auf Heimat" alongside "äusländischer Socialschmarotzer" and "Import von Kriminellen."<sup>13</sup> This study, however, focuses predominantly on the reign of Jörg Haider in the years surrounding 1993, and therefore is not as relevant in relation to contemporary developments.

Herbert Dachs similarly cites the FPÖ's use of *Heimat* in a strategy to depreciate all things foreign and thereby 'protect' national interests (which is equal to the sense of *Heimat*).<sup>14</sup> Dachs also notes the use of *Heimat* in the debate surrounding Austria's entry to the European Union in the FPÖ's slogan "Ausverkauf der Heimat", which implies that Austria's national interests would be sold off to foreign bureaucrats in Brussels.<sup>15</sup> Such citations document the FPÖ's consistent use of the *Heimat* concept to stir patriotism and nationalism, while also encouraging disdain towards foreigners and foreign interests. The use of *Heimat* is therefore concluded by Dachs to be characterised by the more general Right-Wing populist rejection of immigrants and multiculturalism in Austria, characterised, for example, in the slogan "Recht auf Heimat – oder multikulturelle Gesellschaft", which implies the FPÖ's *Heimat* concept is culturally insular and incompatible with cultural or ethnic pluralism.<sup>16</sup> Michał Krzyżanowski similarly cites the use of the *Heimat* concept in the FPÖ's anti-immigration discourse, arguing that catchy slogans such as "Recht aufs Heimat" denotes Austrians' entitlement to live within their own, unique *Heimat*, while also suggesting foreigners also have their own 'right' (or, perhaps, obligation)

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<sup>13</sup> Kas, Onur. *Rechtspopulismus in Österreich die FPÖ als Oppositions- und Regierungspartei*. Hamburg: Bachelor and Master Publ, 2014. Print. 24.

<sup>14</sup> Dachs, Herbert. "Umschmeichelte Heimat? Über Politische Instrumentalisierungsversuche." *Ferne Heimat, Nahe Fremde: Bei Dichtern und Nachdenken*. Eds. Beutner, Eduard and Karlheinz Rossbacher. Würzburg: Verlag Königshausen & Neumann, 2008. 264 - 74. Print. 265.

<sup>15</sup> Dachs 265.

<sup>16</sup> Dachs 265.



to return to their own homelands (thereby implying that they do not belong in Austria at all).<sup>17</sup>

The antagonism shown towards foreigners in the FPÖ's *Heimat* discourse is overwhelming directed towards the Turkish or Islamic population, with numerous studies available that analyse the degree of Islamophobia evident in Right-Wing populist discourse. Dorothee de Nève, for example, refers to the use of *Heimat* as a rallying war cry in the FPÖ's comic series *Sagen aus Wien* from 2010, which refers to historical battles between Austria and the Ottomans to demonstrate the unacceptability of an Islamic population in modern Austria.<sup>18</sup> The FPÖ's comic series will also be pivotal aspect of this thesis. Krzyżanowski argues that since the leadership of Heinz-Christian Strache the FPÖ consistently refers to *Heimat* with a degree of 'us' versus 'them' innuendo, or, to be more precise, Austrians contrasted with a foreign, Islamic 'menace'.<sup>19</sup> Such studies therefore refer to Right-Wing populist *Heimat* rhetoric alongside a certain degree of implicit racism or cultural chauvinism. They reveal that *Heimat* is characterised by the FPÖ as an autochthonous collective identity and place in the world that is somehow connected to this cultural construct. Foreign groups, and Islam specifically, are also shown to be incompatible and therefore unable to gain membership in this *Heimat* narrative.

### **Theoretical framework**

The theoretical framework of this thesis uses a structured and thematic analytical approach to *Heimat*, investigating the term's use by the FPÖ through categories that will provide the basis for each chapter. The sub-sections of the FPÖ's *Heimat* concept are therefore organised into three major chapters, preceded by an introductory chapter that provides a history of the *Heimat* concept since the nineteenth century. The individual features of *Heimat* that assemble the foundation of

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<sup>17</sup> Krzyżanowski, Michał. "From Anti-Immigration and Nationalist Revisionism to Islamophobia: Continuities and Shifts in Recent Discourses and Patterns of Political Communication of the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ)." *Right-Wing Populism in Europe: Politics and Discourse*. Eds. Wodak, Ruth, Majid KhosraviNik and Brigitte Mral. London: Bloomsbury, 2013. 135 - 48. Print. 141.

<sup>18</sup> Nève, Dorothee de. "Islamophobie in Deutschland." *Religion und Politik im vereinigten Deutschland: Was bleibt von der Rückkehr des Religiösen*. Eds. Pickel, Gert and Oliver Hidalgo. Wiesbaden: Springer 2013. 195 - 220. Print. 210.

<sup>19</sup> Krzyżanowski 141.

this thesis are connected by the overarching theory that the *Heimat* concept, in its many varied forms, stands at the centre of an Austrian (and indeed German) moral and political discussion about identity, place, and belonging that is, at least, two centuries old.<sup>20</sup> As a result, this thesis presents the hypothesis that the FPÖ appropriate genuine ‘features’ of Austria as *Heimat* to support their own Right-Wing populist strategies, as well as manufacture their own resolution to the question of Austrian national culture, belonging, and identity in an increasingly unstable age of ‘migration’ and cultural pluralism in the European continent. The conjecture, accordingly, is that the FPÖ’s use of the term *Heimat* is an attempt to manipulate a sense of national consciousness as a means of safeguarding a traditional image of Austrian identity from an age of globalisation and multiculturalism. *Heimat* is resultantly theorised as a narrative that provides example of ‘sameness’ and the ‘collective selfhood’ on a community and national level.<sup>21</sup> As with any narrative pertaining to the collective identity of the social group, it is further surmised that ‘togetherness’ cannot be successfully achieved without the exclusion of the ‘Other’, or those social groups that do not conform to the identity mandate.<sup>22</sup> This thesis uses these assumptions to provide the following hypothesis:

*The FPÖ establishes discursive messages within Heimat discourse, which, by design, attempt to create an national identity narrative in Austria through a heightened sense of indigeneity and exceptionalism within the national ‘In’ group, as well as the simultaneous scapegoating of other groups through messages that are either inflammatory or used to foster an adversarial image.*

### **Definition of Terms**

As an investigation of the FPÖ’s political strategy to use euphemisms, nation-cultural identity characterisations, and exclusionary rhetoric to define the *Heimat* concept, this thesis also exposes the resurgence of identity politics sweeping Western democracies. The research, as such, requires the categorisation of empirical evidence

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<sup>20</sup> Applegate, Celia. *A Nation of Provincials: The German Idea of Heimat*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990. Print. 4 – 5.

<sup>21</sup> Wodak, Ruth, et al *The Discursive*, 11 – 14.

<sup>22</sup> Wodak, Ruth, et al *The Discursive*, 15.

into central themes. The themes within this thesis, accordingly, require definitions of the terms that are imperative to this investigation. The following definition of terms is alphabetically presented, with the omission of '*Heimat*', the definition of which is reserved for the investigation offered in Chapter One.

- **Ethnoculture**

This thesis attempts to introduce the pertinent features of Austrian ethnoculture as outlined in the FPÖ's *Heimat* discourse. By ethnoculture this thesis refers to a specific group of people who have been socialized by institutions and processes to think, act, and self-identify in similar ways.<sup>23</sup> The similarities are largely derived from a group that shares the same racial, national, religious or geographical origin.<sup>24</sup> Therefore ethnoculture is defined in this thesis as *a community or people with a consistent and unchanging culture and ethnicity*. For the purposes of this thesis, ethnoculture is characterised by an unbroken heritage that maintains culture in the form of values, traditions, art, religion and philosophy, as well as ordinary social practices such as food, relationship, and behaviours.

- **Ethnocultural nationalism**

This thesis argues further that the FPÖ demonstrates policies of *cultural encapsulation* and *cultural oppression* in its *Heimat* discourse.<sup>25</sup> The desire to preserve one's own culture and to oppress those cultures that are deemed to be foreign and threatening is characteristic of ethnocentric monoculturalism. Ethnocentric (valuing one's own ethnic or cultural group over others) monoculturalism (belief in one 'true' culture) is defined in this thesis as "a conscious or unconscious overvaluation of one's own cultural beliefs and practices, and simultaneous invalidation of other cultural worldviews."<sup>26</sup> In ethnocultural nationalism, the nation or homeland is understood as a community defined by ethnic and cultural uniformity,

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<sup>23</sup> Lister, Larry. *Human Sexuality, Ethnoculture, and Social Work*. London: The hawthorn press, 1986. Print. 1.

<sup>24</sup> Lister 1.

<sup>25</sup> Sue, Derald Wing. *Multicultural Social Work Practice*. New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, 2006. Print. 50.

<sup>26</sup> Taylor, Jennifer F. "Ethnocentric Monoculturalism." *Encyclopedia of Multicultural Psychology*. Ed. Jackson, Yo. London 2006. 203 - 04. Print. 203.

which is derived from the common ancestry of its members.<sup>27</sup> As a belief system, ethnocentric monoculturalism has three main characteristics:

- i. A strong belief in the superiority of one group's cultural heritage to others,
- ii. Belief in the inferior nature of all other cultural heritages,
- iii. The power to impose restrictions on the less powerful groups.<sup>28</sup>

The prevalence of ethnocultural nationalism in a society tends to result in the establishment of a social or political platform that practices normative measures in order to maintain a perceived level of purity through the reduction of ethnic or cultural complexity. In the ethnocentric monocultural worldview, as a result, pluralism and difference are things to be minimised rather than embraced. The avowal of a specific Austrian culture and ethnicity, it will be shown, is a characteristic example of the ethnocultural nationalism that is embedded in the FPÖ's *Heimat* discourse.

- **Ethnography**

As a study that explores the ethnocultural features presented by the FPÖ in its *Heimat* discourse, this thesis requires a degree of ethnographic analysis. Ethnography is defined accordingly in this thesis as the study of the worldview of a given ethnic 'host population', through an analysis of its cultural systems and their meanings.<sup>29</sup> In the case of the research submitted here, an analysis of the FPÖ's use of the *Heimat* concept is therefore also a systematic ethnographic study of the Austrian people and their culture in accordance with the party's Right-Wing populist beliefs.

- **Right-Wing populism**

As has been noted, this thesis describes the FPÖ as a Right-Wing populist party. The term 'Far-Right' is therefore purposely omitted. The use of 'Right-Wing populism' allows the thesis to draw parallels to a larger movement that exists across

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<sup>27</sup> Brown, David. *Contemporary Nationalism: Civic, Ethnocultural, and Multicultural Politics*. London: Routledge, 2000. Print. 35.

<sup>28</sup> Sue 49 – 53.

<sup>29</sup> Bernard, Russel H. *Research Methods in Anthropology: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches*. Walnut Creek: AltaMira, 2002. Print. 5.

Western democracies, thus demonstrating the authority of a political creed that continues to gather momentum within and without the confines of Austria. For the purposes of this thesis the term Right-Wing populism is defined as a set of principles and a political strategy to reject the pre-existing, mainstream political consensus in favour of free-enterprise neoliberalism.<sup>30</sup> The thesis specifically defines the principles behind Right-Wing populism as:

- a) A belief in the purity of a central people who are native to their location.
- b) A belief in a heartland or homeland that is the vessel in which the purity of the people is preserved.
- c) A general antagonism towards foreigners (migrants/asylum seekers) and elites (usually the established political class, agents of globalisation, and the banking sector).<sup>31</sup>

As a political movement that stylises itself as a rejection of the establishment, Right-Wing populist parties tend to construct themselves through a “Ich bin für/gegen eine konkrete Forderung”, and therefore functions in many cases as an “Ideologie ohne Weltanschauung.”<sup>32</sup> Right-Wing populism, in other words, tends to use self-gratifying and at times ‘popular’ strategies to stir empathy from the citizenry rather than relying on core political philosophies or worldviews.

The skilful use of rhetorical devices that characterises Right-Wing populism is considered ‘populist’ because of overtures to the ‘common man or woman’, which are typified by the use of anti-establishment motifs that criticise the ruling elite and established political class.<sup>33</sup> “Der politische Mode des Rechten Populismus”, Sebastian Riefeldt explains, “beruht auf der Aktivierung von Leidenschaften über krasse Entgegensetzung. Als eine Variation von Politik bezieht er sich vordergründig erst in zweiter Linie auf akute Verwaltungsprobleme des Staatswesens, den in erster Linie zielt er auf die Lebensweisen und alltäglichen Erfahrungen der Bürger in einem Staatswesen.” This thesis explores the FPÖ’s exploration of the interior and

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<sup>30</sup> Wodak *The Politics of Fear*, 7

<sup>31</sup> Wodak *The Politics of Fear*, 26.

<sup>32</sup> Riefeldt, Sebastian. *Nicht-wir und Die-da. Studien zum rechten Populismus*. Vienna: Braumüller, 2000. Print. 3.

<sup>33</sup> Wodak *The Politics of Fear*, 7.

boundaries of *Heimat* as one such strategy the party employs to connect with the 'common' man or woman, and garner empathy from them for their political cause.

Right-Wing populism validates criticisms of established mainstream politics and elites through a referral to Abraham Lincoln's famous definition of democracy as 'government of the people, for the people, and by the people'; meaning that the people should govern themselves, and the intermediary political and elite classes are either secondary actors in, or potential obstructers of, 'true democracy'.<sup>34</sup> Populism is therefore understood as a general political revolt against the 'checks and balances' seemingly introduced by the ruling elite, which deny the common people the ability to rule themselves and seek their own prosperity. The populist mantra, as such, states that the 'people' are entitled to govern themselves, for themselves, and without any restrictions from the elite or outsider groups.<sup>35</sup> The inability of the ruling elite to provide a general sense of security and wellbeing for the common men and women of Western European nations is partly responsible for the decline of the established political powers and the adjacent rise of the Right-Wing populist parties.<sup>36</sup> For the Right-Wing populists, the ruling elite must be removed from power because they have put internationalism and their own self interests above the interests of 'the people' and the nation.<sup>37</sup> The anti-elite strategy further draws disenfranchised voters towards the Right's messages, through which they are depicted as champions of the common man even if their status or background is anything but middle class.

The unfounded assumption that Right-Wing populist parties and politicians are marginalised extremists without any real voice was decisively refuted with the election of Donald J. Trump to the White House in 2016. Trump ran a successful and aggressive campaign that used the anti-establishment and anti-foreign motifs typical of Right-Wing populism, and his victory signalled a fundamental shift in the West

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<sup>34</sup> Pelinka, Anton. "Right-Wing Populism: Concept and Typology." *Right-Wing Populism in Europe*. Eds. Wodak, Ruth, Majid KhosraviNik and Brigitte Mral. London: Bloomsbury, 2013. 3 - 22. Print. 3.

<sup>35</sup> Pelinka *Right-Wing Populism*, 4.

<sup>36</sup> Betz, Hans-Georg. *Radical Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe*. Basingstoke, Hampshire England: Macmillan, 1994. Print. 41.

<sup>37</sup> Rydgren, Jens. "The Sociology of the Radical Right." *Annual Review of Sociology* 33.1 (2007): 241 - 62. Print. 242.

towards the Right.<sup>38</sup> Trump sold himself, in many cases, as a representative of the common man, who would put the interest of ‘the people’ before the will of globalist elites. In doing so Trump struck a deep chord with many disenfranchised (largely white) voters in the United States, and sent a clear message to the rest of the West that new political changes may be, indeed, at hand.

### **Thesis overview**

The term *Heimat*, as used by the FPÖ, includes references to physical landscapes, as well as a human landscape through the paradigms of language, history, and mythology. This thesis will provide new research by exploring these features of Austrian Right-Wing populist *Heimatrhetorik* through a comparative assessment of previous concepts of *Heimat*, and how they interrelate with the Right-Wing populists’ own narrative. The overarching questions that will be addressed in this thesis are:

- (1) How is the physical landscape of *Heimat* defined in Right-Wing populist discourse, and in what way does it resonate with native population?
- (2) Which demographic is ‘at home’ in this image of *Heimat*, and how is their identity defined through linguistic, cultural, and historical examples?
- (3) Which social groups are either marginalised or denied membership in this narrative?

The resolution of these inquiries offers unique insight into what it means to be Austrian from a contemporary Right-Wing populist perspective.

To achieve the above aim, Chapter One introduces arguably the most compelling and emotive feature of the FPÖ’s national identity discourse, that is, the party’s *Heimat* narrative. In order to understand the efficacy of *Heimat* discourse in national identity formulas, Chapter One presents a synopsis of the *Heimat* concept’s development in Austria and Germany since the nineteenth century. To position the Right-Wing populist use of *Heimat* within a historico-cultural framework, a chronological summary is required. The etymological origins of the term, accordingly, are examined first, all of which provide linguistic clues towards

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<sup>38</sup> Aksel, Leth N., et al. "Making America Great Again? A Critical Discourse Analysis of the Slogan Adopted by Donald Trump." RUC, 2016. Print. 18 – 24.

*Heimat's* power as a concept. Departing from *Heimat's* linguistic origins, a thematic exploration of the concept follows by analysing and categorising the activities of various *Heimat* enthusiasts since the nineteenth century. Using a range of empirical evidence and secondary literature pertaining to the concept's development, *Heimat* is then explored in Chapter One through its prevailing references to nature – whether forests, mountains, or rural and agrarian environments. The expediency of the *Heimat* concept to cultivate community and collective identity is also explored through language, history, and mythology paradigms that dominate *Heimat* narratives. Finally, the *Heimat* concept's role in collective identity formation, evidenced through the term's persistent use as a conduit for collective cultural abstractions and national myths, is examined as evidence of the concept's enduring political dimension, where the sense of homeland and place is used to discursively construct national identity narratives.

Due to the *Heimat* concept's effectiveness in establishing community formulas on both a local and national level, an investigation of the development of Austrian national identity is also required. Chapter One therefore presents the diverse origins of the Austrian national identity myth, and explores the problems the country faces in establishing a collective identity that is, culturally at least, both Austrian and European, but not decisively 'German'. It investigates how the tragedies surrounding National Socialism led to the development of a renewed sense of national identity through the *Heimat* concept that was distinctly 'Austrian', and as such, different from the pan-Germanism that dominated Austria in previous decades. The development of Austrian national identity is examined through a comparative assessment of the arguments presented by numerous popular historians and academic scholars. The contention surrounding the topic shows that, despite post-1945 conjecture concerning a unique and consolidated version of Austrian national identity, national consciousness is an abstraction that remains in continual development, and is accordingly prone to subjective interpretation or, indeed, manipulation. The problematic nature of modern Austrian national identity is therefore explored in Chapter One through a particular focus on the divide between the 'Austrian' and 'German' culturo-political positions, and how the two opinions continue to inform the debate surrounding Austria's identity and historical place in the world.

Based on the conclusions presented in Chapter One, Chapter Two returns specifically to the FPÖ's use of the *Heimat* imaginary as a political discourse. Chapter



Two, accordingly, develops an appropriate method for deconstructing the FPÖ's *Heimat* discourse into its first sub-section: the natural topographies that constitute the *physical landscape of Heimat*, as outlined in the FPÖ's identity politics. The chapter, consequently, explores the FPÖ's adoration of Austrian nature, and how that affection influences the party's policies pertaining to the environment. The physical landscape of *Heimat* is arranged in Chapter Two into the subsections of forest, alpine, and rural topographies. The FPÖ's promotional photos, imagery, events, speeches, and conservation policies provide the empirical evidence. The FPÖ's enthusiasm for nature is subsequently analysed as a narrative that encourages territorialism, ethnicity, and ownership over the land. The FPÖ's preoccupation with quintessential Austrian landscapes and associated conservation policies are examined as a strategy employed by the party to diminish the existential divide between the 'In' Austrian social group and their natural environment. Social groups, in other words, have their 'own' place in the world, which, according to the FPÖ, has defined their identities, and must therefore be preserved in the same manner their culture and community should be kept 'pure'.

Chapter Two additionally examines the FPÖ's extremely in depth platform for land conservation and resource management, all of which is at the core of the party's *Heimat* rhetoric. Resource and land management policies, sourced largely from the party's political manifesto, website, social media, and political billboards, provide the evidence for the research. The protection of forests, the sustainable management of ecosystems, increased use of renewable energies, and a reduction in fossil fuels and atomic power are the specific areas investigated in the party's environmental platform. The FPÖ's conservation centered approach to land and resource management, furthermore, is specifically discussed in relation to the FPÖ's rejection of foreign groups and political bodies, and this will be illustrated through an analysis of the party's anti-European Union stance in the context of domestic water management.

Based on the close link established in Chapter Two between natural environments and cultural identity, Chapter Three departs from physical landscapes and presents an analysis of the second sub-section of the FPÖ's *Heimat* discourse: the human landscape. Language is introduced as the first identifying feature of the human landscape that dwells within the FPÖ's *Heimat* imaginary, and is, as such, the focus of the chapter. It highlights the FPÖ's use of the German language as a tool to define

Austrian ethnoculture as a collective identity for the Austrian national ‘In’ group. The chapter therefore presents an investigation of the link the FPÖ forge between Austrian identity and the German language. This requires an analysis of the FPÖ’s attitude, sourced largely from their political literature, on the interrelation between language, national identity, and the *Heimat* concept. The FPÖ’s inferences to the importance of the German language as a facilitator of identity and *Heimat* in Austria are, however, questioned in the chapter. It points to the history of a multilingual (and multicultural) Austria, which is addressed in juxtaposition to the parties’ tendency to allocate German as the sole national language and determiner of national identity in the nation.

The chapter additionally provides a close examination of the FPÖ’s fondness for the term *Muttersprache* (‘Mother Tongue’ or ‘first language’) when it describes the German language in the context of national and cultural identity. Inferences to the biological transmission of languages (and therefore identity) are contrasted with overarching anti-immigration, anti-foreign FPÖ policies. The party’s use of Austrian dialect, furthermore, is explored as a distinctly Austrian (in place of pan-German) form of patriotism. This distinctly Austrian manifestation of linguistic patriotism is comparatively assessed alongside an FPÖ strategy to antagonise or exclude those groups within Austria who display an inability to speak Austrian dialects or German, and who prefer to identify personally with foreign, non-Germanic, dialects. The party’s policy of forced language acquisition for migrants, political programs applying to language more generally, as well as the linguistic depictions of various foreign groups in the FPÖ’s publications, provides the data for analysis. Finally, the chapter addresses the interrelation of language and broader cultural systems, and whether conformity to a language (or not) indicates compliance to, and normalisation within, a broader culturo-national identity narrative.

Chapter Four examines history and mythology as the final features of the human landscape in the FPÖ’s *Heimat* narrative. The empirical evidence is sourced from the FPÖ’s political literature pertaining to the value of history and myth, with a specific analysis of the party’s mythological comic series released during the 2010 and 2013 election campaigns. History and myth are allocated a singular chapter on the

hypothesis that both history and mythology provide a narrative of the nation<sup>39</sup>: a means of collective national identity that is discursively constructed by recounting past events, whether real or imagined, as well as the traditions and culture they are believed to preserve. The chapter explores a Right-Wing populist nuance for the nostalgic, and an image of *Heimat* that is both contemporary and anachronistic. It investigates the validity of a core feature of FPÖ belief: that Austrians all share deep roots in the past, and in order to be a 'real' Austrian one must personally identify with a specific version of the nation's history and subsequently apply those lessons to the present.

To achieve the above aim, the chapter examines the central role history has played in *Heimat* scholarship, comparing the FPÖ's adoration of the past with earlier examples of nineteenth century *Heimatgeschichte*. It explores the similarities between scholars' accounts of the *Heimathgeschichte* movement, and the use of history in the FPÖ's identity politics. This method of research is also applied to the FPÖ's penchant for Austrian mythology, with a thematic case study of the party's comic series. The chapter surveys the link made by the FPÖ between myth and *Heimat*, and how the party aims to define the Austrian human landscape by a discourse of indigeneity and exceptionalism that pushes foreign exclusion. The chapter investigates the similarities established by the FPÖ between myths and contemporary issues such as migration, the question of national identity, and domestic policy. This is investigated in conjunction with examples of the broader Right-Wing populist tendency to project the virtues of heroes onto their own politicians and supporters, thereby re-living and re-enacting the deeds of those that came before. Finally, the anachronistic retelling of a past masquerading as the present is examined with a particular study of the historical and mythic 'enemies' of the Austrian people, and whether the FPÖ use myth and history to resurrect *Feinbilder* and apply the image to contemporary migrant, asylum seeker, and minority groups.

Together, the chapters in this thesis present an overview of the individual sub-sections that merge to create the FPÖ's image of *Heimat*. The first sub-section, the physical landscape, is explored to discover which topographies typify the 'outer *Heimat*', how they affect national identity, and what relationship Austrians share with

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<sup>39</sup> Hall, Stuart. "The Question of Cultural Identity." *Modernity: An Introduction to Modern Societies*. Eds. Hall, Stuart, et al. Oxford: Blackwell, 1996. 595 - 634. Print. 613 – 15.

them. The chapters on language, history, and mythology explore the human landscape in the FPÖ's definition of *Heimat*, in order to discover which ethnocultures the party believes belong in Austria, as well as those that do not. The concept of *Heimat*, therefore, is deconstructed into core features that are used by the FPÖ in a discourse about belonging, national identity, and separatism. The thesis provides an important analysis of how Right-Wing populist parties continue to discursively construct identity narratives in the hope of restricting cultural pluralism and enforcing restricted identity politics as a countermeasure to prevent an increasingly globalised world.

## Chapter One

### Austrian national identity and the appropriation of *Heimat* related concepts

#### 1.0 – Introduction

2016 was a politically challenging year for Europe. The citizens of Western Europe in particular began to directly experience the consequences of war and upheaval in the Middle East, with Muslim migrant influxes to the European continent skyrocketing to result in a migration crisis not felt since the aftermath of World War Two.<sup>40</sup> The ‘open border’ policy perpetuated by Germany’s Angela Merkel, worsened by the lack of any clear strategy for integration, housing, or job opportunities for migrants, fueled the fires of Right-Wing populist antagonism towards the political establishment, and a growingly anxious European populace perceived those flames with empathy. By December 2016, the second round of presidential elections in Austria nearly saw the FPÖ’s candidate Norbert Hofer gain victory, narrowly losing to the independent candidate Alexander van der Bellen. Hofer campaign was largely focused on an anti-immigration, pro-nativist stance, encapsulated in the party’s 2016 slogan “Aufstehen für Österreich – Deine Heimat braucht dich jetzt.”<sup>41</sup> As with most of the FPÖ’s identity politics, the concept of *Heimat*, and the underlying discourse of what features typify the Austrian homeland, remained a dominant aspect of the party’s political strategy. Although Hofer was beaten, albeit by the narrowest of margins, a clear statement had been made in Austria and then delivered to the rest of the European Union and, indeed, the world. Right-Wing populism had struck a decisive blow to the political establishment in the West. The FPÖ’s identity politics, which refers to defence of the homeland, as well as the advocacy of indigeneity through nativist national identity discourses, has successfully resonated with a large percentage of Austrian voters, and, as a result, the concept of *Heimat* has returned to fore of political debate.

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<sup>40</sup> “Europe is facing the worst refugee crisis since World War II – and there’s no end in sight.” *Business Insider*. Reuters, 28 Aug. 2015. Web. 7 Jan. 2016.

<sup>41</sup> FPÖ. “Aufstehen für Österreich – Deine Heimat braucht dich jetzt.” *FPÖ*. FPÖ, 14 Mar. 2016. Web. 17 Jun. 2016.

### **1.1 - The FPÖ's *Heimat* strategy**

For the FPÖ, the term *Heimat* is favoured when the party describes traditional values and a sense of nativism, which in unison is argued to typify the Austrian national character. *Heimat* is used by the FPÖ as a point of reference with which to address the questions of Austrian character, identity, and place in the world. Indeed, identity and cultural factors consistently play a leading role in the political platform of the Austria's Right-Wing populist parties. For example, in the FPÖ's political programme, the party promotes itself as the defenders of a homogeneous Austrian cultural identity by initiating a return to 'traditional' Austrian values and a sense of *Heimat*.<sup>42</sup> The premise that the FPÖ seek to preserve *Heimat* and national identity suggests that these two abstractions are somehow under threat. The FPÖ places themselves in opposition to this alleged threat - the forces of cultural pluralism and globalisation, whose agents are seemingly responsible for the decline in national identity and autonomy. As a result, Austrian cultural identity is not only celebrated by the FPÖ, but also aggressively defended from the perceived encroaching identities of minorities and the spectre of a multicultural Austria and Europe at the expense of a 'native' Austrian homeland. *Heimat*, therefore, is used by the FPÖ as a reference point to questions of national identity, all of which are addressed specifically by the party through cultural and ethnic lenses.

The FPÖ's *Heimat* strategy has, more recently, been a powerful tool with which to criticise and critique the Austrian government and European Union's handling of the asylum seeker crisis. Since 2013, unprecedented asylum seeker numbers alongside migration patterns from the east and south of Europe have caused great problems. Due to instability in the Middle East and North Africa, millions of largely young Muslim men have been massing at Europe's borders in the hope of gaining asylum there. *Frontex*, the agency that promotes, coordinates, and develops European border management and strategy, claimed in a report from 2016 that 1,822,337 illegal immigrants were detected crossing European borders by the end of the previous year.<sup>43</sup> The report went on to conclude that the year 2015 "was marked

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<sup>42</sup> FPÖ. *Handbuch Freiheitlicher Politik*. Vienna: FPÖ Bildungsinstitut, 2013. Print. 31.

<sup>43</sup> Frontex. *Risk Analysis for 2016*. Warsaw: European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union, 2015. Print. 14.

by an unprecedented number of detections of illegal border-crossing between BCPs”, or ‘border crossing points’, “revealing a migration crisis without equivalent in Europe since World War II.”<sup>44</sup> Austria’s numbers were relatively low in comparison to other nations such as Germany and Sweden.<sup>45</sup> However Austria’s intake of asylum seekers reached some ninety thousand by the end of 2015, which led the government to declare a cap on the amount of migrants they would accept daily.<sup>46</sup>

The massive influx of foreign people to Austria and Europe provided an opportune moment for the FPÖ to make their move and assert their political agenda. Norbert Hofer, the FPÖ’s presidential candidate for 2016, ran a carefully designed campaign that focused primarily on anti-immigration messages directed at the prevailing European asylum seeker crisis. On his personal website Hofer urged Austrians to vote for him because he is the only one that will defend “unsere Bevölkerung sowie ihre Kultur, Werte, Traditionen und Sicherheit“ from “die neue Völkerwanderung.”<sup>47</sup> Hofer very nearly secured the presidency in 2016, and was narrowly defeated by the ex-leader of the Green party Dr. Alexander Van der Bellen, who is now a Far Left independent.<sup>48</sup> The FPÖ contested the narrow loss to the Constitutional Court by citing irregularities and evidence of voter fraud, leading to the result being overturned and a return to the ballot boxes.<sup>49</sup> Due to another narrow loss after the second round of voting, the FPÖ’s Norbert Hofer was eventually forced to concede the narrowest of defeats to Van der Bellen by October of 2016.<sup>50</sup> Despite Hofer’s loss, the close result clearly demonstrated the ascendancy of FPÖ, as well as the empathy many voters in Austria share for the party’s *Heimat* instead of multiculturalism message.

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<sup>44</sup> Frontex 14.

<sup>45</sup> Germany received 476,00 asylum claims in 2015 alone. See “Migration Crisis: Migration to Europe Explained in Seven Charts.” *BCC*. BBC, 4 Mar. 2016. Web. 7 Jun. 2016.

<sup>46</sup> “Migrant Crisis: Austria Sets Asylum Claim Cap and Transit Limit.” *BBC*. BBC, 17 Feb. 2016. Web. 7 Jun. 2016.

<sup>47</sup> Hofer, Norbert. “Meine Positionen.” *Norbert Hofer*. FPÖ, n.d. Web. 20 May 2016.

<sup>48</sup> Van der Bellen’s margin of victory was only 0.07%. See “Bundespräsidentenwahl 2016 – 2. Wahlgang – Gesamtergebnis inklusive Verlautbarung der Bundeswahlbehörde.” *Bundesministerium für Inneres*. Bundesministerium für Inneres, 2016. Web. 7 Jun. 2016.

<sup>49</sup> “Austrian presidential election result overturned and must be held again.” *The Guardian*. The Guardian. 1 Jul. 2016. Web. 1 Jan. 2016.

<sup>50</sup> “Austria Election: Far-Right candidate Norbert Hofer concedes defeat in presidential poll.” *ABC News*. ABC News, 5 Dec. 2016. Web. 5 Dec. 2016.

The irreconcilable differences between a traditional Austrian homeland and the threats caused by multiculturalism and ‘outsiders’ is seen most markedly in the political policies and slogans of the FPÖ under the party’s new leadership. In many slogans, the beloved ‘*Heimat*’ is praised in contrast to the evils of outlandish Islamic practices or the corruption of the European Union.<sup>51</sup> As will be explored further in subsequent chapters, the FPÖ’s semantic field of Islam is outlined by referring to the dangers of the growing number of Muslims in Austria: minarets as symbols of anti-European violence, the general violence displayed in the Koran with a particular emphasis on *Jihad*, religious freedom and its abuses by Muslims, and the threat posed to women’s rights.<sup>52</sup> Since ascending to the FPÖ leadership in 2005 after the exit of Jörg Haider to form the BZÖ, the media savvy Heinz-Christian Strache has successfully run a party platform in which he campaigns for the preservation Austrian identity from these perceived foreign threats. Strache’s FPÖ won 26% of the vote in 2010, and most interestingly was the most popular politician for voters under the age of 30.<sup>53</sup> His political approach is consistently constructed around an admiration for European cultural heritage, which must be defended at all costs from the *Überfremdung* – the feeling of being ‘overwhelmed’ by immigrants.<sup>54</sup> The *Heimat*, accordingly, represents all that must be defended from the threat of foreign dominance, which is identified in such events as non-European immigration fluctuations and political or economic globalism.

The term *Heimat*, then, is an important slogan in Austrian Right-Wing populist nomenclature. This thesis explores how this seemingly inconspicuous term has been transformed by the FPÖ to resemble a euphemism for nationalist parlance. Austria as *Heimat*, accordingly, will be shown to play an influential conceptual role in the renewed patriotic and nationalistic rhetoric that the parties exhibit.<sup>55</sup> In their party

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<sup>51</sup> For example, the FPÖ’s “Daham (*Heimat* in Austrian dialect) statt Islam” slogan of 2008 creates the duality of ‘us’ native Austrians and ‘our’ *Heimat* juxtaposed with the foreign and menacing specter of Islam. Islam, as a result, is described by the FPÖ as a foreign entity that cannot gain membership in the *Heimat*. See Krzyżanowski *From Anti-Immigration*, 141.

<sup>52</sup> Wodak *The Politics of Fear*, 144.

<sup>53</sup> Lattinger, Peter. “Grüne, Blaue bei Jungen stärker.” *Heute*. Heute, 27 Sept. 2010. Web. 4 Apr. 2011.

<sup>54</sup> Wodak *The Politics of Fear*, 144.

<sup>55</sup> Lamb-Faffelberger, Margarete. “Beyond “the Sound of Meliusic”: The Quest for Cultural Identity in Modern Austria.” *The German Quarterly* 76.3 (2003): 289 - 99. Print. 296.



literature, speeches, and interviews the FPÖ consistently refers to *Heimat* when describing the identity of Austrians and the characteristics of the Austrian nation.<sup>56</sup> It is a term that is often patriotically referred to in the context of the FPÖ's understanding of Austrian history, culture, the German language, national landscapes, and collective identity. The term dominates Austrian Right-Wing populist literature, speeches, and images, and is constantly brought to the fore by the parties as an example of their patriotism and zealotry for all things 'Austrian'. In an interview from 2013, the Strache explained his own personal definition of *Heimat* as the sacred ground from which native cultural identity flourishes:

Heimat ist, wo sich Menschen angenommen und geborgen fühlen. Heimat ist der Ort, den man mit seinen Liebsten in einer gemeinsamen Sprache, einer Kultur und einer Identität wahrnimmt. Ich halte es mit Johann Gottfried Herder: "Heimat ist da, wo man sich nicht erklären muss." Wir erleben heute ja oftmals, dass sich angestammte Österreicher in ihrem Land erklären müssen.<sup>57</sup>

In this extract Strache relates the sense of *Heimat* with a self-affirmation to remain 'Austrian' in one's own land. As this thesis will explore in subsequent chapters, for Strache, the features of *Heimat* are clearly derived from Austrian indigeneity and exceptionalism. It describes the individual and groups' relationship to the place where they are born and where a sense of self and collective identity is cultivated. For the FPÖ, *Heimat* is a cultural abstraction linked with a physical topography, and it is, as such, a unifying force that helps to describe and define the character of the people that dwell there.

Strache's definition of *Heimat*, however, is by no means novel. An emphasis on *Heimat* in the FPÖ's rhetoric arguably began to take prominence under the leadership of Jörg Haider, who during the 1990s chose to restrain overt pan-German statements in favour of a new form of Austrian nationalism. The spectacular rise of the FPÖ since then is largely attributed to the charisma and intellect of Haider. The

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<sup>56</sup> For example see FPÖ *Handbuch* 2013, 34.

<sup>57</sup> Kramar-Schmid, Ulla, and Michael Nikbakhsh. "H.C. Strache: Die Wunderbare Tradition des Wienerlieds." *Profil*. Profil, 3 Sep. 2013. Web. 10 Aug. 2015.

collective ideology of the FPÖ as a party, accordingly, became largely synonymous with Haider's personal ideas, which included populist opportunism alongside German nationalist traditions.<sup>58</sup> The distinct form of Austrian patriotism favoured by Haider was grounded in the 'sacred' notion of one's Austrian *Heimat*, while also effectively incorporating typical German cultural nationalist imagery.<sup>59</sup> Slogans such as "Heimat, Sicherheit, Arbeit" and "Heimat muss Heimat bleiben" were carefully juxtaposed alongside criticisms directed at presence of foreign groups, values, and culture in Austria, indicating that, for the FPÖ, *Heimat* must remain both culturally German as well as nationalistically 'Austrian'.<sup>60</sup>

Preserving the Austrian identity and way of life thus guides the FPÖ's *Heimatrhetorik*, alongside the implied (and often blatantly stated) opposition to cultural pluralism and multiculturalism. The use of the *Heimat* concept permits the FPÖ to celebrate their nation as both distinct and ancient, through a process of myth building that establishes a subjective view of national and cultural identity. In this chapter I analyse the discursive constructions that lay behind the FPÖ's use of the *Heimat* concept. It explores *Heimat* as a culturo-political abstraction, or a subjective national identity discourse, in which the FPÖ uses provincialism, traditionalism, and a fixed, geographically rooted identity of place symptomatic of typical *Heimat* concepts in order to establish its closed monocultural, monoethnic definition of the nation. As a term with long historical roots in German-speaking communities, however, there are many historical references to *Heimat* as a concept that require analysis. A greater understanding of the concept's efficacy throughout history, with a particular focus on the discursive construction of normative examples of national identity, will assist to illustrate *Heimat*'s persuasive influence in modern Right-Wing populist identity discourses.

## **1.2 – The meaning and historical use of term *Heimat***

As we have seen, the term *Heimat* features prominently in the FPÖ's national identity politics. When carefully applied, the concept of *Heimat* permits the party to

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<sup>58</sup> Judson, Pieter. "Austrian Non-Reception of a Reluctant Goldhagen." *The "Goldhagen Effect": History, Memory, Nazism - Facing the German Past*. Ed. Eley, Geoff. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2003. 131 - 49. Print. 137.

<sup>59</sup> Judson 138.

<sup>60</sup> Judson 138.

defend traditional Austrian values and identity while simultaneously providing the justification for the rejection of ideologies that sanction cultural pluralism and policies that facilitate multiculturalism. The effectiveness of the *Heimat* concept in identity narratives is a result of the term's long historical roots in the German-speaking world, where it functions as a model for self-identification and group belonging. The term *Heimat* stands at the very core of a moral and political dialogue about 'place, belonging, and identity' in Austria and Germany that is nearly two centuries old.<sup>61</sup> Traditionally speaking, *Heimat* is characterised by references to traditional social structures (family, kinship, culture) and the role of the land in collective identity formulas.<sup>62</sup> It is a term that is especially problematical to translate, defined around features that describe local and national identity, and sometimes referring to rather vague, geographically indefinite places, all of which were used to advocate various ideological positions. The mystery of the *Heimat* concept lies, furthermore, in the innocence of its etymological origins, which, when contrasted with the complexities of *Heimat* as a concept, demonstrates the development of a rather inconspicuous term into a cultural abstraction of profound moral and political importance in the German-speaking world.

### **1.2.1 – Early etymological origins and the *Heimatrecht* edict**

As a term denoting one's own home region, *Heimat* appears a rather ordinary concept, with a meaning that is inconspicuously neutral. In a more regressive sense, *Heimat* is the place where one was born, where one establishes his or her life, and realises a sense of self among family or friends.<sup>63</sup> Literal translations of the term *Heimat* include 'home', 'homeland', 'hometown', 'homestead', 'native region' (Lower Bavaria, Frankonia, Upper Swabia, Black Forest, Appenzell, etc.), as well as 'native country' (Germany, Austria, Lichtenstein or Switzerland).<sup>64</sup> Early etymological examples of *Heimat* support these more regressive translations.

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<sup>61</sup> Applegate 4 – 5.

<sup>62</sup> Pyrah, Robert. *The Burgtheater and Austrian Identity: Theatre and Cultural Politics in Vienna, 1918-38*. London: Legenda, 2007. Print. 11.

<sup>63</sup> Wüst, Sarah. "Young German Heimatfilm: Negotiations of a Powerful Myth." *Austausch* 1.1 (2011). Print. 77.

<sup>64</sup> Blickle, Peter. *Heimat: A Critical Theory of the German Idea of Homeland*. New York: Camden House, 2002. Print. X.

According to the Brothers Grimm, the term '*Heimat*' has been present in various German dialects since the 1500s.<sup>65</sup> Relating to a house, hometown, a landscape, a region or a country, *Heimat* is a term often used in a very inconspicuous manner and is frequently accepted as an unquestioned reality.<sup>66</sup> One's home, in other words, simply *is*, and therefore is identified neutrally, without supposedly requiring any investigative approach.

It is from this rather regressive definition of *Heimat* that certain practical laws and rights of domicile in Austria and Germany were derived. From the medieval period until the late 18th century, *Heimat* represented in a practical sense a property such as a regional farmstead (*Haus und Hof*) as well as a legal title (*Heimatrecht*), or the right of domicile.<sup>67</sup> The Bavarian *Heimatrecht* law of the 1820s formed the basis of an administrative effort to recognize the identity of Bavarian Germans and make that definition of citizenship uniform and all-inclusive by emphasising shared cultural factors.<sup>68</sup> During the Austrian First Republic, the principle of *Heimatrecht* provided those living within the German-speaking territories of Austria the basis for Austrian citizenship, as well as those outside German-speaking territories, who, provided they belonged to the same race and spoke the same language, could eventually take up residence in Austria.<sup>69</sup>

*Heimat*'s rather ordinary etymological origins and practical application in law, however, was to profoundly transform during the course of the nineteenth century. The dislocating experiences of nineteenth century European industrialisation, the rural to urban migrations (*Landflucht*), diaspora, the weakening of family and traditional

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<sup>65</sup> In the Brother's Grimm's 1854 *Deutsches Wörterbuch*, *Heimat* is defined as a German word for a land or region to which one belongs either by birth or through long established habitation, "das Land oder auch nur der landstrich, in dem man geboren ist oder bleibenden aufenthalt hat ... der geburtsort oder ständige wohnort" See Grimm, Jacob, and Wilhelm Grimm. *Deutsches Wörterbuch*. Munich: DTV, 1999. Print. 865. Originating from the gothic 'haims' and 'haimopli', the root of the High German *Heim* (home), *Heimat* also includes the meaning of *Ort* and *Dorf*, the place or village where one is established and lives. See for example Prahl, Eckhart. *Das Konzept "Heimat". Eine Studie Zu Deutschsprachigen Romanen Der 70er Jahre Unter Besonderer Berücksichtigung Der Werke Martin Walsers*. Ed. Europäische Hochschulschriften: Lang, 1993. Print. 11.

<sup>66</sup> Blickle 19.

<sup>67</sup> Korfkamp, Jens. *Die Erfindung der Heimat. Zu Geschichte, Gegenwart und politische Implikaten einer gesellschaftlichen Konstruktion*. Berlin: Logos, 2006. Print. 28.

<sup>68</sup> Applegate 8.

<sup>69</sup> Pyrah 13.

kinship arrangements, and the increasing political popularity of German cultural nationalism, all supplanted the regressive and straightforward dimensions of *Heimat* for more emotive connotations. It was due to the dislocating consequences of these political and societal upheavals that the ‘concrete’ dimension of *Heimat* was gradually replaced, as we shall now see, with more emotional resonances concerning native landscapes, self-positioning within groups, and the detailing of culturally ‘normative’ features of collective identity.

Notwithstanding the term’s complexities of meaning, archaic etymological examples provide some clues regarding *Heimat*’s deeper conceptual connotations. Peter Blickle identifies the amorphous nature of the *Heimat* concept in a variation in the fifteenth century spelling *Heinmut*, which appears as a compound noun for *Heimat* with two separate terms *Hein* (grove/forest) and *Mut* (courage).<sup>70</sup> This linguistic variation of *Heimat*, as will be further explained in Chapter Two, is an interesting example of the term’s capacity to represent more subjective ideas about place and identity. The compound noun *Heinmut* denotes a synthesis of the spatial forest with cultural attributes afforded members of a warrior society, both of which are enclosed within in a term for home. *Heinmut*, therefore, does not only describe home in an everyday sense, but is rather a term that discursively constructs the characteristics of that home, and, as a result, also distinguishes the identity of the people that live there. *Heimat* as a concept therefore transcends the geography the term supposedly describes, incorporating cultural constructs that function as discursive instruments for identity formation. It is from the fifteenth century spelling *Heinmut* that the term is seen to abandon its unremarkable classification in place of more abstract and emotive concepts of belonging.

### **1.3 - The *Heimat* concept**

As a concept, *Heimat* is difficult to define. Throughout history *Heimat* as a concept has been prescribed a wide spectrum of abstract meanings, and has had a vast array of applications in the social, moral, and political life of the German-speaking world. Consequently, *Heimat* as a concept is more difficult to define than regressive

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<sup>70</sup> Blickle X.

translations of the term afford. Johannes von Moltke, for example, explains that *Heimat* has come:

to accumulate so many meanings – ranging from the mundane to the religious, from the reactionary to the progressive, from the specific to the unimaginably vague – that it has become difficult to conceive a lexicon entry that could even begin to claim exhaustive treatment of its function.”<sup>71</sup>

Despite the large scholarship into the amorphous nature of the *Heimat* concept, existing research tends to focus primarily on either 1) an entirely German perspective, 2) works relating to the literary use of the term, or 3) the intersection of Austria as *Heimat* and 1930s German National Socialist ideology. For example, Celia Applegate (1990) provides valuable research into the use of *Heimat* for (national) identity formation by the nineteenth century historical *Vereine* in the Pfalz region of Germany. Alon Confino (1998) also presents a study of the nineteenth century German sense of *Heimat*, where *Heimat* enthusiasts tended to draw inspiration from local provincialisms in order to construct compendiums of a greater German national identity. However, it is generally agreed that the *Heimat* concept is linked both to material places and as well as with notions of identity, alterity, and self-positioning within or outside of a community.<sup>72</sup> Despite the ambiguous nature of the *Heimat* concept, certain features have endured throughout concept’s development since the nineteenth century. Although the sense of *Heimat* can differ from region to region, there are certain core attributes that unify the concept. The principal ‘sub-sections’ of *Heimat* together forge a uniformity that has power and influence over national identity through emotive cues that affect notions of belonging and self-positioning within a community.

### **1.3.1 - Nature and landscape**

The first feature that typified the sense of *Heimat* in both Austria and Germany was that of nature, which was seen as a place that embodied provinciality,

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<sup>71</sup> Moltke, Johannes Von. *No Place Like Home: Locations of Heimat in German Cinema*. London: University of California Press, 2005. Print. 8.

<sup>72</sup> Wüst 77.

parochialism, and picturesque folklore all encapsulated in a lifestyle that is traditional, hereditary, and in harmony with the natural world. Nature, as well the communities that lived within or alongside it, became a basic formative element from which all aspects of the *Heimat* imaginary were discursively constructed. Peter Blickle, for example, argues, “The beauty of nature is not only closely related to the idea of *Heimat* but is an integral aspect of it. *Heimat* has absorbed the beauty of nature and given it a geographical grounding.”<sup>73</sup> *Heimat* enthusiasts throughout Austria and Germany looked to their own natural environments as beautiful national landscapes, with topographies so rich with beauty as to leave its audience in awe. Confino, for example, cites the *Heimat* enthusiasts of Württemberg in Germany tendency to treat nature with a sense of “poeticalness and practicality”: a natural place that was cherished for its timelessness, its beauty, the emotive passion it inspired, while simultaneously preserved for its usefulness in the areas of nature tourism and a source of local profit.<sup>74</sup> *Heimat*’s appreciation for local and national nature, however, was not confined to scientific analysis or economic advantages. Nature, rather, remained for *Heimat* enthusiasts a cultural landscape, complete with epic beauty and the collective memories of local communities, and was, significantly, always distinguished from the nature found in other parts of the world.<sup>75</sup> Nature, as a result, became synonymous in the *Heimat* imaginary with a sense of local distinctiveness, and its lakes, rivers, forests, and mountains became the native place where social groups could assert their own identity. It was through the *Heimat* imaginary that communities departed from the confines of the city and returned to nature, and in doing so the extraneousness of the collective being to nature was diminished, or at best, refuted.<sup>76</sup>

While Germany set the standard for *Heimat* enthusiasts during the nineteenth century, similar developments were also taking place in Austria. Authors of the Austrian *Heimatroman*, for example, sought to describe Austrian identity and *Heimat* through the pastoral idealism of the surrounding countryside. The celebration of pastoral settings and communities in *Heimatroman* tended to illustrate agrarian scenes

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<sup>73</sup> Blickle 122.

<sup>74</sup> Confino, Alon. *The Nation as a Local Metaphor: Württemberg, Imperial Germany, and National Memory, 1871-1918*. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1997. Print. 108.

<sup>75</sup> Confino, *The Nation* 114.

<sup>76</sup> Confino, *The Nation* 112 – 113.

as a ‘transitory ground’ that connected a community to nature, by describing that relationship as harmonious and interdependent. In contrast to the urbanisation brought forth by modernity, *Heimaromanen* depicted ‘home’ in a distinctly provincial and nature-orientated way.<sup>77</sup> While the city tended to represent cosmopolitanism, alienation, and lack of identity, the countryside provided a wealth of heritage, community, and tradition. Recognising the endearing magnetism nature evoked in the collective psyche of their readers, authors of the Austrian *Heimatroman* such as Ludwig Azengruber (1839 – 1889) and Peter Rosegger (1843 – 1918) constructed images of *Heimat* by describing home in a way that celebrated nature, agrarian communities, and provincial life. In their works the protagonists lived in, or at least always returned to, the hospitality of communities that were forever pastoral and largely characterised, accordingly, by a sense of rootedness and tradition.<sup>78</sup> The parochialisms of a provincial life represented a rather conservative definition of home in the *Heimatroman*, which tended to describe natural agrarian communities as favourable to modern urbanisation and austere city landscapes.<sup>79</sup> Rather than the facelessness and disorientated sense of place that dominated city or industrial landscapes, community was believed to flourish in natural and rural settings where the close proximity to nature demonstrated a sense of unity and harmony. *Heimat* was described by alluding to the distinct attraction one felt for the natural way of life pastoral communities embodied. *Heimat* returned its participants to the ‘good old days’, encouraging members to empathise with natural landscapes and to one another, via the revalidation (and in many cases restoration) of the anachronisms typical of a simple, provincial life encapsulated in bygone days. Nature allowed *Heimat* enthusiasts to preserve and relive ‘what once was’, to recapture the original meaning of home, and perhaps, as a result, reinstate traditional modes of identity to a modern, more complicated age.

The *Heimat* imaginary’s enthusiasm for nature during the nineteenth century coincided with the creation of nature organisations that sought to preserve natural environments and traditional aesthetics. This is seen, for example, in *Bund*

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<sup>77</sup> Pyrah 13.

<sup>78</sup> Long, J. J. "Austrian Prose Fiction, 1945 - 2000." *A History of Austrian Literature 1918 - 2000*. Eds. Kohl, Katrin Maria and Ritchie Robertson. New York: Camden House, 2006. 223 - 47. Print. 226.

<sup>79</sup> Long 226.



*Heimatschutz*, or ‘The League for Homeland Protection’, a German national citizens group founded in 1904, whose members avidly campaigned against the degraded and austere modern landscape. The aim of the group was outlined in its foundational charter, where it is said to stand for “protecting the natural and historically developed uniqueness of the German homeland.”<sup>80</sup> In many cases, the *Heimatschutz* sought to preserve the landscapes of *Heimat* as features of national identity, thus creating an ideological link between *Heimat*, nationalism, and environmentalism. For example, the founder of the *Bund Heimatschutz*, Paul Schultze-Naumberg (1869 – 1949) used the organisation to merge environmental preservation and nature adoration with strong nationalistic overtures.<sup>81</sup> Regional landscapes, as a result, began to unify as an example of the interconnectedness of localities to the greater national entity.

It did not take long for the synthesis of local patriotism, nationalism, and nature adoration to also take hold in the Austrian *Heimat* movement. In 1904, for example, the magazine *Hohe Warte* began to publish articles and photographs showcasing Austrian nature and countryside alongside nationalistic approaches towards what ‘constitutes’ *Heimat* in Austria.<sup>82</sup> Just as in Germany, the Austrian *Heimatschutz* began to advocate for the preservation of the natural topographies of *Heimat* while also connecting regional identity to the national level. In 1914, for example, the *österreichischer Heimatschutzvereine* brought the individual *Vereine* from Niederösterreich, Oberösterreich, Salzburg, Steiermark and Tirol together in order to celebrate regional natural landscapes and cultures as examples of the combined Austrian nation and *Heimat*.<sup>83</sup> Used within this local and national context, *Heimat* nature illuminated a kinship between community, nature, province, and homeland.

As we shall now explore, the sense of community and belonging that nature and pastoralism helped to facilitate in the *Heimat* imaginary would prove efficacious in discursive constructions of national identity throughout the German-speaking

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<sup>80</sup> Rollins, William H. *A Greener Vision of Home: Cultural Politics and Environmental Reform in the German Heimatschutz Movement, 1904 - 1918*. Michigan: The University of Michigan Press, 1997. Print. 3.

<sup>81</sup> Grancy, Antje Senarcles de. *"Moderner Stil" und "Heimisches Bauen": Architekturreform in Graz Um 1900*. Wien: Böhlau 2001. Print. 35.

<sup>82</sup> Grancy 35.

<sup>83</sup> Grancy 35.

world. Nature was immediate, real, and tangible, and was therefore a convenient means with which to summon sentiments of local and national belonging. Local nature provided ease and security to the national image through images and descriptions of the mountains, forests, and agrarian valleys that collectively belonged to the people: a national topography over which one could boast ownership. Nature therefore, ceased to be a foreign wilderness, and rather was used to describe the intimacy between social groups and place. The focus on the regional and natural landscapes that housed traditional communities, afforded *Heimat* a new socio-political dimension: a means of manipulating a national consciousness through the amalgamation of indigenous history and ethnographic features.

### **1.3.2 –Local provincialism as national identity**

The use of the *Heimat* concept to cultivate a sense of national consciousness began during the nineteenth century. It has been well documented in previous studies that the evolution of the *Heimat* concept during the nineteenth century followed the shifting allegiances of belonging from a hometown (or region) to a nation, thus gaining a nationalistic, political dimension.<sup>84</sup> Applegate provides a valuable case study for this in the context of Germany, describing how the renewed interest in provincial culture (such as histories, dialects, songs, and various other ‘qualities’ of the locale) resulted in the emergence of *Heimatbestrebungen* that sought to provide a mythology and character for the new German nation.<sup>85</sup> Applegate, however, concludes that the overwhelming presence of local identities in the *Heimat* concept demonstrates that the movement was, in essence, a local, regional one, and not entirely a national phenomenon.<sup>86</sup> However, the persistent appropriation of local identities in order to facilitate a greater ‘German’ national consciousness in the *Heimat* movement leads to the assumption that the *Heimat* idea became largely synonymous with national identity.<sup>87</sup> *Heimat* thus became more analogous to a ‘national myth’, and a means with which to establish national identity formulas in addition to regional allegiances.

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<sup>84</sup> Applegate 13.

<sup>85</sup> Applegate 13.

<sup>86</sup> Applegate 106 – 7.

<sup>87</sup> Confino *The Nation*, 188.

Despite the tendency of scholarship to focus on the development of the *Heimat* concept in a German context, the term's usage in national identity discourse does find manifestations in Austria as well. For example, in his study *Kulturraum Österreich: die Identität der Regionen in der bildenden Kunst des 19. Jahrhunderts* Werner Telesko notes developments in Austria that are markedly similar to Germany, where a prevailing *Denkart* tended to characterise *Heimat* as a concept that emphasised both the regional (in this case the surrounds of Salzburg) and the national aspects of heritage, culture, and identity.<sup>88</sup> Robert Pyrah also shows that the *Heimat* concept in Austria from the nineteenth century could represent a collective empathy for local regions such as Tyrol, as well as all the way to national levels of self-identification.<sup>89</sup> The concept differed from Germany, however, in that the use of *Heimat* in Austria constantly encountered the difficulty of defining a new homeland following the collapse of the Habsburg Empire. The loss of former territories, the dissolution of the 'Danubian Federation', and the subsequent emergence of a more homogeneous ethnic character to *Heimat Österreich* post 1918, largely characterised by the Western German-speaking territories of *Cisleithania*, together demonstrated the predicament of describing a clear, and continual, example of the Austrian *Heimat*.<sup>90</sup> Despite these conflicting historical differences, we can nonetheless assert with some confidence that from the nineteenth century onwards the concept of *Heimat* came to represent 'home' on both a regional and national level in Austria as well as Germany. Although *Heimat* can refer to anything from a local village to an entire nation, the concept does not describe the specifics of any given place alone, but rather is much more a concept of a group or individual 'belonging somewhere'. The architects of the *Heimat* concept expanded upon the notion of belonging by describing the ethnography of the people who had dwelt within the land for centuries, looking toward history as the inspiration with which to construct national myths pertaining to both populations and place.

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<sup>88</sup> Telesko, Werner. *Kulturraum Österreich: Die Identität der Regionen in der bildenden Kunst des 19. Jahrhunderts*. Wien: Böhlau Verlag, 2008. Print. 267.

<sup>89</sup> Pyrah 12.

<sup>90</sup> Pyrah 12.

### **1.3.3 - History and ethnography**

At the end of the nineteenth century, local communities throughout the German-speaking world began to publish a new style of book that documented regional identity. These *Heimatbücher* contained popularised local histories, all of which were recorded in an effort to preserve the character of the community through the recounting of a region's past. Consistent with the *Heimat* idea's affection for agrarian and natural settings, *Heimatbücher* were characterised by nature adoration, local genealogies, and histories. *Ortsgeschichte*, or local history, an earlier genre written by schoolteachers and priests from around 1819, greatly influenced the style and content of *Heimatbücher*, transmitting to the new literary field its focus on local nature and history.<sup>91</sup> *Heimatbücher*, however, expanded upon the themes seen in *Ortsgeschichte*, including, for example, the history and times of Germanic tribes to the present (thereby establishing a link with antiquity), catalogues of regional nature, geography, plants, and animals, and expositions of antiquated lifestyle through examples of tradition and customs.<sup>92</sup>

The preservation and documentation of regional history during the nineteenth century helped to distinguish local identities. *Heimat*, as a result, was described in these historical compendiums in a very immediate and native way. The political era of pan-Germanism had only begun to awaken, and the *Heimat* concept, while still in its infancy, was therefore limited to histories describing proximate homelands only, and not any greater German cultural territory. In Austria, for example, Joseph Fink and Hippolyt von Klenze's '*Der Mittelberg: Geschichte, Landes und Volkskunde des ehemaligen gleichnamigen Gerichtes*' (1891), and the very first *Wälder Heimatbuch* '*Au im Bregenzerwald*' by the priest Joseph Hiller in 1890, presented the local history of the mountainous Vorarlberg region as an example of Austrian regional distinctiveness. Local priests or schoolteachers, who were seen as the authority for the transmission of community history, usually authored *Heimatbücher*, and, unlike scholarly texts, were clearly written and well-illustrated publications destined for school curriculum or the family home.<sup>93</sup>

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<sup>91</sup> Confino *The Nation*, 101.

<sup>92</sup> Confino *The Nation*, 101.

<sup>93</sup> Confino *The Nation*, 101.

By the twentieth century *Heimatbücher* had become an established literary style. The ‘*Wiener Heimatbücher*’ series openly made use of the term in its title, and was released as individual compendiums of local history pertaining to Vienna’s various *Gemeindebezirke*.<sup>94</sup> The distinct history reserved for each *Gemeindebezirke*, simultaneously assembled as a greater historical Viennese narrative, is further evidence of the close synergy placed between local and national identity discourses in the *Heimat* concept, albeit within the context of Austria’s ancient imperial capital. The authors of *Heimatbücher* presided over the reawakening of older times, by providing conceivable and therefore popular accounts of the past that were all but stripped of academic banality. *Heimat* history was therefore not a logical or theoretical account of the past, but rather a living and vivid account of the legacy left by the ancestors, and the identity this heritage imparts. *Heimat* history, in particular, looked toward the past for political, cultural, and existential reassurances of distinctiveness and meaning in a present age of national homogenisation.<sup>95</sup> The individual histories of the Viennese *Gemeindebezirke*, accordingly, coalesced to provide its audience with a grand narrative pertaining to the exceptionalism of Viennese history and identity, and presented evidence that while the political uncertainties of the twentieth century were transforming Austria and much of Europe, local identities remained the very foundation of the nation’s collective identity narrative.

Having successfully attracted audiences to the preservation of natural landscapes, while also simultaneously writing compendiums of local history, *Heimat* enthusiasts then set about the aim of evoking ethnographic consciousness. A detailed presentation of local communities’ culture and customs, sourced largely from folkloric data, provided the stimulus from which to generate *Heimat* ethnography. *Heimat* ethnography was practiced by academic and non-academic circles, all of which, together, dutifully collected, catalogued, studied, displayed, promoted, and, indeed, invented folk traditions.<sup>96</sup> The results of their ethnographic research provided the *Heimat* concept with an important human presence. The folkloric studies

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<sup>94</sup> For example see Aichhorn, et al. *Wiener Heimatbücher: die Wieden*. Vol. 4. Vienna: Gerlach & Wiedling, 1913. Print.

<sup>95</sup> Confino *The Nation*, 103.

<sup>96</sup> Confino *The Nation*, 115.

undertaken by the *Heimat* movement cultivated traditional customs, values, and lifestyles to communities in a very personal way. Developing collective ethnographic awareness through folklore was structured largely around the goal of developing a culture that was rooted in the people, with *Heimat* as the centre point from which all was derived and cultivated.<sup>97</sup> Individual social groups could take great pleasure in a sense of ownership over these stories, and subsequently laude them as chronicles to their distinctiveness. Through the preservation and, indeed, adoration of folklore, *Heimat* enthusiasts could describe where their local communities had lived, as well as how they lived and thought throughout an extended temporal continuum.<sup>98</sup>

In Germany, for example, *Heimat* became a way to celebrate provincialism and nationalism through the conservation of language, folklore, history, traditions, and all things that were believed to characterise local and national identity.<sup>99</sup> Nineteenth century *Heimatkundler*, and the more general *Heimatsbewegungen*, provided both the local and national community compilations of folk culture that extolled the virtues of local customs that were ascribed to a greater national image.<sup>100</sup> From the nineteenth century, Austrian *Heimat* enthusiasts also attempted to diminish the divide between nationalist territorial claims and the identities of local villages by showcasing local histories, culture, geography, and language as characteristic of the Austrian *Heimat*.<sup>101</sup> The *Verein für Volkskunde* was established 1894 in order to further explore Austrian folk culture through the lens of historical anthropology, and *Museum für Volkskunde* opened a year later to showcase the results of such ethnographic research to the public.<sup>102</sup> The field of *Volkskunde* (folkloric studies or anthropology) is attributed to the German Wilhelm Heinrich Riehl (1823 – 1897), who wrote numerous works on Germanic folklore, culture, and history in order to

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<sup>97</sup> Manz, Carl von, Alois Mitterwieser, and Hans Ziess. *Heimatarbeit und Heimatforschung*. Kösel and Pustet, 1927. Print. 74.

<sup>98</sup> Confino *The Nation*, 115.

<sup>99</sup> Applegate 59.

<sup>100</sup> Moltke 7.

<sup>101</sup> Zahra, Tara. "The Borderland in the Child: National Hermaphroditism and Pedagogical Activism in the Bohemian Lands." *Localism, Landscape, and the Ambiguities of Place: German-Speaking Central Europe, 1860 - 1930*. Eds. Blackbourn, David and James N. Retallack. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007. 214 - 35. Print. 216.

<sup>102</sup> Stewart, Jane. "Popular Culture in Austria: Cabaret and Film, 1918 - 45." *A History of Austrian Literature 1918 - 2000*. Eds. Kohl, Katrin Maria and Ritchie Robertson. Rochester: Camden House, 2006. 87 - 106. Print. 87.

illuminate the ‘German social essence’ as a model for the state.<sup>103</sup> From its very inception then, *Volkskunde* sought to use ethnographic data as a design for collective national identity, with *Heimat* as its focal point. In Austria, *Heimat* ethnography also attempted to capture the ‘essence’ of the populace through an exploration of culture and folklore. *Die österreichische Zeitschrift für Volkskunde* (1895), for example, included articles by Richard von Kralik titled *Zur österreichischen Sagenkunde* and Alois Riegl’s *Der Volksmäßige und die Gegenwart*.<sup>104</sup> The purpose of the articles was to highlight the distinctiveness of the Austrian character through the paradigm of folklore.

Rather than research that was motivated by a pan-Germanist agenda, however, Austrian *Heimat* ethnography was principally an exercise in recording and cultivating the folk culture of the Habsburg Monarchy, which, due to the urbanisation of late nineteenth century Central and Western Europe, was sourced largely from the influx of peoples from the Austrian countryside as they moved toward the cities.<sup>105</sup> *Heimat* folklore in Austria thus integrated many local traditions into a distinctly Austrian narrative. Austrian ethnography, through the many references to the folk culture and traditions of the Habsburg past, became a popular patrimony that connected generations of Austrians together in a long continuum. *Heimat* ethnography epitomised the *Volkscharacter* of Austrians, reconciling regional identities into a conceivable whole that was epitomized through legends, dialects, costume, food, dances, values, and traditions. A proclivity for that which is inherited, however, could easily be utilised in an agenda that impelled biologically derived notions of *Heimat*. The pan-Germanic racism that would develop in Germany and Austria by the twentieth century would transform the *Heimat* concept into a platform with which to promote *völkisch* nationalism, Aryanism, and the politics of National Socialism.

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<sup>103</sup> Applegate 35.

<sup>104</sup> Kralik, Richard von.. “Zur österreichischen Sagenkunde I-III.” *Österreichische Zeitschrift für Volkskunde* 1 (1895). 7 – 9, 111 – 17, 204 – 216; in the same volume, Alois Riegl. “Der Volksmäßige und die Gegenwart.” 4 – 9.

<sup>105</sup> Stewart 87.

#### **1.3.4 - The biologically derived homeland: *Heimat*, racism, and National Socialism**

The FPÖ's tendency to use the *Heimat* concept as a point of reference in a discourse that antagonistically contrasts a genuine Austrian national 'in' group with foreign 'outsider' groups has led to numerous accusations of xenophobia leveled against the party. Due to the party's additional intransigent rejection of multiculturalism, the FPÖ's use of *Heimat* is interpreted in some corners as a racially inimical platform. Jack Malone, for example, argues that the FPÖ's frequent use of *Heimat* alongside discourse that is antagonistic towards the Islamic community of Austria indicates that the term is being used by the party to encourage nationalistic fervor that can also, directly or indirectly, lead to manifestations of racism.<sup>106</sup> The FPÖ's *Heimat* discourse has even been indicted elsewhere for allegedly exhibiting National Socialist undertones. Wodak and Reisigl, for example, argue that the FPÖ's *Heimat* discourse is a direct and calculated appeal to Conservative Austrians, which, when persuasively applied, harkens the sympathetic ear back to a time before and even during the Nazi era, and is therefore much more evocative than the notion of 'nation' or state'.<sup>107</sup>

While the FPÖ makes its anti-immigration platform abundantly clear, there is also a certain stigma surrounding the term *Heimat* that is a result of the concept's role in the development of aggressive ethnocentric nationalism and National Socialism in Central Europe during the late and early twentieth centuries. The historical usage of the term *Heimat* as a means of manipulating a sense of national consciousness proved to be very expedient during the reign of the National Socialists. Although Nazism would merge concepts of *Heimat* with racism and a biologically derived notion of homeland, the concept's previous proclivity towards ethnographic data as collective identity, all of which was connected to a specific territory, allowed for easy manipulation under National Socialism. The origins of the 'racist' taboo associated with the concept of *Heimat* lies in the rise of German *völkisch* nationalism, which

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<sup>106</sup> Malone, John. "Examining the Rise of Right Wing Populist Parties in Western Europe." Saint John's University, 2014. Print. 37.

<sup>107</sup> Reisigl, Martin, and Ruth Wodak. *Discourse and Discrimination: Rhetorics of Racism and Antisemitism*. London: Routledge, 2001. Print. 155.



begun in the nineteenth century but reached its zenith during the twentieth century.<sup>108</sup> By the early twentieth century, this rising tide of German cultural nationalism in Central Europe began to influence the philosophy and politics of the *Heimat* movement in Austria. Although the favored narrative that celebrated the history of the Habsburgs remained present, the popular notion of a pure, autochthonous, and interrelated Germanic history, culture, and identity began to grow. Austrian *Heimatschützer* joined their German counterparts in their emphasis on a collective return of the people to their “heimische” or “bodenständige” traditions, which were encapsulated in both the local and national histories.<sup>109</sup> The traditions that informed the *Heimat* concept, however, increasingly began to be understood as examples of an Austria that, by the nature of the nation’s Germanic heritage, belonged within the German cultural community.<sup>110</sup> The defeat of the Habsburgs in World War I, the radically more homogeneous ethnic makeup of the westerly German speaking territories known as *Cisleithania*, and the loss of more ethnically and culturally diverse territory to the east, all led to a more vigorous debate around the possibility of *Anschluss* with Germany.<sup>111</sup>

In the debate surrounding a political union with Germany, it was the commonality of culture and ethnicity between Germans and Austrians, assisted by growing *völkisch* attitudes within the *Heimat* movement and contiguous politico-cultural groups, which proved to be the most persuasive. In an essay from 1919, for example, Robert Musil (1880 – 1942), a philosophical writer born in the Austrian city of Klagenfurt, declared that a ‘mystic’ and ‘spiritual’ union existed between the two nations on the basis of linguistic and ethnic kinship.<sup>112</sup> The only logical conclusion for many Austrians who prescribed to *völkisch* interpretations of *Heimat* was that a political union should follow suit. The rising political power of Germany, and the growing will of many Austrians to join with her on the basis of common ethnoculture, demonstrated a profound ambiguity within the twentieth century *Heimat* narrative: the

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<sup>108</sup> Moltke 54.

<sup>109</sup> Grancy, 36 – 37.

<sup>110</sup> Pyrah 11.

<sup>111</sup> Pyrah 12.

<sup>112</sup> Musil, Robert. "Der Anschluss an Deutschland, VIII: Essays." *Gesammelte Werke*. Ed. Frise, Adolf. Vol. 9. Hamburg: Reinbek bei Hamburg. 1033 - 42. Print.

sense of belonging to both an Austrian homeland and to the German *Volk*. Austrian *Heimat* ethnography, while undoubtedly maintaining a distinctly local Austrian character, had nonetheless drawn the population closer to their Germanic cultural roots. The preoccupation with the history and cultural identity of the *Volk* demonstrated that, from its very beginnings, the *Heimat* concept was appropriate for manipulation by the advocates of ethnocentric nationalism. With the rise of *völkisch* nationalism and the success of Adolf Hitler's Nazi party, the Austrian sense of *Heimat*, identity, would be transformed to suit the propaganda of the NSDAP. The local autonomy of the *Heimat*, as a result, would all but disintegrate under the weight of the prevailing pan-Germanic narrative that would characterize early twentieth century Central Europe.

Like so many other aspects of German-speaking cultural life, the *Heimat* concept was wholly manipulated and transformed under National Socialism to represent the will and ideology of the Nazi regime. So total was the Nazi conquest and control over cultural abstractions such as *Heimat*, that, as Michael Giesler argues, "National Socialism was the greatest movement toward the destruction of 'Heimat' in German history."<sup>113</sup> The ruin of the original *Heimat* concept lay in its total conversion into a political creed that proclaimed ethnic superiority, segregation, and racist political violence. National Socialism achieved the disfigurement of the *Heimat* concept by dominating descriptions of the homeland through references to race, blood, and biology. In the National Socialist interpretation of *Heimat*, the concept became linked with an aggressive form of *völkisch* cultural nationalism.<sup>114</sup> *Heimat* therefore came to be synonymous with *völkisch* concepts of race and territory. The

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<sup>113</sup>Geisler, Michael. "'Heimat' and the German Left: The Anamnesis of Trauma." *New German Critique* 36 (1985): 25 - 66. Print. 59.

<sup>114</sup> The racial emphasis on *Volk* in twentieth century *Heimat* conceptions can be traced to German *völkisch* cultural nationalism, which preceded the ideology of National Socialism. While *Heimat* enthusiasts had originally celebrated provincial lifestyle and community, aggressive *völkisch* nationalism took these 'virtues' and repackaged them as Germanness in an effort to glorify the 'superiority' of Germanic identity. In late Wilhelmine Germany, the principle feature of *völkisch* writers and groups was the study and veneration of Germanic antiquity. See Mees, Bernard. "Hitler and Germanentum." *Journal of Contemporary History* 39.2 (2004). Print. 256. The preoccupation with the *Volk*, which found its origins in the German *Sturm und Drang* movement, led to the belief that the collective identity of all Germans could be found in the cultural heritage they shared. See Goodrick-Clarke. *The Occult Roots of Nazism*. London: Tauris Parke, 2004. Print. 3.

National Socialist *Blut und Boden* policy defined *Heimat* as “rootedness that has been transformed into feeling and spirit. Through the sense of *Heimat*, the individual, the family, and the group are tied together by fate to a piece of land that dominates their soul.”<sup>115</sup> The policy of *Blut und Boden* was developed by the *Reichminister* for Food and Agriculture Richard Walther Darré (1895 – 1953), an Argentine-born German and dedicated member of *völkisch* groups in his youth. In Darré’s ideology, *Blut*, as blood, stands for his *völkisch* racial theories and biological-nationalism, and *Boden*, as soil, for all his notions on agriculture.<sup>116</sup> As a result, the combination of blood and soil in National Socialist *Heimat* discourse led to the exile or murder of those that were believed to not belong to the land. By linking the identity of the land with biologically derived *völkisch* notions of race, *Heimat* stood as the murderous campaign against anyone who was deemed “un-German.”<sup>117</sup>

By the turn of the century, German *völkisch* poet Adolf Bartels’s definition of (1862 – 1945) *Heimat* as a membership to the Germanic racial group, thus excluding other ethnicities, was largely accepted.<sup>118</sup> The principles of *völkisch* German nationalism, and the distortion of *Heimat* as a biologically derived notion of society and state, achieved a dominant intellectual and political position in the National Socialist dictatorship. As Johannes von Moltke explains, it was *völkisch* antagonism toward the homogenizing forces of modernity, which led authors and participants of the *völkisch* movement to see themselves as disgruntled cultural elites, which subsequently helped pave the way for National Socialism.<sup>119</sup> While *völkisch* nationalism had influenced the politics of Hitler, the Nazi party entirely usurped *Heimat* to encourage patriotism and racism. By the time Nazi control in both political and academic circles was absolute, *Heimat* had lost its autonomy, becoming just another word in the party’s lexicon to promote the central themes of race, blood, and German destiny.<sup>120</sup> For this reason modern scholarly tradition often attempts to link the discourse of *Heimat* with the National Socialist ideology of biological-cultural

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<sup>115</sup> As cited in Moltke 56.

<sup>116</sup> Lovin, Clifford R. "Blut Und Boden: The Ideological Basis of the Nazi Agricultural Program." *Journal of the History of Ideas* 28.2 (1967): 279 - 88. Print. 282.

<sup>117</sup> Kaes, Anton. *From Hitler to Heimat: The Return of History as Film*. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1989. Print. 166.

<sup>118</sup> Pyrah 14.

<sup>119</sup> Moltke 53.

<sup>120</sup> Applegate 19.

nationalism.<sup>121</sup> For example, the *Heimatschutz* organisation, with its environmental planning and activism alongside vague association with cultural mysticism, has been consistently argued to be a prelude to Nazi *Blut und Boden* policies, and thus labelled ‘crypto-fascist’.<sup>122</sup> However as with many ideas and institutions under Nazi dictatorship, the meaning and direction of *Heimat* groups was largely transformed, or hijacked, to suit the narrative of the party. It is generally agreed that the Nazi *Blut und Boden* ideology benefited from the strength of pre-existing rural traditions and provincial identities<sup>123</sup>, preserved, for example, by the numerous *Heimat* and *völkisch* organisations.

For all their talk about *Heimat*, race and roots, localism was anathema to the regime, which consolidated its power by advocating national policy.<sup>124</sup> For example, the four-volume Nazi textbook *Deutsches Volk, deutsche Heimat* of 1935 provides a natural history of Germany from the primordial and mythic *Urdeutschland*, to the contemporary return of Germanic superiority embodied in the Nazi regime. The historiographical theorem implicit in *Deutsches Volk, deutsche Heimat* defines the German *Volk* as “the unity of blood, language, will and fate” and *Heimat* as “the unity of the soil that has been shaped by the work of the people and is populated entirely or predominantly by this people.”<sup>125</sup> While *Heimat* enthusiasts had originally focused on regional identity, under National Socialism *Heimat* is consistently seen as a reference to nation and *Volk*.<sup>126</sup> *Heimat* was consumed into the Nazi revolutionary totality, a synthesis of blood and soil, and a mythic ethnogenesis culminating in Nazi ascendancy and political dominance. In the conclusion to *Deutsches Volk, deutsche*

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<sup>121</sup> Koshar, Rudy. "The Antinomies of Heimat: Homeland, History, Nazism." *Heimat, Nation, Fatherland: The German Sense of Belonging*. Eds. Hermand, Jost and James Steakley. Oxford: Peter Lang, 1997. Print. 113.

<sup>122</sup> Rollins 15.

<sup>123</sup> Bramwell, Anna. *Blood and Soil: Richard Walther Darré and Hitler's "Green Party"*. London: Kensal Press, 1985. Print. 8.

<sup>124</sup> Moltke 54.

<sup>125</sup> See Schemm, Hans. *Deutsches Volk - Deutsche Heimat*. Munich: Deutscher Volksverlag, 1935. Print.

<sup>126</sup> In the National Socialist worldview, the German people shared a ‘mystical’ relationship with nature, which resulted in an organically grown community and nation (*Volksgemeinschaft*). See Lee, Robert G., and Sabine Wilke. "Forest as Volk: Ewiger Wald and the Religion of Nature in the Third Reich." *Journal of Social and Ecological Boundaries* 1.1 (2005): 24 - 46. Print. 25.

*Heimat*, it states “National Socialism is a march into Heimat”, and that “only a people’s revolution that seized all aspects of life and initiated the march into Heimat, to a renewed unity of blood and soil, could preserve the one thing that gives any politics it sense and goal: the life of the German people.”<sup>127</sup> Through works like *Deutsches Volk, deutsche Heimat*, the Nazis transformed *Heimat* into a *völkisch* national entity that entirely suited their social-biological principles. Adolf Hitler’s failure to secure victory in Europe, and the subsequent abandonment of his party’s ethnocentric, pan-Germanic principles, essentially permitted the *Heimat* concept to reset itself. The *Heimat* concept in Austria, like the nation’s own government, was now free to look once more to its own landscapes, history, and distinct culture as a means of inspiration.

#### **1.4 - Austrian national identity in the Second Republic**

With the defeat of Nazism in Europe, and with it any political or academic musings on pan-Germanism, the Second Republic of Austria attempted to put the pieces of its *Heimat* back together. As we have seen, the concept of *Heimat* had up until the Third Reich been increasingly used to illustrate Germanness as a discourse of identity through cultural or biological perspectives. However, thanks to the Allies decree that Austria was, despite considerable evidence to the contrary, the first victim of Hitler’s aggression, the Austrian nation was at liberty to unburden itself of the ‘ghosts’ of the Third Reich, and return to their cultural cities, rural topographies, and mountainous *Heimat*. This meant that *Heimat* in post-war Austria would become a place in which to forget, feel renewed pride, and to retreat into the peaceful tranquillity of the mountain landscape. This modern Austrian *Heimat* was seen from the Second Republic as a one-thousand-year old country with a unique history and cultural traditions, all of which developed in naturally beautiful landscapes.<sup>128</sup> Patriotism and a sense of a distinct collective history were gained through focussing on the great era of the Habsburgs. The legacy of this powerful European dynasty allowed Austria to distance itself from the failed national concepts of *Kultur-* and *Sprachnation* endemic under Nazism, by providing Austrians a distinct historico-cultural identity narrative that predates the era of nationalism or pan-Germanism.

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<sup>127</sup> Moltke 55.

<sup>128</sup> Lamb-Faffelberger 291.

Ancient history and cultural inheritance of a golden artistic and feudal age provided a continuity of greatness and legitimacy. The natural beauty of the Austrian landscape was also harnessed as a *Heimat* motif to attract tourists, a rich and beautiful land of the blessed.<sup>129</sup>

The Austrian *Heimatfilm* genre provided a powerful medium with which to discursively construct a distinctly Austrian image of *Heimat* during the Second Republic. Post World War II Austrian *Heimatfilm* is described specifically as those productions, which, according to their own self-image, wanted to depict the Austrian character by using Austrian countryside, customs, and mentality, all of which is encapsulated in beautiful, clichéd landscapes, which are charged with positive, rural, and even mythical values.<sup>130</sup> Eventually reaching heights of popularity during the 1950s, Gertraud Steiner writes that after 1945 the *Heimatfilm* was not only a West German genre but also the dominant product of the Austrian film industry.<sup>131</sup> The dramaturgy of post-war *Heimatfilm* portrays the homeland by using ‘native’ people filmed alongside ‘intact’ nature. Austrian *Heimatfilm* therefore focused on displaying to its audience those Austrian topographies and communities that were believed to have cultural and national significance.<sup>132</sup> *Heimatfilm* in Austria was thus devised to adapt beautiful scenery and narratives pertaining with simple and traditional modes of existence in order to demonstrate a hidden message – the quest to establish a new nation and national identity.<sup>133</sup> The result was a new and popular medium that could educate and inform all Austrians of their unique, collective national identity through the lens of the *Heimat* concept. Much like the FPÖ, the architects of post-war Austrian *Heimatfilm* sought to create a new sense of Austrian patriotism through a celebration of regional landscapes and the cultural communities that live there. *Heimatfilm* thus sought to negate the alienating influence of modernity by ‘turning back the clock’ to a more pure and genuine age, enriched with native tradition.<sup>134</sup>

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<sup>129</sup> Lamb-Faffelberger 294.

<sup>130</sup> Steiner, Gertraud. *Die Heimat-Macher: Kino in Österreich 1946-1966*. Vienna: Verlag für Gesellschaftskritik, 1987. Print. 45.

<sup>131</sup> Steiner 45.

<sup>132</sup> Steiner 45.

<sup>133</sup> Zimmermann, Stefan. "Landscapes of Heimat in Post-War German Cinema." *The Geography of Cinema - a Cinematic World*. Eds. Lukinbeal, Chris and Stefan Zimmermann. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2008. 171 - 87. Print. 172.

<sup>134</sup> Moltke 123.

The persistent attempts to construct national consciousness through the lens of the *Heimat* concept shows that Austrian national identity in history remains contested. Despite the turbulent socio-political history of the Austrian nation, however, the *Heimat* concept continues to function somewhere within the very centre of the debate surrounding place, belonging, and identity. Although *Heimat* has proven expedient in the manipulating a sense of national consciousness, as a concept that is consistently evoked to further one interpretation of national identity or the other, the question of collective identity in Austria remains problematical. Austria is a nation of many *Heimaten*, and the historical examples of what constitutes the Austrian nation continue to perplex the architects of *Heimat*. While *Heimat* may evoke national consciousness, national identity in modern Austria remains complex and at times altogether illusive.

### **1.5 – Austria’s complicated national image**

While it is apparent that for the Right-Wing populists *Heimat* is analogous with a national identity informed by hereditary and uniform cultural patterns, Austrian national identity remains a contested topic. Austria’s identity has many contradictory features, sourced from a wide array of historical and cultural sources. Academic literature on the topic of Austrian identity principally uses historical perspectives in an attempt to verify the existence of an independent Austrian nation and national identity, using empirical evidence to demonstrate how these abstractions are firmly rooted in the Austrian psyche.<sup>135</sup> In this argument, Austria is seen as distinct from German origins. However, opinions on the topic remain as diverse as the nation itself. Austria is described either as the great European power Habsburg power that dominated most of central Europe, or defined by its complex relationship with Germany especially from 1848 – 1938, a land that was a focus of Nazism, or imply a small alpine country like that of Switzerland.<sup>136</sup> Indeed, there is no other European country at the end of the twentieth century whose identity has changed so often since the 1800s.<sup>137</sup>

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<sup>135</sup> Wodak *The Discursive*, 49.

<sup>136</sup> Pelinka, Anton. *Austria: Out of the Shadows of the Past*. Oxford: Westview Press, 1998. Print. 1.

<sup>137</sup> Pelinka *Austria*, 9.

The continuum of alternative opinion on the Austrian national character, which has long been obscured by profound historical and political incongruities, hinders attempts to consolidate a definitive identity narrative. Expressions of Austrian identity (understood here as the popular identity in the territory that makes up the Republic of Austria) traditionally incorporate a range of opinion, which, along with local identity rooted in provincial origin, claim Austria holds both a geographically Austrian and ethnocultural German identity.<sup>138</sup> Modern attempts to define the Austrian nation and cultural identity as European, but not German, continue to puzzle and cause debate among scholars today. The contentious nature of the debate, in the past few decades in particular, over what defines an Austrian in a national sense results in many contradictions within public and academic opinion. ‘Austria’ was established prior to the age of nationalism, it has seen the rise of a multiethnic empire to the east, been the purveyor of territories won and lost, seen a decline to a core German speaking territory after the First World War, as well as the forfeit of sovereignty in the German annexation of 1938. Peter Thaler notes that in “the (modern) Austrian nation debate, the lines have been drawn more sharply, and the cultural notions of nationhood are frequently interpreted as a German aberration.”<sup>139</sup> The case of Austria, at the very least, is a good example of the difficulty in gaining an appropriate balance between cultural notions of nationhood, and more straightforward conceptualisations of national identity as systems of governance. Matters concerning culture are so intrinsically linked with the nation’s political history that any pursuit of a firm national identity in modern Austria is at the same time a quest for cultural identity.<sup>140</sup> The borders of Austria may be geographically clear, but the frontiers of Austrian identity throughout the course of history into modern day seem too contested to permit a common identity upon which all Austrians can agree.

### **1.5.1 – The founding myths of the Austrian nation**

Austria’s diverse history is contested in the debate between popular historians and traditional scholarship. According to the ‘Germanist perspective’, Austria’s

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<sup>138</sup> Thaler, Peter. *The Ambivalence of Identity: The Austrian Experience of Nation-Building in a Modern Society*. West Lafayette: Purdue University Press, 2001. Print. 184.

<sup>139</sup> Thaler 185.

<sup>140</sup> Lamb-Faffelberger 289.



German heritage and close political relationship with Germany indicates a close and natural repour between the two nations. The emergence of ‘Austrianist’ scholarship during the Second Republic, however, disputes the ‘Germanist’ argument in favour of a distinctly Austrian narrative. Since the collapse of National Socialism, scholars have construed the origins of the birth of the Austrian nation in various ways. For example, Gerald Stourzh (1990) and Ernst Bruckmüller (1991) identify the beginning of the Austrian nation in the local traditions of various provinces dating back to the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.<sup>141</sup> Other historians concur that a distinctly separate Austrian identity developed during the course of the nineteenth century beginning with the abdication of Franz II from the Holy Roman Empire in 1806.<sup>142</sup> We may well trace the modern debate on Austrian national identity to the final days of World War II, where in the wake of the National Socialist defeat, political leaders of the Austrian Second Republic emphasised the country’s long tradition of culture and autonomy.<sup>143</sup> As Innsbruck historian Anton Pelinka explains in his essay *From Pan-Germanism to New Populism in Austria*, after the Allies re-established Austrian independence in 1955, the pan-German tradition, so well established in Austria previously, was ostracised “due to its identification with Nazism.”<sup>144</sup> Indeed, there is an explicit attempt to deny the very legitimacy of the German cultural community as a platform for national identity.<sup>145</sup> The aversion to German Nazism in the nation has led many historians to subsequently conclude that the re-emergence of a separate Austrian identity at the beginning of the Second Republic is entrenched in an Austrian ‘resistance’ to National Socialism.<sup>146</sup> The arguments of historians such as Kriessler negate the earlier concept of the nation defined by ethnic and cultural characteristics,

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<sup>141</sup> See Stourzh, Gerald. *Vom Reich Zur Republik : Studien Zum Österreichbewußtsein Im 20. Jahrhundert*. Vienna: Wiener Journal Zietschriftenverl, 1990. Print. Bruckmüller, Ernst. "Die Frage nach dem Nationalbewußtsein in der österreichischen Geschichte unter sozialhistorischem Aspekt." *Probleme der Geschichte Österreichs und ihrer Darstellung*. Eds. Wolfram, Herwig and Walter Pohl. Vienna: Verl. der Österr. Akad. der Wiss, 1991. 49 - 56. Print.

<sup>142</sup> Wodak *The Discursive*, 50.

<sup>143</sup> Thaler 185.

<sup>144</sup> Pelinka, Anton. "From Pan-Germanism to New Populism in Austria." *OpenDemocracy*. OpenDemocracy, 12 July 2012. Web. 6 Mar. 2015.

<sup>145</sup> Thaler 185.

<sup>146</sup> For example see Kriessler, Felix. *Der Österreicher und seine Nation: Ein Lernprozess mit Hindernissen (Forschungen zur Geschichte des Donauraumes)*. Vienna: Böhlau, 1984. Print.

a German *Kulturnation* or *Sprachnation*, which places Austrian identity within a wider German *Kulturgemeinschaft*, and which is accepted by only a small number of scholars in Austria today.<sup>147</sup> While Austrian historiography had been previously been known for its Germanist perspective, this modern rejection of the *Kultur-* and *Sprachnation* was, at least academically, a profound distancing from past perspectives. As a result, all Austrian roots in German history were ignored in the restoration years, and Austria's own unique history was honoured for the purposes of identity formation.

It was during the early years of the Second Republic that the so-called "Ostarrîchi myth" was applied in a re-emerging national identity that was distinct from the formerly prevailing pan-German narrative.<sup>148</sup> *Ostarrîchi* is the middle-high German from which the name *Österreich* is derived. The word first appears in a document dating back to A.D. 996, describing the lands of Leopold of Babenberg in what is present-day Lower Austria.<sup>149</sup> The historical document provides Austria an ancient past, placing the origins of the modern Austrian nation in the Middle Ages. The result of such national historiography was new myths of national identity that distanced Austria from Germany and Nazism, and put the nation at the heart of a one-thousand-year old land, rich with history, cultural tradition, and epic natural beauty. The term 'Austria' thus came to once more reference the unifying force of the house of Habsburg as well as the House of Austria (*Casa d'Austria*), which from the nineteenth century stood for the Austrian empire as a Central European power.<sup>150</sup>

The Second Republic's 'Austrianist' argument provided the country with a sense of 'national pride' derived from Austrian high culture and the Habsburg monarchy. National consciousness was linked to an image of Austria as a 'cultural world power' that boasted a wealth of typically 'Austrian', and not necessarily

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<sup>147</sup> The historian Lothar Höbelt argues Austria is a nation closely associated with German identity and history. See for example Höbelt, Lothar. "Drei Staaten - Zwei Nationen - Ein Volk? Kontinuität in der Deutschen Geschichte." *Die Presse* 7 Aug. 1985: 10. Print. And Höbelt, Lothar. "Österreich = Deutsch ≠ Bundesrepublikanisch." *Kontroversen um Österreichs Zeitgeschichte*. Eds. Botz, Gerhard and Gerald Sprengnagel. Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 1994. 338 - 45. Print.

<sup>148</sup> Lamb-Faffelberger 290.

<sup>149</sup> Lamb-Faffelberger 290.

<sup>150</sup> Wodak *The Discursive*, 51.

German, history, cultural symbols, and traditions.<sup>151</sup> Numerous artworks in Austria have been used to evoke national pride in the Habsburg victory over the Ottomans in 1683 – 97. Telesko, for example, cites the use of art as a medium to illustrate the potent mythification of the Habsburg victory over the Islamic army in Austria, and the subsequent national legend it created.<sup>152</sup> Memories of these events endure today, and the historical myth that describes Habsburg's dominance over the Ottomans has endured to inform the collective identity of many Austrians. For many, Austria remains characterised as a defender of the West and Christendom from Islam, leading to a prevailing anti-Islamic, anti-Turkish attitude in Vienna in particular.<sup>153</sup> The Habsburg legacy, therefore, not only provides a distinctly Austrian identity narrative that bestows pride in its sympathisers, but also, indirectly, formulates images of an historical enemy.

In furtherance of Austria's independence from German history, the history of the nation is further described by recalling the Austrian Empire (Kaisertum Österreich), which was created in 1804 out of the various provinces ruled by the Habsburgs and represented not only German speakers but also Polish, Czech, Hungarian, Italian, Slovenian, Slovakian, Serbo-Croatian, Ukranian, Romanian, Yiddish, and Romani.<sup>154</sup> In origin, therefore, Austria was seen as a great and independent power second only to Russia, whose multi-ethnic population was ruled over by a dynasty whose lineage stretched back to the Holy Roman Empire, and was thus unrestrained by the cultural and national limitations of the Germany nation or cultural community. For example in 1980, Austrian Felix Kreissler published *La prise de conscience de la nation autrichienne, 1938-1945-1978*, in which he identifies the origins of the Austrian nation with the proclamation of empire in 1804.<sup>155</sup> In his work *Österreich: Zweite Republik*, historian Georg Wagner also illustrated an Austrian nation that was distinct from the German cultural community by locating Austria's Celtic origins in the state of Noricum, as well as the development of the Habsburg

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<sup>151</sup> Wodak *The Discursive*, 50.

<sup>152</sup> See for example Telesko 23 – 32.

<sup>153</sup> Wodak, Ruth, and Bernhard Forchtner. "Embattled Vienna 1683/2010: Right-Wing Populism, Collective Memory and the Fictionalisation of Politics." *Visual Communication* 13.2 (2014): 231 - 55. Print. 231.

<sup>154</sup> Pelinka *Austria*, 9.

<sup>155</sup> See Kreissler, Felix. *La prise de conscience de la Nation autrichienne: 1938, 1945, 1978*. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1980. Print.

hereditary lands around 1500.<sup>156</sup> Viennese historian Ernst Bruckmüller similarly emphasised the formative roles of local province and popular participation in his study *Nation Österreich*, where he argues that the longing for collective national identity post-1945 to consolidate a definitive national identity from the various regions of Austria.<sup>157</sup> While the emphasis on distinctions from German patterns of cultural-identity dominated public opinion post-1945, it was through the seminal work of such popular histories that the traditional Germanist academic view of Austrian identity was openly contested, and Austrian national historiography became clearly visible.

Despite the dominance of national historiography in the Austrian identity debate, however, the commonality of culture in a pan-German identity narrative persists, greatly influenced by those scholars and historians who oppose the strictly ‘Austrianist’ approach to history and national identity. The traditional ‘Germanist’ view defines Austrian identity as an integral part of the broader German identity narrative, while the new school of ‘Austrianists’ refute a relationship between Austrian and German identity of any kind.<sup>158</sup> The highly respected Austrian historian Fritz Fellner, for example, advocates a ‘Germanist’ perspective by refuting the simplicity and tunnel vision of Austro-nationalist historiography. For Fellner, such a school of thought is similar to the restricted, state-centric Prusso-German model of historiography, and he emphasises the polycephalic diversity of German history, in which Austrian developments are key to understanding greater German developments.<sup>159</sup> In 1978 West German historian Karl Dietrich Erdmann encountered much criticism, where, in his essay *Die Spur Österreichs in der deutschen Geschichte*, Erdmann followed a ‘German’ historical narrative through Austrian components.<sup>160</sup> Erdmann’s tendency to describe Austrian national identity through historiography that linked Austria with the greater German cultural community had largely fallen out of favour in academic circles.

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<sup>156</sup> For example see Wagner, Georg. *Österreich: Zweite Republik : Zeitgeschichte und Bundesstaatstradition*. Vienna: Österreichischer Kulturverlag, 1983. Print.

<sup>157</sup> For example see Bruckmüller, Ernst. *Nation Österreich: Kulturelles Bewusstsein und gesellschaftlich-politische Prozesse*. Vienna: Böhlau Verlag, 1996. Print.

<sup>158</sup> Thaler 19.

<sup>159</sup> Thaler 5.

<sup>160</sup> See Erdmann, Karl D. *Die Spur Österreichs in der deutschen Geschichte ;Drei Staaten, zwei Nationen, ein Volk?* Zürich: Manesse-Verlag, 1989. Print.

However Austria's past role as a central European power continues to hinder a conclusive modern Austrian self-image, as a constant measuring between a small modern Republic and an "old" empire is at times specious.<sup>161</sup> As Thaler explains, Austria's long relationship to the German cultural community, along with a sizeable demographic that has sought to distance the nation from Germany, has arguably not only facilitated the disintegration of a common central European cultural identity, but also hindered a distinctly common Austrian identity from forming in its place. The contemporary popular notion of what makes up modern Austrian national identity, then, possesses the following conflicting elements. Austria as a nation has both territorially Austrian as well as culturally German characteristics, both of which have developed alongside local identity rooted in regional and provincial idiosyncrasies, which are also unique unto themselves.<sup>162</sup> Therefore the debate over where one identity starts and the others begin remains problematical. The dividing lines seem too established, the history too complicated, to allow for a commonly accepted collective identity.

It is clear in a historico-cultural context that both a 'Germanist' and 'Austrianist' perspective on national identity remain in modern Austria. The two opposing schools of thought continue to cause ambiguities and contradictions in the national identity debate in contemporary Austria. It would be unfair to deny 'Austrianists' their belief that their identity is independent from central European German cultural influence, in the same way it would be irrational to reject that a people whose mother tongue is German indeed hold some relationship with the larger German community. Austria's two schools of thought on the national identity debate demonstrate, either by preserving older historico-cultural identity myths or establishing distinct and separate new ones, that cultural factors play an inseparable role alongside political ones in defining modern Austria. The FPÖ's political success will lie in its ability to overcome the incongruities of Austrian identity, and at the same time appeal to both the 'Austrianist' and 'Germanist' demographic. The parties seek to accomplish this broader political influence by advocating a national 'in' group of Austrians that are both nationalistically Austrian and a part of the German

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<sup>161</sup> Fellner, Fritz. "The Genesis of the Republic." *Modern Austria*. Ed. Steiner, Kurt. Palo Alto: Sposs Inc, 1981. 1 - 23. Print. 3.

<sup>162</sup> Thaler 185.

*Kulturgemeinschaft*. The party's use of *Heimat* in its national identity discourse, as will be explored in the following chapters, allows for the exclusion of minority groups or outsiders that do not conform to the normative cultural abstractions that characterise the party's understanding of the nation and its genuine population.

### **1.6 - Conclusion**

*Heimat*, then, is an important point of reference in questions pertaining to Austrian collective identity and belonging. The typical image *Heimat* depicts, from its origins and development to the modern Austrian perspective, is that of provinciality, parochialism, nature, and picturesque folklore all encapsulated in a lifestyle that is traditional, hereditary, and in harmony with nature. The image of *Heimat* may be immediate as a surrounding, although that is not always necessary. *Heimat* can also be that special place known as home that is remembered, sometimes collectively, as childhood memories or long lost recollections. In synthesis the spatially and temporally determined elements of *Heimat* construct a national identity narrative with long provincial roots, often where a definitive national identity is lacking. A typically Austrian physical and human landscape develops from the notion of *Heimat*, and defines how the population should identify themselves and their community or nation. The use of the *Heimat* concept helps elites facilitate and strengthen an imagined national community, in which representations of locality, region, and nation become interchangeable and interdependent to create a definition of a modern 'Austria'. This version of modern Austria enjoys an historical continuity traced back to antiquity, which allows native Austrians to express a degree of pride in local traditions and cultural inheritance, and avoid the problematic question of pan-Germanism and Germanic identity while not directly denouncing it. The diversity of regional identities in the greater Austrian identity framework allows many to use the concept of *Heimat* to establish definitive national (while also local) examples of the true Austrian character. As a result, modern Austria as *Heimat* provides the grounds for firm patriotism (*Nationalgefühl*) and new sense of unique identity and purpose. The previous oppositional discourse endemic in *Heimat* discourse, such as provincial instead of urban, traditional before modern, and fixed community rather than migration and displacement, have always demonstrated a certain desire in local German speaking communities to maintain their cultural identity when the future of the political establishment is either in transition or in turmoil.

However, as we have seen, identifying a definitive Austrian national identity remains, at least from a historico-cultural perspective, as illusive as the many ambiguous definitions of *Heimat* throughout history. Austria as an empire and kingdom predates the classifications of nationalism, and the history of the nation into the modern world has seen a great range of tumultuous changes to borders, administration, and national identity narratives. The cultural dimensions of Austria's national past often distort any clear boundaries between Austria as a European nation, and a community with a cultural identity that is fixed within the German cultural sphere. This is seen most noticeably in the fierce debate about Austrian national identity between Austrianists and Germanists, and also demonstrates that the histories and mythologies of nations are largely open to interpretation by the historians that analyse them. Distinguishing the boundaries of the Austrian nation and *Heimat* therefore becomes a Right-Wing populist quest to wrest an Austrian identity from the influences of cultural pan-Germanism, without necessarily negating Austria's cultural roots. In the FPÖ's debate surrounding the German cultural origins of Austrian identity, *Heimat* may very well be symbolically depicted as a tree with roots that run deep. The tree is harvested for timber, which is then used to fashion the collective 'house', or nation, that accommodates the population. German roots, in other words, produced the wood that came to build a uniquely Austrian nation. Although the *Heimat* concept, with its numerous citations of ethnographic data, acknowledges the Germanic heritage of Austrian identity, it also, through natural landscapes and dialect for example, describes the very genuine Austrian *contribution* to the German cultural community. *Heimat*, therefore, describes the profundity of local identity over pan-German abstractions, no matter the close cultural ties. *Heimat*, accordingly, affords all Austrians a heritage and identity that grew to exceptional and distinctive heights, while never disregarding origins and roots.

It is through the *Heimat* concept that Austria attempts to discursively construct its own unique national story to share with the world. *Heimat* is summarised, as this thesis will now explore, through Austrian national landscapes, histories, culture, and traditions. My thesis explores, furthermore, the manipulation of the *Heimat* concept into a discursively constructed national identity narrative that suits the FPÖ's Right-Wing populist political agenda of monoculturalism and ethnic preservation. Their interpretation of *Heimat* legitimates their vision for a monoethnic society, which marginalises other ethnic minorities through a denial of the practicality of both multi-

and unculturalism in modern Austria. This definition of *Heimat* is legitimated, as we shall see, through the thematic portrayal of the elements that supposedly constitute a true sense of *Heimat*. The first of which is the topography of the land itself, which is symbolically charged with cultural elements of Austrian national identity that are hereditary and fixed to the landscape.



## Chapter Two

### *Heimat, Nature, and Landscape*

*Nothing more gladdening grows on earth, O Zarathustra, than an exalted, robust will: it is the earth's fairest growth. A Whole landscape is refreshed by one such tree.*

*To the pine-tree, O Zarathustra, do I compare him who grows up like you: tall, silent, hard, alone, of the finest, supplest wood*

*- at last, however, reaching out with the strong, green branches for its domain, asking bold questions of the winds and storms and whatever is at home in the heights.<sup>163</sup>*

#### 2.0 - Introduction

As has been established in chapter one, for the FPÖ the notion of *Heimat* and therefore also national identity is closely linked to nature and landscape. This is seen for example in the party's 2011 Graz party programme, where, under the title *Heimat, Identität und Umwelt*, the party's policies on the environment are listed as an ethnic-cultural-environmental triptych alongside perspectives on Austrian culture and identity. The 'greening' of nationalism, with such detailed and dedicated programmes toward environmental conservation, initially appears to reflect Green political thought. For example, Right-Wing populist and Far Left Green groups both criticise the Western ethos of consumption and the degradation of nature without any real advancement in human prosperity or fulfilment.<sup>164</sup> Green political thought, however, advocates sustainable practices alongside core policies of social justice, decentralisation, pacifism, progressive gender roles, and racial equalities, all of which are largely incompatible with Rightist ideology.<sup>165</sup> For the FPÖ, nature and landscape are brought into the political debate to demonstrate a local sense of place, ownership over nature, and a long-established inhabitancy, all of which demonstrate a definitive identity of place through a *Heimat* discourse that is embedded in emotive rhetoric.

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<sup>163</sup> Nietzsche, Friedrich. *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*. Trans. Hollingdale, R.J. London: Penguin, 2003. Print. 291.

<sup>164</sup> Hamilton, Paul. "The Greening of Nationalism: Nationalising Nature in Europe." *Environmental Politics* 11.2 (2002): 27 - 48. Print. 29.

<sup>165</sup> Hamilton 29.

## 2.1 – Umweltschutz ist Heimatschutz

Right-Wing populist parties in Europe share the political creed that local nature defines the homeland, and that each separate people have developed a unique identity and culture in interaction with their own land and territory.<sup>166</sup> The FPÖ similarly uses environmentalism in order to diminish the existential divide between the Austrian national group and its natural environment. For example, in their political programme the FPÖ explains the need for environmental protection alongside the demand to preserve culture, national identity and *Heimat*.<sup>167</sup> Nature, therefore, plays a decisive role in their image of *Heimat*. This is observed particularly in the FPÖ's *Umweltschutz als Heimatschutz* platform, which merges eco-nationalism with the conservation of nature, resource management, and agricultural protectionism. The fusion of emotional nationalistic rhetoric and environmentalism is a popular approach across the Right-Wing populist political spectrum. Many European Right-Wing populist parties engage in environmentalism as a platform designed to protect the homeland."<sup>168</sup> Although the FPÖ has always had an environmental preservation platform, political expert Thomas Herfer explains that the modern FPÖ identifies Umweltschutz, specifically, "als Heimatschutz."<sup>169</sup> The blending of *Umwelt* and *Heimat* is seen, for example, when in 2006 the then FPÖ *Vizebundesparteibmann* Norbert Hofer stated that for the FPÖ "Umweltschutz" also means "Heimatschutz."<sup>170</sup> The Graz chapter of the FPÖ also declares that the party aspires to preserve *Heimat* "für kommende Generationen", and make possible "ein selbstbestimmtes Leben in einer intakten Umwelt."<sup>171</sup> Environmental preservation, in other words, is specifically associated with the protection of nation and *Heimat* from any form of exploitation.

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<sup>166</sup> Hurd, Madeleine, and Steffen Werther. "Nature, the Volk, and the Heimat: The Narratives and the Practices of the Far-Right Ecologists." *Baltic Worlds* 2 (2013): 13 - 19. Print. 16.

<sup>167</sup> FPÖ *Graz Parteiprogramm*, 6 – 7.

<sup>168</sup> Olsen, Jonathan. *Nature and Nationalism: Right-Wing Ecology and the Politics of Identity in Contemporary Germany*. New York: St. Martin's, 1999. Print. 5.

<sup>169</sup> Cited in Payr and Müller. "Bekenntnisse zur Umwelt nur Lippenbekenntnisse." *Der Standard*, Der Standard. 15 Jun. 2012. Web. 07 Jan. 2016.

<sup>170</sup> "Weltumwelttag: FPÖ: Umweltschutz ist Heimatschutz." *APA-OTS*. APA-OTS, 05 June 2006. Web. 05 July 2015.

<sup>171</sup> "Grazer FPÖ setzt für Graz-Wahl auch auf Umwelt- und Tierschutz." *FPÖ*. Unser Mitteleuropa. 6 Jan. 2017. Web. 4 Mar. 2017.

Many other German-speaking Far Right groups share the *Umweltschutz ist Heimatschutz* thesis. The *Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands*, for example, state in their programme under the title *Umweltschutz ist Heimatschutz* that an ‘intact’ nature is the foundation of the future, and that nature is not only *Umwelt* but also *Mitwelt* because it is an integral part of national identity.<sup>172</sup> The party goes on to state specifically that man is a part of nature, and any existential divide between national groups and their environment must be negated.<sup>173</sup> The Far-Right Sweden Democrats see humans as a part of nature, with “the qualities of beauty that are embedded in nature” required in order to “fulfil our spiritual needs and make possible a high quality of life.”<sup>174</sup> Nature, as such, is a place that is recognised by Right-Wing populist groups as identify-forming and identity-preserving.<sup>175</sup> From the Far Right perspective, environmental preservation has “as much to do with protecting a piece of ourselves, as it does with protecting forests, rivers, and lakes.”<sup>176</sup> ‘Environmentalism’, as a result, is understood as a platform that preserves not only natural topographies, but also the specific national identity narratives that have been ascribed to them. In this discourse, the preservation of the environment becomes as much a pursuit to secure autonomy and self-sufficiency in the resource and energy sectors, as it is any greater obligation to the planet as a whole.

For the FPÖ, the conservation of Austria’s environment is also a matter of national sovereignty and is also, therefore, directly linked to the preservation of national identity. National identity facilitates a preeminent sense of belonging, and for Right-Wing populist parties environmental policies also apply to a platform that protects the homeland of the national ‘in’ group’.<sup>177</sup> On the topic of ‘*Heimat, Identität und Umwelt*’ in the FPÖ’s political programme, for example, the party states that that they are the defenders of ‘our’ *Heimat Österreich*, ‘our’ national identity, and ‘our’

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<sup>172</sup> Die Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschland. “Heimatschutz: Was ist Das?“ *Umwelt und Aktiv*. NPD, n.d. Web. 01 Nov . 2013.

<sup>173</sup> NPD.

<sup>174</sup> Cited in Hurd, Madeleine, and Steffen Werther. "Nature, the Volk, and the Heimat: The Narratives and the Practices of the Far-Right Ecologists." *Baltic Worlds 2* (2013): 13 - 19. Print. 14.

<sup>175</sup> Olsen 5.

<sup>176</sup> Olsen 5.

<sup>177</sup> Olsen 6.

“Eigenständigkeit” through the defence of the nation’s natural resources.<sup>178</sup> The FPÖ’s combination of environmental conservation with the safeguarding of national identity forms the premise of the party’s “Umweltschutz als gelebten Heimatschutz”<sup>179</sup> narrative, in which the preservation of the environment directly contributes to the protection of *Heimat*. The party’s thesis is derived from an inherent Right-Wing populist requisite that ‘all humans have the right to a homeland’.<sup>180</sup> According to the FPÖ, Austrians have a *Recht auf Heimat*, and are therefore entitled to live in an autonomously in and “einer intakten Umwelt.”<sup>181</sup> The sense of ownership over the land, of inhabitancy, the right to speak for a territory and thereby preserve the topography, in other words, all contribute to the FPÖ’s collective sense of self and national identity formula. The FPÖ’s understanding of *Umweltschutz* is therefore directly linked to the party’s overarching *Heimat* and national identity narrative, emboldened through continual references to a tenure of the land that is the birth right of all Austrians.

### **2.1.2 – ‘Österreich muß energieautonom werden’**

The FPÖ’s determination to secure local, autonomous, and renewable energy resources is the principal feature of the party’s *Umweltschutz* platform. Norbert Hofer explained in 2006 that *Energienutzung* was a matter of national importance, “weil wir vom Ausland unabhängig sein wollen. Und das können wir nur, wenn wir unsere erneuerbaren Ressourcen nutzen.”<sup>182</sup> Environmental concerns, in other words, require innovative renewable energy solutions that will liberate Austria from its subservience to outside energy sectors. In the Graz chapter’s website the FPÖ outline a need to extract energy from “Energiequellen” that are in “Einklang mit der Natur”, while also, unlike the Greens and KPÖ, underscoring the need for balance “zwischen Ökologie und neuem Freizeitraum in Graz.”<sup>183</sup> While the Greens and KPÖ reject

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<sup>178</sup> FPÖ *Graz Parteiprogramm*, 3.

<sup>179</sup> “Umweltschutz.” *FPÖ Graz*. FPÖ, n.d., Web. 2 Jan. 2015.

<sup>180</sup> Turner-Graham, Emily. “‘An Intact Enviroment Is Our Foundation of Life’: The Junge Nationaldemokraten, the Ring Freiheitlicher Jugend and the Cyber-Construction of Nationalist Landscapes.” *Varities of Right-Wing Extremism in Europe*. Eds. Mammone, Andrea, Emmanuel Godin and Brian Jenkins. New York: Routledge. 233 - 48. Print. 238.

<sup>181</sup> FPÖ *Graz Parteiprogramm*, 5.

<sup>182</sup> APA-OTS *Weltumwelttag*.

<sup>183</sup> FPÖ *Graz Umweltschutz*.

many new innovative projects regarding resource management and energy production due to their obstinate environmental platform, the FPÖ wish to appeal to both the environmentally conscious and those that encourage innovation and self-sufficiency.

An emphasis on land and resource ownership is also indicative of the FPÖ's belief in the relationship between environmental conservation, the concept of *Heimat*, and the preservation of national identity. This is seen, for example, in the party's political handbook, where it states that the "Schutz" of Austria's natural resources is the "Lebensgrundlage für unsere Heimat Österreich", and therefore requires a sustainable approach management of resources, as well as a homegrown, self sufficient, and Austrian owned *Energiegewinnung*.<sup>184</sup> Renewable energies, which are sourced from the local environment, will provide freedom and autonomy for the Austrian population, provide jobs and technological development, as well as safeguard the natural environment through the reduction of pollution.<sup>185</sup> Through the implementation of renewable energies, and the phasing out of fossil fuels, the FPÖ demonstrates its will to preserve the environment by reducing 'dirty' energy sources, while also advocating local infrastructure and technological development in wind, solar, and other clean energies that will provide jobs and industry for Austria.

The FPÖ's inference that environmental protection, renewable resource management, and the preservation of national identity are all somehow interdependent, however, also reveals the separatist principles that underscore much of the FPÖ's ideology and policy implementation. The FPÖ's argument for self-sufficiency and comprehensive proprietorship in the resource and energy sector advances an underlying 'us' and 'them' dichotomy, through which the party reserves the environment solely for the use of the national 'in' group, while simultaneously exposing those that would exploit Austria's natural beauty. The premise that *Heimat* must be *energieautark* is an example of the FPÖ disassociating itself and the nation from outside markets and globalisation, a will of the FPÖ to facilitate an insular approach to the management of the nation. In the party's discussion surrounding *Umweltschutz*, the local environment is a privately owned possession of the national 'in' group', and therefore also demonstrates a collective responsibility to preserve a homeland for future generations that will facilitate autonomous existence "in einer

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<sup>184</sup> FPÖ Graz Parteiprogramm, 6.

<sup>185</sup> FPÖ Handbuch 2013, 55 - 56.

intakten Umwelt.”<sup>186</sup> The FPÖ’s *Umweltschutz* policies accordingly cast disparities between the local Austrian people, who benefit from conservation policies, and outsider groups, who would seek to circumvent protectionism, exploit Austria’s resources for foreign gain, and implement globalist platforms.

When the FPÖ proclaims that the party stand for protecting ‘our’ natural resources, ‘our’ national identity, and ‘our’ *Eigenständigkeit*, it also clandestinely creates a ‘them’ and ‘us’ scenario. The Right-Wing populist predication of maintaining a clean and intact natural environment indicates the party ethos that the current system of environmental management is corrupted or inadequate. For the FPÖ, Austria’s resource management and energy consumption is vulnerable due to the importation of fuels. In its political programme, for example, the party declares “Österreich ist nicht frei”, because of the nation’s lack of renewable energy.<sup>187</sup> The inference that Austria remains constrained is due to a reliance on these fossil fuels that are, presumably, imported from overseas. The party sees dependence on outside markets as a weakness, especially when it is unnecessary. The FPÖ’s deliberate reference to the Austrian politician Leopold Figl’s famous speech is an attempt to draw its audience back to the dark days of post-war occupation. While Figl’s celebrated Austria’s freedom from occupation with the dawn of the Second Republic, the FPÖ intentionally negate the famous quote, thereby implying Austria can never truly be free when it relies on outside markets in the energy and resource sectors. This lack of freedom can be overcome by establishing a renewable energy platform to meet Austria’s needs. As a result of this, the FPÖ declares in its party programme that Austria must free herself from the chains of importation and foreign agents, especially when the nation’s resources are being extracted to satisfy overseas interests.<sup>188</sup>

### **2.1.3 - Defending Austria’s commodities: water as a case study**

Charging outside corporate and political actors with national resource and economic theft is a typical Right-Wing populist position, in which the homogenizing forces of international capitalism and globalisation, personified through political

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<sup>186</sup> FPÖ *Graz Parteiprogramm*, 5.

<sup>187</sup> FPÖ *Handbuch 2013*, 54.

<sup>188</sup> FPÖ *Handbuch 2011*, 58.

agents, are depicted as hostile to local forms of existence.<sup>189</sup> In contrast to the theft brought forth by globalism, therefore, the FPÖ stand for local, sovereign control over commodities. Comparing this to globalism is an easy and popular strategy used by the party. The foremost antagonist in the FPÖ's 'them' and 'us' dichotomy is the European Union, and resource management plays a central role in the party's argument. In an interview with *NT News*, Strache explains that the EU is, by definition, a centralised, centralising agent, and therefore by its very design seeks to take everything from Europe "into its own hands."<sup>190</sup> Austria's leading Right-Wing Populist Party accordingly claims to stand as the last line of defense against the occupying force of the European Union, which, the FPÖ allege, wants to rob Austria of its environment, resources, and ultimately, freedom.

To demonstrate this argument, the FPÖ turned in 2012-2013 to the issue of Austria's domestic water supply. During 2013 in particular, the EU proposal to privatise water supplies in Austria was met with great concern.<sup>191</sup> Austrians are known for the pride they place over their water supply, with 94% of the population showing satisfaction with the quality of the nation's alpine springs.<sup>192</sup> Water supplies, therefore, are seen as a national commodity, and an all-important element of *Daseinsvorsorge*. The FPÖ similarly celebrates the high quality of Austrian water in their political programme, insisting that alpine water alongside rich soil provides the some of the best conditions for agriculture in the world.<sup>193</sup> Such a valuable commodity therefore requires protection. The EU's suggestion during 2013 that Austria's water sector should be privatised was, therefore, met with great outrage.<sup>194</sup> According to the EU, the premise for such moves is due to the fact that:

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<sup>189</sup> Turner-Graham *Environment*, 237.

<sup>190</sup> An interview with RT news posted by Timedjumpoff. "Heinz-Christian Strache, Leader of Austrian Freedom Party." Online video clip. *YouTube*. Youtube, 9 Feb. 2013. Web. 12 Mar. 2014.

<sup>191</sup> "EU-Pläne zu Wasser-Privatisierung erhitzen weiterhin Gemüter." *Wiener Zeitung*. Wiener Zeitung, 27 Jan. 2013. Web. 17 Mar. 2015.

<sup>192</sup> Childs, Margaret, and Phillipe Schennach. "Private Property: Is Water the Price of Union?" *Vienna Review*. Vienna Review, 4 Mar. 2013. Web. 20 Jan. 2015.

<sup>193</sup> FPÖ *Handbuch 2013*, 69.

<sup>194</sup> Childs and Schennach.

over 780 million people do not have access to safe drinking water and over 4,000 children under five die every day from diseases associated to the lack of access to clean drinking water. This is not only a tragedy, it is simply unacceptable. This is why the EU provides almost EUR 400 million per year to help 60 countries build infrastructure for drinking and waste water systems and provide basic sanitation and hygiene worldwide.<sup>195</sup>

Those countries with ample water, therefore, should provide relief to those other nations in the union that struggle with adequate water levels. For many Austrians, however, the EU's moves to implement private control over public water are not exactly indicative of an act of altruism, but are rather designed to restructure the transparency and self-determination of Austrian public service models.<sup>196</sup> The rejection of water privatisation, therefore, is more to do with Austrians defending their own service models and commodities from outside influence than the simple pouring of a glass would suggest. As *News.at* noted during 2013, "Kein EU-Wahlkampf" is handled in Austria "ohne die Sorge um 'unser' Wasser."<sup>197</sup>

It was during this climate that the FPÖ continued its advocacy of the total local proprietorship over Austrian commodities – all of which was directly linked to the party's overarching 'us' and 'them' formula. Pasqualoni cites the properties ascribed to water (from the rivers and lakes of which Austria happens to be particularly rich) by Austrian political parties – being clean, pure, and energising – as instrumental in constructs of the Austrian nation.<sup>198</sup> Evidence can be sourced from Austrian ruling political parties during the early days of the Second Republic and their attempts to use water for the purpose of establishing an Austrian national identity.<sup>199</sup> Water continues to play an important role identity formulas designed by the FPÖ. For example, in *Für ein freies Österreich*, a book written by Michael Howanietz on behalf

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<sup>195</sup> "Water is Vital to the Air we Breathe." *European Union Delegation to the UN*. European Union, 2013. Web. 2 Mar. 2016.

<sup>196</sup> Childs and Schennach.

<sup>197</sup> Steinlecher, Daniel. "Wird Wasser privatisiert?" *News.at*. News.at, 27 Jan. 2013. Web. 7 Mar. 2015.

<sup>198</sup> Pasqualoni 133.

<sup>199</sup> Pasqualoni 133.



of Norbert Hofer in 2013, the party celebrates the ‘purity’ of Austrian water.<sup>200</sup> The pure, clean, and energising properties of water further evoke connotations that are key to how the FPÖ constructs *Heimat* and the Austrian nation, it’s ‘human landscape’.

While water can be used to characterise the properties and characteristics of the land and the national ‘In’ group, it is also used in critical attacks on the European Union. Although the EU charter, as we have seen, explains the privatisation and distribution of water as a result of observing the fundamental human rights of existence for all nations in the union, the FPÖ claim it is yet another example of the EU as an occupying force intent on exploitation, with Austria’s resources inevitably coveted to suit the designs of unelected bureaucrats in Brussels. Norbert Hofer, for example, argued in 2013:

Das österreichische Wasser ist ein wesentlichster Aspekt unserer Daseinsvorsorge. Dieses lebenswichtige Element unserer Souveränität über eine von Profitinteressen bestellte Richtlinie zu opfern, ist ein beispielloser Vorgang, der einen lauten Aufschrei quer durch die Republik zur Folge haben muss.<sup>201</sup>

Heinz-Christian Strache even goes so far as to directly correlate Austrian water with his understanding of *Heimat*. On his Facebook page in January 2013, Strache declared: “Ich kämpfe für unser österreichisches Wasser als Heimat-, Grund- und Menschenrecht. Es ist Eigentum der Österreicher und das hat es auch zu bleiben.”<sup>202</sup> The FPÖ openly protests against the sale of domestic water overseas by the Austrian political establishment, leaders they argue have repeatedly attempted to liberalise irreplaceable *heimischen Wasserressourcen*, insisting under the heading of “Weißes Gold als von Begehrlichkeiten” that “Besonderes Augenmerk gilt unserem heimischen Wasserschutz, der Ziel von Begehrlichkeiten ist.”<sup>203</sup> In their political

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
<sup>200</sup> Howanietz, Michael. *Für ein freies Österreich: Souveränität als Zukunftsmodell*. Wien: Norbert Hofer, 2013. Print. 67.

<sup>201</sup> “FPÖ-Hofer zur geplanten Wasser-Privatisierung: Unerträgliche Irreführung der Österreicher durch SPÖ und ÖVP!” *APA-OTS*. APA-OTS, 3 Jan. 2013. Web. 3 Mar. 2015.

<sup>202</sup> Strache, Heinz-Christian. “Ich kämpfe für unser österreichisches Wasser als Heimat.” *Facebook*. Facebook, 30 Jan. 2013. Web. 31 May. 2013.

<sup>203</sup> FPÖ *Handbuch 2011*, 67.

programme the FPÖ also refers to water ‘an oil of the future’, a ‘white gold’ that will increasingly become a commodity sought after by powerful groups all over the world, and therefore “dass die Verfügungsgewalt über österreichische Wasserschätze ausschließlich in österreichischer Hand zu bleiben hat.”<sup>204</sup> On his Facebook account, Strache elaborates further on the deceptive deals being committed by the European Union in order to secure Austria’s resources for their own profit:



**Figure 1.**

“Jetzt will die EU auch noch auf unser österreichisches Wasser zugreifen. Unser österreichisches Wasser - unser weißes Gold - muß daher vor solchen EU-Enteignungs-Plänen ala ESM geschützt und bewahrt werden. Unser Wasser ist Eigentum aller Österreicher!!!! Und soll und wird es mit der FPÖ auch bleiben!”<sup>205</sup>

The narrative of foreign actors pursuing the destruction of Austria’s environment and the acquisition of her resources is continued by the FPÖ in its political comic *Der blaue Planet*. The use of comics provides an interesting new development in the Right-Wing populist approach to disseminating their political messages – such as those on the environment – to a larger audience. Emily Turner-Graham explains that the youth wings of various Rightist political groups, such as the

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<sup>204</sup> FPÖ *Handbuch* 2013, 63.

<sup>205</sup> Strache, Heinz-Christian. “Jetzt will die EU auch noch auf unser österreichisches Wasser zugreifen.” *Facebook*. Facebook. 10 Sep. 2012. Web. 10 Sep. 2012.

FPÖ's *Ring Freiheitlicher Jugend* (RFJ), use such media to target Europe's young people by focusing on issues that are contemporary and important to them.<sup>206</sup> The FPÖ use the comic medium to discuss politics to a younger audience through a style of communication they are familiar with and will understand. In the comic, the FPÖ portrays Austria's resources as a type of 'white gold', which is coveted by internationalists pursuing foreign interests and profits. In the comic, a delegation from the *Zentralplanet*, which represent the capitalist bureaucratic mechanism of the European Union, cunningly explains their malicious plans: "Mit Euren... ähh unseren Fördergeldern könnt Ihr z.B. dann das Wasser wieder kaufen, das wir Euch vorher abpumpen!"<sup>207</sup> Strache and his companions' response to this threat is clear in this portrayal - foreign intervention into the distribution of Austria's resources must be negated, and therefore their guests are met with cynicism and suspicion:



Figure 2.

Image taken from the FPÖ's *Der Blaue Planet*.<sup>208</sup>


In *Der blaue Planet* the FPÖ further elaborates on their policy of *Umweltschutz gegen Globalisierung*, using domestic water resources as a primary example. When Strache asks about selling water resources to foreign markets, he is given a dire warning:

<sup>206</sup> Turner-Graham *Environment*, 234.

<sup>207</sup> FPÖ *Der Blaue Planet*. Vienna: FPÖ, 2009. Print. 6.

<sup>208</sup> FPÖ *Der Blaue Planet*, 4.

“Kann ich mir vorstellen. Wollen Euer Wasser, Euern Zaster, Eure Freiheit kassieren. Dann geht’s Euch so wie uns. Vorbei die Selbstbestimmung. Geld abliefern und mundhalten ist jetzt die Sache!”<sup>209</sup> Consequently the Austrian *Heimat* is disfigured through industrialised mechanisms of resource extraction; the people lose their right of self-determination and their sovereignty of capital, and ultimately lose their own money from buying these assets back. For the FPÖ, the reality of outside intervention into the distribution of natural commodities presents a dire situation:



**Figure 3.**

Image taken from the FPÖ's *Der Blaue Planet*.<sup>210</sup>

This image, according to the FPÖ, is the result of foreign actors who are allowed to pursue their own corrupt interests and access Austria's resources entirely unchecked. Austria's natural beauty is diminished under the austere frames of industrial progress, the ecosystem is largely ruined, and the profits of such activities, of course, are going abroad. Therefore the protection of nature and resources from the pressures of industrial economies and foreign agents requires the acknowledgement of ecological integrity, natural beauty, and national sovereignty. Arguments such as these underpin the FPÖ's Right-Wing populist approach to environmentalism and resource conservation, which explains environmental destruction as a result of foreign agents

<sup>209</sup> FPÖ *Der Blaue Planet*, 19.

<sup>210</sup> FPÖ *Der Blaue Planet*, 19.

or globalisation, and extreme finance capitalism that has reduced nature to a commodity. In the comic's portrayal it is never the Austrians themselves that are responsible for such environmental mismanagement. The fault of the local Austrians lies only in their foolishness to believe the promises of foreign political bodies or corporations, or allow these groups access to the land in the first place.

The FPÖ's desire to secure Austria's water supplies is also due to the importance it places on renewable energies and self-sufficiency in the energy sector. Austria is a nation with large alpine ranges and vast water supplies, making hydroelectric power an ideal source of energy production. The FPÖ explain in their political programme:

Um Abhängigkeiten abzubauen und Österreichs Energieversorgung für die Zukunft zu sichern, muss auch die Wasserkraft als bisher wichtigster Träger erneuerbarer Energie in Österreich weiter ausgebaut werden.<sup>211</sup>

Hydroelectricity is thus described as the obvious choice for Austrian self-sufficiency and an end to a reliance on the importation of fossil fuels. For hydroelectricity to be viable, however, you need control of your water. The protection of Austria's water, therefore, as well as an advocacy for innovation in renewables such as *Wasserkraft*, demonstrates the FPÖ will to not only protect Austria's public service models, but also to declare ownership over all resources and provide a self-sufficient future for the nation that no longer relies on guidance from the EU.

#### **2.1.4 – Agricultural protectionism**

The FPÖ's strategy to safeguard Austrians' proprietary right to the nation's commodities continues in the agricultural sector. In their political programme the FPÖ advocates agricultural protectionism by actively selecting local produce for domestic markets above of those that are imported.<sup>212</sup> This is seen by the FPÖ as an important aspect of environmental management because it preserves the natural rural landscapes of Austria by investing in them.<sup>213</sup> Protecting local produce will also

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<sup>211</sup> FPÖ *Handbuch* 2013, 59.

<sup>212</sup> FPÖ *Handbuch* 2013, 68 - 70.

<sup>213</sup> FPÖ *Handbuch* 2013, 9.

provide communities with a natural, local supply of healthy foods that are GM free, and factory farm free.<sup>214</sup> The FPÖ advocates for the protection of local produce, as well as the indirect unveiling of foreign goods in supermarkets, through the implementation of clear ‘local’ labelling that will demonstrate which goods are Austrian and which are foreign.<sup>215</sup> Rather than a modern, industrialised, and largely globalist approach to agriculture, therefore, the FPÖ choose to champion local farmers. For the FPÖ, agriculture and farming cannot be reduced to nostalgia or tradition, but must play a central role in addressing the challenges of the future, thereby proclaiming the interdependent of *Ernährung*, *Umwelt*, and *Energieversorgung* with *Landwirtschaft*.<sup>216</sup>



**Figure 4.**

FPÖ Salzburg 2010.<sup>217</sup>

According to the FPÖ, local Austrian produce is seen as superior and fresh to factory farming, and should therefore be supported over all other outside markets. This is seen, for example, in the Salzburg FPÖ election billboard of 2010, which gives the

<sup>214</sup> FPÖ *Handbuch* 2013, 68.

<sup>215</sup> FPÖ *Handbuch* 2013, 69.

<sup>216</sup> FPÖ *Handbuch* 2013, 72.

<sup>217</sup> Image taken from “Reinrassig und echt’: Plakat der Salzburger FPÖ-Bauern sorgt für mächtig Wirbel.” *News Austria*. News Austria, 18 Feb. 2010. Web. 24 Aug. 2015.

choice to support local, “Reinrassig & Echt” produce or to submit to EU “Knechtschaft.” The FPÖ responds to such concerns by stating:

Die FPÖ wird nicht zulassen, dass unsere Selbstversorgungsfähigkeit auf diese Art und Weise untergraben wird und man unseren Bauern vorschreibt, was in Österreich angebaut werden darf und was nicht.<sup>218</sup>

Therefore the FPÖ stand for the “Renationalisierung der Agrarpolitik”, and fair prices for “hervorragenden Produkte unserer Landwirte. Diese sollen nicht von EU-Förderungen abhängig gemacht werden, sie sollen für gute Arbeit ehrlich entlohnt werden.”<sup>219</sup>

Through gratifying overtures to Austria’s local farmers and their concerns, the FPÖ continues to disseminate its perpetual ‘us’ and ‘them’ formula. The party’s agricultural protectionism directly addresses the concerns of the local industry, and portrays the FPÖ policies as directed specifically to the needs of the national ‘in’ group. Contrarily, the FPÖ’s agricultural protectionism is explained as a defence against the centralising power of the European Union, an attempt to renationalise the agricultural sector, and, as a result, negate the influence of foreign operatives in the industry. In the FPÖ’s political programme, for example, the party states that the EU is slowly procuring control of local and domestic agricultural sectors through a common agricultural policy for all of Europe.<sup>220</sup> The FPÖ explain with outrage that around 400 million Euros flow into the centralised EU *Agrarpolitik*, fund - money, the party believes, that would be better spent locally within Austria.<sup>221</sup> By placing local farming industries in opposition with foreign political bodies, the FPÖ successfully disseminate its ‘us’ and ‘them’ dichotomy, which describes the European Union as an occupying force intent on robbing genuine Austrians of their livelihoods. For this reason, the FPÖ reiterate that the “EU-Agrarmisswirtschaft” is a great concern for Austria, leading directly to “irreparablen Schäden an unserer Heimat.”<sup>222</sup>

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<sup>218</sup> FPÖ *Handbuch* 2013, 70.

<sup>219</sup> FPÖ *Handbuch* 2013, 71.

<sup>220</sup> FPÖ *Handbuch* 2013, 70.

<sup>221</sup> FPÖ *Handbuch* 2013, 70.

<sup>222</sup> FPÖ *Handbuch* 2013, 70.



These concerns are well received by a population that is already cognizant of flaws in the EU common agricultural policy. Through the promise of implementation of agricultural protectionism in Austria, the FPÖ attract the votes of grass roots farming communities, who feel disenfranchised or negatively affected by EU policy. In 2010, for example, *die Presse* reported that for every Euro Austria contributes to the EU agricultural budget, only 77 cents is returned to local industry, and is, therefore, in need of radical reform.<sup>223</sup> Like the case of Austria's water supplies, the FPÖ use these anxieties to perpetuate separatism from the EU. By championing localised industry and the farmers that feel they are not being adequately compensated, or, indeed, represented, the party attracts votes from the middle working class demographic who feel their jobs and livelihood may be either exploited, or lost. According to FPÖ arguments, the agricultural policies of the EU seek to undermine Austrians' ability to choose what they grow on local farms, in an attempt to either flood the market with genetically modified foods or introduce those products directly to the agricultural process. Underlying this argument is the assumption that the European Union will flood Austria with foreign inferior produce, or change Austrian agricultural laws to serve the interests of large-scale factory farming above those of local ones. Therefore the FPÖ advocates 'clean, green' localised farming over that of the EU's *Agrarfabriken*.<sup>224</sup> It is with this politics of fear stratagem that the FPÖ successfully campaign their 'us' and 'them' scenario, with direct references to EU corruption and exploitation that is felt specifically in the back pocket of the working middle class agricultural sector.

### **2.1.5 - Sustainable forests**

The FPÖ also mention the forests as valued areas that require protection. For example, in their party programme the FPÖ states:

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<sup>223</sup> Grimm, Oliver. "Agrarpolitik: Nettozahler Österreich." *Die Presse*. Die Presse, 29, Jun. 2010. Web. 15 Aug. 2016.

<sup>224</sup> FPÖ *Handbuch 2013*, 69.



Der Schutz des Waldes ist daher von großem Interesse für Österreich. Ein Waldschutzgesetz soll sicherstellen, dass unsere Wälder auch für kommende Generationen Sicherheit und Erholung bieten.<sup>225</sup>

The persistent theme of Austria's topography as a type of national landscape, a commonly held treasure, and a home that must be preserved, continues with the forest. A communal place of recreation and a 'safe place', the forest is explained by the FPÖ to be yet another paragon of *Heimat*, which must be preserved by Austrians and kept for coming generations. The FPÖ also describes the forest as important for economic reasons (forestry), as a habitat for animals, as a recreational area for the population, as a protective barrier against mudflow and avalanches, as a source of drinking water, and the tourist industry.<sup>226</sup> In general terms, the FPÖ describes its approach to forest management as follows:

Die FPÖ bekennt sich zu einer nachhaltigen Bewirtschaftung und Betreuung von Waldflächen. Die Nutzung des Waldes muss so gestaltet sein, dass biologische Vielfalt, Produktivität, Verjüngungsfähigkeit und Vitalität des Waldes erhalten bleiben.<sup>227</sup>

The FPÖ's *Waldschutzgesetz* therefore also approaches forest preservation in order to foster a harmonious human-nature relationship. For the party, forest as place holds an integral importance for Austria: "Wälder haben als Lebensraum für zahlreiche Tierarten, als Erholungsraum für den Menschen, als Wirtschaftsfaktor, zur Sicherung vor Lawinen oder Muren sowie zur Reinhaltung von Gewässern eine zentrale Bedeutung für die gesamte Gesellschaft."<sup>228</sup> The FPÖ therefore commits itself to a sustainable „nachhaltigen Bewirtschaftung und Betreuung von Waldflächen. Die Nutzung des Waldes muss so gestaltet sein, dass biologische Vielfalt, Produktivität, Verjüngungsfähigkeit und Vitalität des Waldes erhalten bleiben.“<sup>229</sup> The FPÖ demands forest protection so that it can be utilised in a sustainable way for the

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<sup>225</sup> FPÖ Handbuch 2011, 77.

<sup>226</sup> FPÖ Handbuch 2013, 73.

<sup>227</sup> FPÖ Handbuch 2013, 73.

<sup>228</sup> FPÖ Handbuch 2011, 78.

<sup>229</sup> FPÖ Handbuch 2011, 77.

Austrian population, with both a level of wilderness and harvestable forest so as to find symmetry between ecologism and economics.

The FPÖ also references the imminent global issue of climate change, and the affect this is having on Austria's forests. As the party explains in their political programme: "Naturschutz sieht seine Aufgabe im Bewahren und Erhalten der Schöpfung."<sup>230</sup> Siting a common argument of our age as their impetus for action, the Freedom Party argues that due to the dangers of climate change, the forests need protection more than has been previously seen in history.<sup>231</sup> The party suggests maintaining, or even extending, national parks in order to protect species of plants and animals alongside permission for the human population to hunt responsibly.<sup>232</sup> They even suggest the implementation of 'buffer zones' to keep nature trails, roads, and other essential infrastructure away from the natural habitats of wild forest animals.<sup>233</sup> However there remains a clear premise throughout that these environmental objectives must be achieved sustainably and rationally, where a logical symmetry between nature and human activities is respected, "Beim Bewahren dieses Gleichgewichts sind Jäger und Naturschützer logische Partner und sollten aus freiheitlicher Sicht eng zusammenarbeiten."<sup>234</sup>

These examples demonstrate a resolution to nationalise the Austrian environment, and secure its resources for the wealth and longevity of the Austrian population. It is not disputed that the Right-Wing populists have a clear programme to preserve the environment; however some of their goals demonstrate a more complex agenda. For the FPÖ, environmentalism signifies ownership of Austria's immediate natural world arguably more than preserving the planet for humanity as a whole. The Right-Wing populist parties advocate ownership of land and nature (as well as the resources therein) as a counterargument to this perceived loss of sovereignty to globalist agents. Conservative land management practices, as a result, are as much about the right *to speak for* a territory, and the manner by which it will be preserved and managed, as they are about solely defending the natural world. The guidelines of conservation do not, therefore, focus on environmental issues as a global concern, but

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<sup>230</sup> FPÖ Handbuch 2013, 77.

<sup>231</sup> FPÖ Handbuch 2013, 78.

<sup>232</sup> FPÖ Handbuch 2013, 78.

<sup>233</sup> FPÖ Handbuch 2013, 78.

<sup>234</sup> FPÖ Handbuch 2013, 77.

rather from a limited Austrian focus. While the parties are committed to securing a sustainable and environmentally clean future, their primary concern is to achieve this for the sake of Austria specifically, and on Austrian terms.

In a practical sense, FPÖ ‘environmentalism’ follows an entirely logical and justifiable set of principles and demands, all of which is guided by protectionist policies and sustainable approaches to resource management. The beauty and diversity of Austria must be preserved, forest and rural ecosystems allowed to flourish, and environments left untouched by the often devastating human hand of industrial and economic progress. In their typical posturing as saviours and representatives of both people and *Heimat*, the FPÖ presents a programme that claims to have policies that will relinquish the corruption endemic in Austrian politics, along with the policies and infrastructure that pursue only profits at the expense of the natural environment. The FPÖ justifiably identifies an issue with the modern, capitalist Western ethos of consumerism and mass harvesting of the land for resources, and seeks to achieve a sustainable future where both society and environment can live together in harmony. Finally, the FPÖ reasonably suggest that what resources can be harvested by the nation should be done so for the benefit of the nation, and not for the profit coffers of international corporations and agents. This argument also includes a close examination of renewable energies and a reduction in the reliance on fossil fuels, which is undoubtedly the way of the future. Thus, in a practical sense, the FPÖ’s *Umweltschutz* policies follow an entirely reasonable political course, and would attract the sympathies of any environmentally conscious voter. However, the practical side of their discourse on environmentalism is only one part of a larger ideological framework. Beneath the conservationist image resides a belief that the natural world plays a much deeper formative role in the identity of social groups. Humanity’s relationship to nature, and the way this association affects identity, is the foundation from which the FPÖ’s environmental principles develop.

## **2.2 – Naturschutz**

The FPÖ perceive nature as an integral feature of identity for Austrians. As early as 1994, the then FPÖ leader Jörg Haider outlined his vision of an environmentally sustainable Austrian state, which includes underlying cultural and political approaches for establishing an Austrian society that is founded on the grounds of an intact environment that houses an intact culture and ethnic group. This

thesis on the interrelated nature of an intact environment and identity is predicated on man's inescapable and long established relationship to the natural world. For example, under the section titled "Freedom and Nature" in the English language edition of his book *Die Freiheit, die ich meine*, Haider argues "A humane state can only flourish when people have the freedom to live in harmony with nature," and identifies a fundamental relationship between freedom and nature: "The freedom I mean looks on people as a part of nature and sees nature as a part of the people."<sup>235</sup> In order to secure Austria's freedom and self-sufficiency, the community has "a responsibility to promote the environment."<sup>236</sup> If a community, or nation, can achieve an adequate level of harmonious coexistence with each other – then they will also, theoretically, find a congenial mode of existence with the natural and familiar topography of their *Heimat*. For Haider, "this ethic requires a profound change in the consciousness," of the people, "to rid nature of the exploitation by man. Man is not only the advocate of his own freedom but the trustee of the earth."<sup>237</sup> Only through the preservation of nature can the culture and history of the community also be, consequently, preserved for future generations. In their political programme, consequently, the party states that "Naturschutz" is a task to preserve the "Schöpfung."<sup>238</sup>

The synergy between social groups' collective identity and the natural world demonstrates a revival in older Rightist perspectives on the integral relationship between identity and nature. In this discourse, nature provided as a commonly held home to negate the perceived negative consequences of modernity and alienation. Nature has always figured strongly in romantic nationalism as a metaphor for homeland alongside discourses of struggle, ethnicity and adaption.<sup>239</sup> The cumulative environmental consciousness demonstrated by nationalist parties in developed Western nations is symptomatic of a broader trend, seen in Europe in particular, in which the revival of communal attachments to local environmental landscapes is typical.<sup>240</sup> The latest surge of environmental empathy in Western democracies

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<sup>235</sup> Haider, Jörg. *The Freedom I Mean*. New York: Swan, 1995. Print. 5.

<sup>236</sup> Haider 5.

<sup>237</sup> Haider 6.

<sup>238</sup> FPÖ *Handbuch* 2013, 77.

<sup>239</sup> Hamilton 33.

<sup>240</sup> Hamilton 27.

demonstrates, as such, a fundamental shift in the political orientation of Western electorates at international, national, and local levels toward environmental and regional consciousness.<sup>241</sup> This shift is identified most noticeably in a renewed sense of territorialism, which is defined in part by a social group's affinity with their local and natural surroundings. These modern movements are also typically nationalist, characterised through their refutation of modern identity markers and their will to identify collectively with more traditional modes of group classification, such as a shared sense of ethnicity.<sup>242</sup>

FPÖ youth spokesperson Manfred Haimbuchner describes his local *Bundesland* of Oberösterreich as a “Naturtalent”, describing “Sauberes Wasser, hochwertige Luftqualität und Artenvielfalt in der Tier- und Pflanzenwelt” that make the territory liveable and worth visiting.<sup>243</sup> For Haimbuchner, the protection of such a “Paradies” requires bringing people closer to nature through an active “Naturschutz” programme.<sup>244</sup> Haimbuchner also directly connects nature to *Heimat* in a 2014 video outlining *Naturschutz*, where he describes local nature as the ‘äußere Heimat’ to which Austrians belong:

Die Natur ist die äußere Heimat, denn was wäre unser Land ohne Wälder, Flüsse, Wiesen und Felder? Was wäre unser Oberösterreich ohne Berge und Seen, ohne Tiere und Menschen? Die Erhaltung von Arten und Lebensräumen ist untrennbar mit meinem Verständnis von Heimat verbunden.<sup>245</sup>

By linking the concept of *Heimat* with local nature, Haimbuchner and the FPÖ attempt to diminish the divide between people and nature, and also, therefore, connect nature with a national identity formula. In a modern age where nature has been divested of meaning, the sentimentality of the *Heimat* concept alongside images of natural surroundings permits the FPÖ to simplify the complexities of belonging and

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<sup>241</sup> Hamilton 27.

<sup>242</sup> Hamilton 27 – 28.

<sup>243</sup> Haimbuchner, Manfred. “Naturschutz.” *Manfredhaimbuchner*. FPÖ, n.d. Web. 17 Sep. 2015.

<sup>244</sup> Haimbuchner *Naturschutz*.

<sup>245</sup> Haimbuchner, Manfred. “5 Jahre Landesrat für Wohnbau und Naturschutz: Manfred Haimbuchner.” Online video clip. *YouTube*. FPÖ, 29 Oct. 2014. Web. 16 Jan. 2015.

identity, by distilling it down to the place that you come from. In a promotional video from 2012, Haimbuchner makes it abundantly clear that local nature informs the party's sense of *Heimat* and Austrian identity:



**Figure 5.**

Screenshot taken from YouTube.<sup>246</sup>

Alongside panoramic views of Austrian countryside, rivers, mountains, and forests, Haimbuchner describes Austrians as “natürlich naturverbunden”, and deeply connected to “unsere Heimat – unser Land!”<sup>247</sup> Describing Austrians as ‘in close touch with nature’ demonstrates an attempt to dramatically reduce the existential divide between people and nature by the FPÖ, and heralding place (in this case nature) as a definitive feature of their national identity formula. While Western democracies have witnessed a renaissance in the politics of ethnoterritorial movements, the FPÖ has sought to capitalise on the perceived societal failures that have caused such environmental devastation. Their brand of environmentalism thus seeks to answer ecological issues with a narrative that encourages territorialism, ethnicity, and an ownership of the land. The mastery of nature through the pursuit of

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<sup>246</sup> Haimbuchner, Manfred. “Naturschutzlandesrat Haimbuchner.” Online video clip. *YouTube*. FPÖ, 22 Aug. 2012. Web. 16 Jan. 2015.

<sup>247</sup> Haimbuchner *Naturschutzlandesrat*.

anthropocentrism<sup>248</sup> has alienated modern Europeans not only from each other, but also their natural surroundings. Society, as a result, is no longer a community in the truest sense; rather a series of individuals who believe that tradition and where one lives are irrelevant to identity. The practices that tie a community to their time and place, to their heritage and environment, have disappeared. The fusion of nature and *Heimat* by the FPÖ negates these developments, and attempts to reorientate the Austrian community around the nature that characterises their nation.

### **2.3 – Landscape, identity and *Heimat***

Austria is a nation endowed with rich natural beauty. The epic natural landscapes of Austria are used by the FPÖ as a powerful visual tool with which to illustrate their definition of *Heimat* and national identity. Haimbuchner, for example, describes the “Oberösterreichische Natur- und Landschaftsschutzgesetz” as a quest to preserve “die heimische Natur und Landschaft in ihren Lebens- oder Erscheinungsformen.”<sup>249</sup> The natural landscapes of Austria, Haimbuchner concludes, must be preserved for today and into the future, “damit unser Heimat-Land auch unser Wohlfühl-Raum bleibt.”<sup>250</sup> In this statement Haimbuchner emphatically decrees a strong relationship between the people of Oberösterreich (the region where Haimbuchner is from), their local landscapes, and the sense of *Heimat*. Landscapes, much like nature, require protection because of their important role in fostering a sense of ‘well-being’ in the *Heimatland*. The extensive use of Austrian natural landscapes in Haimbuchner’s publicity is testament to the importance the party places on such ‘national topography’. Haimbuchner’s videos typically laud various natural landscapes of Austria, such as lakes, mountains, fields, farms, forests, and hiking trails, all of which is showcased as quintessential examples of the identity of place, as well as the ‘Lebenswert’, all Austrians share.<sup>251</sup>

Underlying such publications is the argument that the concept of *Heimat* is specifically linked to the landscapes of the nation, with a particular emphasis on

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<sup>248</sup> Anthropocentrism refers to the idea that humanity is at the center of the universe above all other factors. See Krebs, Angelika. *Ethics of Nature: A map*. Berlin New York: W. de Gruyter, 1999. Print. 21.

<sup>249</sup> Haimbuchner *Naturschutz*.

<sup>250</sup> Haimbuchner *Naturschutz*.

<sup>251</sup> See for example Haimbuchner *Naturschutzlandesrat*.

natural topographies. This thesis, typical of many Right-Wing populist parties, attempts to place a special emphasis on the importance of the place of origin, of the home environment, to identity. The FPÖ's overtures to the Austrian population to rediscover their roots in the landscapes of the nation is an indirect attempt to negate, or even refute, the more complex modern identity formulas – such as class, religion, profession, etc. Anthony Giddens also identifies a loss of identity of place in the modern Western by noting that in pre-modern societies, social relationships were informed by individual's immediate surroundings, whereas with the onset of modernity, social relations are no longer limited to the 'local context'. Giddens calls this the "disembedding" of social relations "from the local contexts of interaction and their restructuring across indefinite spans of time-space."<sup>252</sup> An obvious example here is the Internet, radio, or television, all of which function as a means of communication that allows people to construct a sense of self through various sources that are not confined to one's immediate sense of place. Modern transportation is another, which through the ease of travel has allowed for people to break free from the area in which they are born and construct identity based on the various places they choose to visit or dwell in. While these modern feats of technology have their observable benefits, they also have contributed to the negative consequences of 'disembedding', in which traditional and hereditary qualities of group identification, usually associated with the place in which one is born or lives, are abandoned from a more global, migratory, and cosmopolitan construction of self.

This modern process of identity formation involves the dislocation of a community from their sense of "place" as a socio-spatial marker, which is understood in this context as "the idea of the locale, which refers to the physical settings of social activity as situated geographically."<sup>253</sup> Daniel Deudney summarizes this process of disembedding as the divorce of "who-ness" from "here-ness."<sup>254</sup> The modern world, with all its various forms of communication and methods of migration, allows relations to be conducted across broad geographical areas, and this has slowly

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<sup>252</sup> Giddens, Anthony. *The Consequences of Modernity*. London: Stanford University Press, 1990. Print. 12.

<sup>253</sup> Giddens 18.

<sup>254</sup> Deudney, Daniel. "Ground Identity: Nature, Place and Space in Nationalism." *The Return of Culture and Identity to International Relations Theory*. Eds. Lapid, Yosef and Friedrich Kratochwil. New York: Lynne Rienner 1995. 129 – 45. Print. 304.



degraded the limited and local manner of social activity and collective identity traditionally informed by local place. Traditional modes of collective identity, as such, also begin to fracture under this form of social relations, along with the mythologies and biographical histories they preserve. A sense of collective identity informed by the place of birth or domicile, as a result, is diminished or negated entirely.

In order to respond to this problematic social imaginary and the ‘disembedding’ of community from nature, the FPÖ approach local environment as a broader identity issue. Among Far Right and Right-Wing populist ideologues there has always been a fundamental rejection of these principles of ‘Enlightenment universalism’, or the “world view in which a system of places is a human, not a natural construction...”<sup>255</sup> As Emily Turner-Graham explains, for the Far Right the sense of place (and thus environmental consciousness) is imperative because according to the Far Right worldview all ethnic and cultural groups “have a geographical area with which they are naturally and inherently connected. This area forms and consistently informs their ethnic and cultural characteristics.”<sup>256</sup> In other words, social groups such as those nations embody require a homeland in which they can develop a distinct collective sense of self. In a modern world that has been dislocated from the identity-forming and identity-preserving influence of local nature, a renewed sense of environmental consciousness is one way the Right-Wing populism provides an otherwise frustrated and alienated population with a collective sense of home. Nature provides a spatial home that is immediate, recognizable, and, most importantly, acquired by birthright. It is not assigned by disproportionate monetary means or any other capitalist pursuit. Nature as a commonly held homeland is available to all in the ethnocultural group: it does not require societal advantage, and is something, therefore, that all those from the targeted demographic can relate to and believe in. Nature as identity, as a result, is a populist strategy to reverse the ‘disembedding’ caused by the modern European social imaginary, and replace it with a fixed, stable identity that is accessible from the immediate spatial dimensions people experience.

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<sup>255</sup> Olsen 5 – 6.

<sup>256</sup> Turner-Graham *Environment*, 237.

The ‘greening’ of nationalist sentiment symptomatic of Right-Wing populist ‘eco-nationalism’ is, then, an example of collective identity constructed around human-nature interaction. In this narrative, the natural environment is a mirror for the collective identity of the ethnocultural group that claim that place as a native homeland. Distinctive natural topography must be protected because it is the architect of the ethnic nation’s unique identity. The natural world, specifically with all of its regional particularity, is subsequently loaded with symbolism to help determine the distinctiveness of the people that have dwelt there for generations. The populist Right’s discourse on man’s close relationship with local nature as a source of culture and collective identity is a convenient catalyst to convey a counter-ideal and imaginary to the modern social system that is informed by spatially vast and culturally diverse social agents. Such anti-modernist tendencies seek to replace modern social formations and attitudes with new ones, some of which can also be identified as resurrected from pre-modern systems of nature reverence. In order to resist the dislocating tendencies of this modern European social imaginary, which has deconstructed traditional modes of identity and reduced nature to a source of commodities, the populist Right attempts to evoke a sense of place that encourages both nature adoration and a national identity that is deeply rooted to the geography of the land. It is from this eco-nationalist perspective that the populist parties begin to transform natural topography into national landscapes and utilise them to discursively construct national identity.

Austria possesses ample examples of natural beauty and landscapes that can facilitate patriotic national identity narratives through emotive visual overtures in political media. Whether vast forests, clear alpine lakes, or towering mountainous panoramas, the natural topography of Austria is something locals boast of and tourists venerate. Margarete Lamb-Faffelberger notes that since the dawn of the Second Republic, referencing the splendid natural beauty Austria’s possesses has consistently evoked a uniquely Austrian sense of *Heimat* and identity.<sup>257</sup> The beauty of the Austrian landscape is instrumental in helping to shape how Austrians see themselves, as well as how they wish to be perceived abroad.<sup>258</sup> Ruth Wodak argues that upon

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<sup>257</sup> Lamb-Faffelberger 291.

<sup>258</sup> Haen, Theo, and Pieter Vermeulen. *Cultural Identity and Postmodern Writing*. Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2006. Print. 106.

returning home from abroad, many Austrians contemplate their uniqueness in the world by identifying with, amongst other cultural elements, the distinctive beauty of their homeland's landscape.<sup>259</sup>

Peter Westenthaler, one time member of the Austrian Right-Wing populist party the *Bündnis Zukunft Österreich* (BZÖ), released the upbeat pop song *Wir halten zam* for the party in 2006, which patriotically celebrated the beautiful Austrian landscape and its importance to a sense of *Heimat*:

Wir Österreicher leb'n im schönsten Land der Welt  
Schaut's euch um, wir haben all's was zählt  
Berge, Flüsse, Wälder und die klaren Seen  
Dieser Fleck der Erde ist doch wunderschön

Wir halten 'zam  
Ein Leben lang.  
Wir halten ganz fest 'zam  
Für unser Heimatland.<sup>260</sup>

The packaging of such clichéd sentiments within a popular music piece is an interesting example of the Austrian Right-Wing populist foray into mainstream circles. The lauding of Austria as “schönste[s] Land der Welt” uses the emotive power of national landscapes to encourage patriotism in the audience – a land of such beauty unsurpassed as to be the envy of the entire world. The inclusiveness of the song, of statements such as “schaut'd euch um, wir haben alles...”, with landscapes and natural topographies described as communal possessions, bring Austrians together as a definite social group with a unique and beautiful homeland. The phrase that provides the basis for the song title, “Wir halten ganz fest 'zam, Für unser Heimatland”<sup>261</sup>, further describes Austrians as a unified force (behind the

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<sup>259</sup> Wodak *Discursive*, 116.

<sup>260</sup> Westenthaler, Peter. “Wir halten zam” *BZÖ Podcast*. PodHost, 28 Aug. 2006. Web. 5 Sep. 2015.

<sup>261</sup> Westenthaler.

figurehead of Austrian Right-Wing populism), with a sense of *Heimat* that is, in part, defined through landscapes that typify the land Austrians call home.

In Hofer and Howanietz' book from 2013, Austria as *Heimat* is described in a similar fashion, with the consistent use of emotive cues pertaining to the beauty of the land, and how fortunate Austrians are to have it as their *Heimat*:

Österreich sei ein „wunderbares“, ein „liebens- wertes“, ein „schönes“, ein „fantastisches“, ein „faszinierendes“ Land. Und was sagen die Österreicher? Sie sind nahezu ausnahmslos dankbar, in diesem Land geboren zu sein, in diesem unserem Heimatland leben zu dürfen.<sup>262</sup>

The process of encouraging group gratification for the land into which one is born helps the FPÖ consolidate its national 'In' group formula. In an interview in 2015, for example, FPÖ youth spokesperson Manfred Haimbuchner addressed the question of why the environment is so important to contemporary young Austrians by also emphasising the relationship between environment, landscape, and *Heimat*: “Der Schutz unserer Landschaften und unserer Umwelt stellt auch gleichzeitig einen Schutz unserer Heimat dar.”<sup>263</sup> The strong use of the possessive pronoun *unser* in this statement demonstrates that Haimbuchner perceives both landscape and environment as things owned by the Austrian people. In a Facebook post in 2012, Heinz Christian-Strache also explained the importance of landscape and *Heimat*:

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<sup>262</sup> Howanietz 139.

<sup>263</sup> Haimbuchner, Manfred. “Beantwortet von Manfred Haimbuchner, Jugendsprecher der FPÖ.” *Wahlkabine*. Institut für Neue Kulturtechnologien, n.d. Web. 2 Feb. 2016.



**Figure 6.**

Image taken from Facebook.<sup>264</sup>

Described again using the first plural possessive pronoun, *our*, the landscape and *Heimat* of Austria as a possession of the people provides for Strache the grounding reason to remain strong in defence of the *Heimat*. Strache, furthermore, directly links the words *Heimat* and *Landschaft*. Emily Turner-Graham argues that the FPÖ maintains what is in fact a long held Rightist view that national landscapes and national identity are interrelated.<sup>265</sup> Landscapes, therefore, although connected to the concept of environment, appear to transcend base topography and nature, and as a result speak for a deeper sense of communal, national identity that is embedded in the land with which Austrian people feel a special affinity. The use of the term *Heimatland* further merges the two concepts of homeland and landscape, creating the idea of landscapes as a paragon of *Heimat*. The concept of *Stolz* and *Verantwortung*, further evoke a sense of strength, timelessness, and continuity, as Austrians must remain united in the defence of their national landscapes, *Heimat*, and national identity for future generations. Strache's post aptly illustrates the powerful use of the human-nature-landscape interaction that underpins much of the FPÖ's use of *Heimat* to facilitate a national identity narrative that constructed around an identity of place formula in juxtaposition to globalisation or the concept of a 'global citizen'.

<sup>264</sup> Strache, Heinz-Christian. "Unserer wundervolle Heimat Und Landschaft." *Facebook*. Facebook, 31 May 2012. Web. 31 May 2012.

<sup>265</sup> Turner-Graham *Enviroment*, 234.

Nature alone, therefore, does not signify landscape. The character of landscape is derived from the human interaction with nature, and the human meanings that are ascribed to those places as a result. Simon Schama explains that:

Landscapes are culture before they are nature; constructs of the imagination projected onto wood and water and rock [. . .]. But it should also be acknowledged that once a certain idea of landscape, a myth, a vision, establishes itself in an actual place, it has a peculiar way of muddling categories, of making metaphors more real than their referents; of becoming, in fact, part of the scenery.<sup>266</sup>

Landscape is thus a matter of human perception, and while the natural topography is real, the sentimentality of special meaning assigned to it is an abstract human imaginary. In other words, as Sam Turner puts it, “today’s landscape is a form of active material culture that has both shaped people and been shaped by them.”<sup>267</sup>

Landscapes are also loaded with emotive qualities for those that perceive them, which transcend the limitations of base nature. This process allows landscapes a great power of coercion over those that imagine them. W J T Mitchell notes that “landscape exerts a subtle power over people, eliciting a broad range of emotions and meanings that are difficult to specify.”<sup>268</sup> Kirby Farrell explains that when people imagine nature as landscapes, the landscape ceases to be nature alone, and instead “functions as a symbolic extension of the self.”<sup>269</sup> Nature as landscape is not simply a picture, panorama, or entity, but rather an instrument for managing or constructing identity narratives. Farrell describes landscape in this way as a form of ‘psychic topography’, infused with social history that functions as “a record of the attempts not just to own the land, but to identify with it.”<sup>270</sup> When discussing the concept of landscape, then, one must also consider existential identity, whether as individuals or

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<sup>266</sup> Schama, Simon. *Landscape and Memory* New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1995. Print. 61.

<sup>267</sup> Turner, Sam. "Historic Landscape Characterisation: A Landscape Archaeology for Research, Management and Planning." *Landscape Research* 31.4 (2006): 385 - 98. Print. 387.

<sup>268</sup> Mitchell, W J T. *Landscape and Power*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002. vii.

<sup>269</sup> Farrell, Kirby. "Eschatological Landscape." *Land and Identity: Theory, Memory, and Practice and Memorylands: Heritage and Identity in Europe Today*. Eds. Berberich, Christine, Neil Campbell and Robert Hudson. New York: Rodopi, 2012. 117 - 39. Print. 118.

<sup>270</sup> Farrell 118.

social groups. Derk Jan Stobberlaar and Bas Pedroli explain that, in relation to landscape imagery, existential identity is not only formed by physical attributes, but also symbolic meanings attached to the physical landscape, which is the basis of the “social and cultural environment.”<sup>271</sup> As a result, we approach the Right-Wing populist concept of *Heimat* as a discursive construct that employs landscape as identity. This landscape identity, as we shall see, is very much determined by how the FPÖ perceives and interprets it. This imaginary, in particular, relies on a process of symbolically charging the terrain with desired national identity composites, and as a result expands upon the identity narrative so important in the FPÖ’s *Heimat* discourse.

We can therefore define landscape identity as the imagined or perceived uniqueness of a place, which when visualised together by a social group helps to foster or compose a national identity narrative that is geographically grounded. People tend to forge their identities (and national identities) by formulating a sense of belonging to a specific landscape where they were raised, have lived for an extended period (sometimes generations), or where they came to the realisation of self. Identity that is derived from these types of landscapes is called ‘place identity’, and it is formulated through the “inherent quality of the landscape as perceived by the people.”<sup>272</sup> We therefore identify a difference between nature as ‘space’, and landscape as ‘place’. Marcel Hunziker, Matthias Buchecker and Terry Hartig explain that in ‘space mode’, people perceive landscape as raw natural topography that provides for biological or survival needs, whereas in ‘place mode’ “people perceive the landscape primarily in terms of self-reflection (experiences, achievements) and social integration (values, norms, symbols, meanings).”<sup>273</sup> In other words, cultural and social actions transfer meaning on space and nature, thereby transforming it into place identity and landscape.

As Daniel Williams explains, physical space becomes place only when meaning is attached to the geographical locale, which provides emotive and

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<sup>271</sup> Stobbelaar, Derk Jan, and Bas Pedroli. "Perspectives on Landscape Identity: A Conceptual Challenge." *Landscape Research* 36.3 (2011): 231 - 339. Print. 323.

<sup>272</sup> Stobbelaar 323.

<sup>273</sup> Hunziker, Marcel, Matthias Buchecker, and Terry Hartig. "Space and Place - Two Aspects of the Human-Landscape." *A Changing World: Challenges for Landscape Research*. Eds. Kienast, Felix, Otto Wildi and Sucharita Ghosh. Dordrecht: Springer, 2007. 47 - 62. Print. 49.

affectionate bonds in those that perceive it and results in a long-lasting and deep-rooted attachment.<sup>274</sup> When space transforms into place, therefore, it helps nurture a sense of belonging, social integration, life values, and a sense of self.<sup>275</sup> This is achieved through a social group's interpretation of the place or landscape, which is also a self-reflective perspective. People's identity is connected to place by first identifying one's own environment, being identified by others in the environment, and finally accepting oneself as a part of that environment.<sup>276</sup> The reciprocal procedure of human-landscape interaction between groups and place allows landscape to remind people of their own identity by loading the environment with human qualities, cultural values, abilities, and social histories all of which facilitate a sense of belonging. Landscape identity and place identity therefore force people into constant contact with the landscape in which they live to confirm who they really are, or who they believe or imagine they are. Landscape and place identity provides social groups a sense of distinctiveness and enables people to distinguish themselves from others. In other words, when a person distinguishes himself or herself as an Austrian from the foothills of the Alps, they are connecting themselves to the landscape of the mountains, as well as all the human values that are loaded into it. As Stobbelaar and Pedroli explain, it is through identifying with landscapes that place begins to act as a social category, and thus "place identification can be seen as synonymous with social identification."<sup>277</sup> We therefore approach the populist concept of *Heimat* as an example of landscape identity, which provides their audience with a mode of social identification that is characterised by 'Austrian' values, qualities, histories, and a resultant collective sense of self that, while abstract and discursive, is at the very least geographically immediate.

### **2.3.1 - Agrarian landscapes**

Agrarian scenery is the first landscape of significance in the FPÖ's *Heimat* as national identity discourse. The FPÖ states in its political *Handbuch*: "Das Schicksal

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<sup>274</sup> Williams, Daniel, et al. "Beyond the Commodity Metaphor: Examining Emotional and Symbolic Attachment to Place." *Leisure Sciences* 14.1 (1992): 29 - 46. Print. 31.

<sup>275</sup> Hunziker 51.

<sup>276</sup> For example see Graumann, Carl. "On Multiple Identities." *International Social Science Journal* 35 (1983): 309 - 21. Print.

<sup>277</sup> Stobbelaar 326.



unserer Heimat ist eng mit unserer Landwirtschaft verbunden.”<sup>278</sup> In this narrative of *Heimat* as agricultural life the FPÖ identifies a convergence of *Umwelt*, *Heimat*, *Landeskultur* and *Kulturlandschaft*, in order to depict an Austrian landscape identity that is synonymous with provincial, agrarian life. This is seen, for example, when rural and agrarian Austrian settings are listed by the FPÖ as worthy of preservation because they are culturally and historically significant to the identity of the native population. The traditions associated with the *Bauerntum*, and the economic and resource prosperity *Landwirtschaft* provides for the Austrian population, are highly valued by the FPÖ:

Die österreichische Kulturlandschaft wurde über Jahrhunderte durch die bäuerliche Bearbeitung kultiviert und geprägt. Sie bildet gemeinsam mit den ländlichen Siedlungsformen, den Nutztierarten, den Bewirtschaftungsformen und dem ländlichen Brauchtum die Landeskultur.<sup>279</sup>

In this extract there is powerful language describing rural Austrian landscapes as cultivated landscape that is rich in hundreds of years of history and tradition.

The FPÖ’s argument on the validity of an Austrian *Kulturlandschaft* typified by agrarian settings and *Landeskultur* is predicated on the long-established inhabitancy of Austrians in the land, a sense of productivity and ownership, and the cultural affinity they share with each other and the environment through their shared sense of place. This identity narrative requires examples of Austrians sharing a long established, harmonious, working relationship with the landscape from which they are derived. Rural landscapes and agrarian communities provide the first justification. In this identity of place narrative, rural and agrarian communities are supported as examples of traditional Austrian identity, with a particular emphasis on these communities’ close and practical relationship with the natural world. In a video from 2014, Haimbuchner on behalf of the FPÖ emphasises the long-standing traditions that are preserved in Austria’s agrarian landscapes and the people who live and work there:

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<sup>278</sup> FPÖ *Handbuch* 2013, 69.

<sup>279</sup> FPÖ *Handbuch* 2013, 69.



**Figure 7.**

Screenshot taken from YouTube.<sup>280</sup>

Such imagery, which portrays Austrian farmers using traditional farming tools and wearing customary *Tracht*, discursively constructs an impression of *Heimat* in which traditional modes of existence (that are rooted to the land and informed by local culture) are normative. Agrarian landscapes, as a result, are understood by the FPÖ to be indicative of cultural inheritance and fruitfulness, a wonderful exposé of the beauty and authenticity of the *Heimat* concept in the party's national identity discourse. The agrarian landscape is, as a result, loaded by the FPÖ with 'Austrian' qualities - hard work, innovation, tradition and community, all of which facilitates a sense of belonging through an abstract cultural interpretation of natural landscapes. The agrarian landscape provides the FPÖ with images of *Heimat* that are rooted in the soil, traditional, and in harmony with nature – all of which is then introspectively consumed by the audience as an important element in a national identity formula that is therefore worthy of preservation. Agrarian landscapes, in other words, are customary and unchanging. They preserve traditional community structures informed by an immediate sense of place, as well as by the inter-generational transmission of culture. They are entirely contradictory of the 'global citizen', and encourage communities to remain firmly rooted in the places from which they originate, thereby further emphasizing an insular and unchanging concept of national identity and home.

For the FPÖ, agriculture is understood in an idyllic and natural context, the

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<sup>280</sup> Haimbuchner *5 Jahre*.

result of the toil of farming communities, who live harmoniously with the natural environment. The nostalgic, *völkisch* image of the peasant farmer has rich cultural symbolism: a patriot, who through conventional and organic farming, produces high quality goods for the longevity of the nation. The sentimental portrayal of farming communities, as true Austrians who live harmoniously with their native soil, is a useful technique in the political discourse of Austrian identity and landscape in the FPÖ ideology. In their *Handbuch* they emphasise the importance of farming communities to culture, nature preservation, and national identity, stating that “Ein freier und leistungsfähiger Bauernstand ist Voraussetzung für den Erhalt der natürlichen Existenzgrundlagen unserer Heimat.”<sup>281</sup> The best agricultural method for the FPÖ employs a system of land-bound production, which takes into consideration “das kleinräumige natürliche Gleichgewicht Rücksicht, schont die natürlichen Ressourcen und schafft die für Österreich typische bäuerliche Kultur...”<sup>282</sup> On the importance of what the FPÖ describes as ‘peasant culture’, the party explains that the ancestral ‘peasantry’ has dual economic and cultural importance, as both the providers of healthy food for national self sufficiency, and for the preservation of the national culture through the guardianship of cultural landscapes such as the Alpine settlement areas.<sup>283</sup>

In the BZÖ *Grundsatzprogramm*, under the title ‘Zukunft braucht Heimat’, position IV provides an image of the Austrian countryside and farm fields as *Heimat*:

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<sup>281</sup> FPÖ *Handbuch* 2013, 68.

<sup>282</sup> FPÖ *Handbuch* 2013, 68.

<sup>283</sup> FPÖ *Handbuch* 2011, 73.



**Figure 8.**

Image taken from the BZÖ.<sup>284</sup>

This nostalgic image of an idyllic, rural and mountainous land, with a church in centre surrounded by the fields of agriculture, transmits to the viewer a symbolically enriched landscape. The implied symbolism of this image exhibits an implicitly detailed narrative of the BZÖ's opinion on *Heimat* and identity, based primarily on the rural farming characteristics of a more vintage and timeworn Austria. Again, and perhaps not by chance, the town design with church in the very centre appears to confirm the importance of Christian-Occidental values. In explaining state identity and the notion of *Heimat*, the BZÖ proclaim, "Nur aus starken Wurzeln kann eine gute Zukunft entstehen. Unser Werteverständnis fußt auf diesem Fundament."<sup>285</sup> Society, like the farmer's fields, requires strong roots and natural organic growth in order to reach its full potential. The landscape provided to visually demonstrate the deep natural roots of *Heimat* and identity, the idyllic and mountainous rural *modus vivendi*, demonstrates the importance of pre-established, customary and arguably autochthonous modes of communal identity in Right-Wing populist rhetoric. This grounded sense of organic and traditional fraternity is utilised as a counter-balance to what the BZÖ describe as the "zunehmender Migration und den Folgen der Globalisierung."<sup>286</sup> Thus the core human element in the landscape of pastoral idealism

<sup>284</sup> BZÖ. *Zehn rechtsliberale Grundsatzpositionen*. Vienna: BZÖ, 2011. Print. 8.

<sup>285</sup> BZÖ *Grundsatzpositionen*, 8.

<sup>286</sup> BZÖ *Grundsatzpositionen*, 8.

propagated by the Right-Wing populist parties, and the culture that is symbolically charged within the panorama, demonstrates a customary agrarian society.

In order to understand landscape as a symbolically charged element that reflects societal identity, one must consider the dualistic Right-Wing populist approach. In an almost Manichean good versus evil narrative, that of a grounded, traditional and Germanic agrarian society, which is symbolically charged into natural landscapes, versus the homogenising, denationalising and cultural decrepitude of the abyss that is modernism and globalisation. This ideology is not regressive, and does not, for example, negate development and technology. This narrative, does, however, celebrate the natural and sustainable approach of the ‘traditional’ Austrian farmer. For example, the FPÖ explains:

Die österreichischen Bauern bewirtschaften und gestalten im Alpenbereich einen ökologisch besonders sensiblen Raum. Die Bodenkraft und der qualitative hochwertige Wasserhaushalt stellen zunehmend wertvolle Produkte der Alpenregion dar, die eine sorgfältige, - nachhaltige - Bewirtschaftung erfordern.<sup>287</sup>

The unique character of the Austrian farmer, and his or her rural lifestyle, is the symbolic heart of the *Heimat*. For the Freedom Party it is imperative to preserve the farming landscape of Austria, as “Österreich kann aus dem reichen Schatz einer weitgehend intakten Umwelt und einer kleinstrukturierten Landwirtschaft schöpfen.”<sup>288</sup> The farmers of Austria have a special role as defenders of the national culture. Therefore customary modes of farming must be preserved as integral elements of state identity, “Der Arbeitsplatz Bauernhof ist uns daher ein hohes Gut. Die Struktur der bäuerlichen Familienbetriebe als Vollerwerbsbetriebe ist vor den Verzerrungen der europäischen Agrarförderpolitik zu schützen.”<sup>289</sup> Here the dualistic, Manichean argument is clear, a traditional, sustainable and localised farming culture against the mass production, faceless factory harvest advocated at the heart of

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<sup>287</sup> FPÖ *Handbuch* 2013, 69.

<sup>288</sup> FPÖ *Handbuch* 2013, 69.

<sup>289</sup> FPÖ *Handbuch* 2013, 69.

European Union agricultural policies, which as we have seen, dominates their practical environmental policies.

For Austria's Right-Wing populist parties, the values associated with Austrian farmers on the land are that of hard working, energetic, traditional, and provincial men. It is, therefore, a landscape in which they desire to be seen and a cultural landscape identity they wish to emulate. For example, during his 2008 election campaign, Jörg Haider released a billboard depicting himself within the golden cornfields of Austria, sleeves rolled up and ready to grapple, a true example of the machismo and energy of the typical 'Austrian' agrarian landscape identity formula:



**Figure 9.**  
BZÖ 2008.<sup>290</sup>

Haider delights in portraying himself as 'one of the boys', a provincial Austrian who is at home in the agrarian landscapes, and informed by a cultural landscape identity that represents the values of perseverance, strength, and provincialism. It demonstrates an Austrian identity that is deep rooted at home in the cultural landscapes of the *Heimat*, and is far from the cosmopolitan influences of urban life. Haider is hard working, in his prime, robust, and very much at home among his fellow 'salt of the earth' Austrians. Haider appears to understand the concerns and daily activities of hard-working Austrian farmers. It is therefore not by chance that such images and slogans were disseminated alongside the principle maxim of

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<sup>290</sup> Image taken from "Österreich den Österreichern": BZÖ startet in den Wahlkampf." *Die Presse*. Die Presse, 27 Aug. 2008. Web. 10 Jan. 2015.

‘Österreich den Österreichern’, as the landscape identity of provincial Austrian folk is championed by the Right-Wing populist parties as one strong example of the larger Austrian national identity. The image of the hard-working peasant within his accustomed rural landscape demonstrates a degree of ruggedness and machismo, which Right-Wing populist politicians consistently favour. The identity formula that develops in the fusion of landscapes and people is directed by the illustration of such cultural values, which in this case are developed from a perceived long legacy of human-nature interaction, such as those diligent qualities of the masculine and innovative farmer who works the land.

Support for local agrarian landscapes over a more globalized image of the world, and therefore the weakening of national identity formulas, is, thus, typical of Rightist ideology in Germany and Austria. As Olsen explains, the defense of small scale communities, such as agrarian ones, from a homogenizing one-world consumer-capitalist culture, and the protection of local environments from globalist agents, are simply modern representations of “*völkisch* traditions that have long coloured Right-Wing German and Austrian understanding of the interconnection between national identity and national environments.”<sup>291</sup> Stobbelaar and Pedroli explain, furthermore, that this form of cultural landscape identity, which celebrates the culture preserved in agrarian environments, is informed by a merger of existential identity and spatial characteristics, and that cultural landscape identity is ascribed “socio cultural meanings that are linked to place... playing a role in the collective living world and confirming that ‘we-feeling’ of a group.”<sup>292</sup> The FPÖ’s support for farmers, as well as the party’s consistent use of agrarian imagery in its publicity, combines existential identity with the spatial characteristics of Austria’s pastoral lands. Agrarian landscapes, as a result, help the party to facilitate its persistent ‘us’ narrative, which is fixed to the land and incongruous with modern migration or the global citizen with no affiliations to place whatsoever. The use of *Heimat* alongside this exclusive national identity formula only emboldens such discourse by emotionally, linking the age-old imagery of rural existence with a modern concept of what it means to be at home in Austria, and what it means to be Austrian.

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<sup>291</sup> Olsen 2.

<sup>292</sup> Stobbelaar 325.



### **2.3.2 - Alpine landscapes**

The second Austrian locale that evokes a landscape identity in the FPÖ's *Heimat* discourse is the Alps. In his book titled *The Alps: A Cultural History* Andrew Beattie asserts that a profound link exists between Austria's Far Right and alpine settings, reminding us that "From nowhere in the continent (of Europe) does the far-right sentiment linger on most tenaciously than in the mountain regions of Austria."<sup>293</sup> Austria's geographic position determines the nation's 'alpine' characterisation, however it is the persistent observances to this designation with the mountains throughout history that make the Alps a cultural landscape. Heinz-Christian Strache has more recently utilised the powerful social media tool of Facebook to encourage his unique sense of *Heimat* and national patriotism, by emphasising the importance of (and his particular love of) alpine panoramas for Austrian identity. In the image seen here, posted by Strache in 2012, a patriotic scene of national colours and alpine landscape is projected with the adjacent comment: "Flagge zeigen .... Für unsere wundervolle und schöne Heimat Österreich! :-)"<sup>294</sup>:



**Figure 10.**

Image taken from Facebook.<sup>295</sup>

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<sup>293</sup> Beattie, Andrew. *The Alps: A Cultural History*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006. Print. 155.

<sup>294</sup> Strache, Heinz-Christian. "Flagge zeigen .... Für unsere wundervolle und schöne Heimat Österreich!" *Facebook*. Facebook. 26 Oct. 2012. Web. 26 Dec. 2012.

<sup>295</sup> Strache *Flagge zeigen*.



This particular image demonstrates the fusion of national landscapes, in this case the power and beauty of Austria's alpine landscape, with national identity and patriotism. In the image, Austrian national identity is symbolically depicted with the use of the Austrian flag, which foreshadows a panoramic alpine background that portrays the the nation possesses. A publicity video from Haimbuchner from 2012 also uses alpine vistas while simultaneously explaining that Austrians are, by nature, connected to these landscapes, to 'our' *Land* and 'our' *Heimat*:



**Figure 11.**

Screenshot taken from YouTube.<sup>296</sup>

The use of alpine images alongside national identity and *Heimat* narratives constructs an image of the homeland with which many Austrians can empathise and subsequently feel a sense of patriotism. When observing the beauty and mastery of local nature, many cannot help but be in awe and experience pride and sentimentality. The mountains, as a result, become 'our home' - an exclusive interpretation of the landscape that belongs only to Austrians, and thus carries oblique references to separatism, nationalism, and insularism that emerge from a distinctive belief in ownership over the panoramas the landscapes depict.

National identity in alpine landscapes is further constructed by the FPÖ through the inclusion of symbology indicative of the Western ethos and civilisation. In 2012, for example, Strache released a poster celebrating the emotive power of the

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<sup>296</sup> Haimbuchner *Naturschutzlandesrat*.

Austrian Alps, alongside the rather nationalistic proclamation - “Mein Österreich, wir lieben dich und deine Natur!”:



Figure 12.

Image taken from Facebook.<sup>297</sup>

The possessive quality of the slogan ‘My Austria, we love you and your nature’ further propagates the ‘us’ and ‘them’ formula so prevalent in FPÖ rhetoric. The FPÖ’s poster, furthermore, symbolically loads Austria’s alpine topography with a deeper existential meaning through the inclusion of the nationalist and religious icons. In the poster, the alpine landscape of Austria is clearly lined to Christianity and Western culture through the iconographical clue of the crucifix. The placement of the national flag and a crucifix alongside the mountains demonstrates to the observer that Christianity is an equally integral feature of Austrian identity: as natural in the nation as the Alps under which the population lives. The crucifix is also indicative of the broader anti-Islamic policy of “Abendland in Christenhand”<sup>298</sup> disseminated by the FPÖ, which suggests that new immigrants, particularly from Islamic nations, have no connection to Austrian nature or culture and therefore are incapable of assimilation into the broader Austrian national consciousness. The poster, accordingly, not only shows which topography is typical in Austria, but also which values, cultures, and

<sup>297</sup> Strache, Heinz-Christian. “Mein Österreich, wir lieben dich und deine Natur!” *Facebook*. Facebook. 30 Sep. 2012. Web. 30 Sep. 2012.

<sup>298</sup> For example see FPÖ *Handbuch* 2013, 50.

social groups belong there. The use of the Alps, subsequently, illustrates an image of *Heimat* that is insular and determined by Western values, and is, therefore, anathema to an open, all-inclusive view of the homeland.

The crucifix appears again in a poster shared by Strache in 2013, where he describes the FPÖ as the only true defenders of Austria:



**Figure 13.**

Image taken from Facebook.<sup>299</sup>

Here alpine landscapes directly compliment Strache and the FPÖ. The slogans ‘We are Austria’s only protection mechanism’, and ‘Our heart beats red/white/red’ (a reference to the colours of the Austrian flag), are specifically linked to alpine scenery. A true Austrian party that only loves and represents Austria, with no other hidden or extended agenda, in other words, protects archetypal Austria. The values of Austria, symbolically depicted in the crucifix, and the quintessence of *Heimat*, illustrated in the Alps, are thus simultaneously defended by the FPÖ in contrast to other parties who would usurp these national identity formulas and replace them with more inclusive, globalist platforms. In the fore of this symbolically loaded image, Strache appears as the leader of the party and the nationalist ethos they represent.

<sup>299</sup> Strache, Heinz-Christian. “Entscheidung für unsere Heimat Österreich!” *Facebook*. Facebook, 02 Nov. 2012. Web. 02 Nov. 2012.

While the FPÖ use alpine scenery to illustrate an image of *Heimat* that is selective of the ethnocultural demographic that fits within its national identity formula, other parties have, in contrast, selected an opposing, and inclusive approach. During the Austrian presidential election, the Left-wing candidate and current president Alexander Van der Bellen adopted alpine imagery and the *Heimat* concept from the FPÖ in order to challenge their prevalence on the topic:



**Figure 14.**

Van der Bellen 2016. Image taken from *Preussischer Anzeiger*.<sup>300</sup>

In the quote, Van der Bellen indicates his strong desire to contribute to the *Heimat* debate by contributing to the concept's meaning from his own perspective. Van der Bellen appears to agree with the fundamental features of *Heimat*: a romantic fusion of childhood memories born and raised in the mountains, pastoral settings, alpine vistas, and local villages. His stance in front of a typical alpine vista, additionally, is not at all alien to the publicity strategy of the FPÖ. The difference between the political strategy of the one-time leader of the Austrian Greens and the FPÖ, however, is made clear in additional posters released during the campaign:

<sup>300</sup> Hagen, Ernst. "Grüne entdecken Heimat." *Preussischer Anzeiger*. Preussischer Anzeiger, 17 May 2016. Web. 12 Jan. 2017.





**Figure 15.**

Van der Bellen 2016. Image taken from the Austrian Green party website.<sup>301</sup>

Rather than the FPÖ's linking of exceptionalism and exclusion with alpine images, Van der Bellen emphasises that the landscape, and the nation itself, belong to all those who reside there, regardless of class, gender, culture, religion, or ethnicity. Any demographic that lives in Austria has access to this understanding of *Heimat*, without any assumed prerequisites. Such an inclusive use of *Heimat* is indicative of Van der Bellen's principles as a representative in favour of mass immigration and cultural pluralism.<sup>302</sup> In an additional poster released during the 2016 presidential campaign, Van der Bellen further challenged the FPÖ's separatist politics by including the term *Heimat*:

<sup>301</sup> Hobek-Zimmermann, Monika. "Van der Bellen stolz: Noch nie so eine Bewegung." *Greens*. Greens, 28 Apr. 2016. Web. 13 Aug. 2017.

<sup>302</sup> For further details on Van der Bellen's political platform see Van der Bellen, Alexander. "Ziele und Inhalte" *Van der Bellen*, Van der Bellen, n.d. Web. 24 Jan. 2017.



**Figure 16.**

Van der Bellen 2016. Image taken from *Vanderbellen.at*.<sup>303</sup>

*Heimat*, for Van de Bellen, requires solidarity – and this means an all-inclusive agenda for all Austrians regardless of their backgrounds, as well as new immigrants or refugees. Where the FPÖ used alpine scenery to evoke a sense of patriotism and nationalistic pride in one’s identity of place, Van der Bellen attempts to platform the beauty of Austria’s landscape as an example of the affluence of the nation as well as the justification for helping outsiders to join the nation’s prosperity and the beauty of its territory. The result of this debate on *Heimat* was the clash of diametrically opposed political platforms, one nationalist and exclusionary, the other inclusive and globalist, played out with the use of alpine landscapes to draw audiences towards either political message.

### **2.3.3 - Alpine elevation and the cult of machismo**

The alpine region of Austria is not only synonymous with rich natural beauty, but is also the location of masculinist, ultra-fit extreme sports and competitive triumphs. Indeed, there is something to be said for the pursuit of adventure and competition in the height of the mountains. As Johannes von Moltke explains, in the work of *Heimat* authors like the German Ludwig Ganghofer (1855 – 1920), “Alpine elevation was synonymous with physical and spiritual well-being.”<sup>304</sup> For the Austrian populist Right, ‘alpine elevation’ also means a place where heroic masculine virtues are found. For the Right-Wing populist parties, it is not sufficient to simply

<sup>303</sup> Van der Bellen, Alexander. “Heimat braucht Zusammenhalt.” *Van der Bellen*. Van der Bellen, 2016. Web. 24 Jan. 2017.

<sup>304</sup> Moltke 37.

celebrate the topography and beauty of alpine panoramas. Landscape as identity, rather, requires an exploration of the human virtues the terrain symbolises. As a result, the Alps as a national landscape are symbolically charged with desired national values, such as athleticism, power, adventurousness, transcendence, machismo, and determination. On the 21<sup>st</sup> of August 2012 Strache posted in his Facebook profile a picture of FPÖ *Generalsekretär* and powerbroker Herbert Kickl taking part in the heroically titled “Inferno-Triathlon”, a test of endurance in the mountains of Switzerland. The image, depicting Kickl climbing high in the the Alps, was joined with an adjacent comment from Strache:



**Figure 17.**

„GS Herbert Kickl bei seinem "Inferno-Triathlon" im Berner Oberland in der Schweiz (Schwimmen 3,1 km, Rennrad 97 km - 2.145 Höhenmeter, Mountainbike 30 km - Steigung 1.180 Höhenmeter, Berglauf 25 km Steigung 2.175 Höhenmeter)....In 11 Stunden und 48 min bewältigt!!! Größten Respekt für diese sportliche Leistung.“<sup>305</sup>

This image is typical of the machismo exhibited by Right-Wing politicians, who characteristically take great pleasure in boasting their athleticism and active participation in sports. For example, Strache also delights in flaunting his athletic side

<sup>305</sup> Strache, Heinz-Christian. “Inferno-Triathlon.” *Facebook*. Facebook, 21 Aug. 2011. Web. 27 Aug. 2011.



during his leisure time on the ski fields of the Alps. In a picture on one of his holidays on the slopes, Strache celebrated a hiking and skiing weekend in the mountains, to which he proclaimed: “Unsere österreichische Bergwelt und Natur ist ein Traum!”<sup>306</sup> In another similar image Strache boasts of his surroundings, “St. Jakob im Deffereggental in Osttirol, im Hochgebirge (2.700 Meter hoch), Naturschutzgebiet Hohe Tauern (an unserer südtiroler Grenze - ein Tirol) ist ein wundervoller Traum der Natur. Ein Stück einzigartiger rot-weiß-roter Heimat!”<sup>307</sup> One viewer of this image proclaimed “Die Alpen Sind unsere Heimat!” another comments on Strache’s athleticism by stating “Super HC he he.”<sup>308</sup> Strache uses Facebook to disseminate a veritable montage of pictures that are testament to his athleticism and alpine spirit, all of which are also symbolic of the determination of ‘Austrians’, as well as the Populist Party members themselves:



**Figure 18.**

Strache and his FPÖ team ascend the summit, a symbolic depiction of their machismo and dedication to their political mission. Image taken from Facebook.<sup>309</sup>

<sup>306</sup> Strache, Heinz-Christian. “Am vergangenen Wochenende in den Tiroler Alpen!” *Facebook*. Facebook, 07 Feb. 2012. Web. 07 Feb 2012.

<sup>307</sup> Strache, Heinz-Christian. “Ein Stück einzigartiger rot-weiß-roter Heimat!” *Facebook*. Facebook, 07 Feb. 2012. Web. 07 Feb. 2012.

<sup>308</sup> Strache *Ein Stück*.

<sup>309</sup> Strache, Heinz-Christian. *Facebook*. Facebook, 30 Aug. 2015. Web. 24 Oct. 2015.





**Figure 19.**

Strache at home in the heights: with a quintessential Austrian alpine panorama to detail his conviction and mountain climbing abilities. Image taken from Facebook.<sup>310</sup>



**Figure 20.**

Strache crossing an alpine glacier near the summit. It is interesting to note the success of such media campaigns, which seek to merge the Austrian landscape with the party and their sense of Austrian national identity. A Facebook user commented on this photo, stating “Der Himmel passt alles Blau ;-))”, a reference to the new found political heights of the FPÖ and their ‘blue’ brand of politics.<sup>311</sup>

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<sup>310</sup> Strache *Facebook* 30.

<sup>311</sup> Strache *Facebook* 30.




**Figure 21.**

In images such as these the FPÖ politicians wish to depict themselves as fearless men: masculine, powerful, and above the degeneracy of career politicians. Their attempt to depict themselves as an elite troop of athletic and dedicated men appears to work with their desired demographic, with one Facebook user commenting “Blaue Elitetruppe hoch oben. Kein Platz für Rot-Schwarz-Grün. Dieses Bild wird im Oktober nach den Wahlen Geschichte schreiben.”<sup>312</sup>

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<sup>312</sup> Strache *Facebook* 30.



**Figure 22.**

Strache and his team reaching 3798 meters on Grossglockner – Austria’s highest peak. The stark contrast between man and unfathomable nature is reminiscent of the heroic imagery in *Bergfilm*. Image taken from Facebook.<sup>313</sup>



**Figure 23.**

Heinz-Christian Strache, Johan Gudenus, and Herbert Kickl on top of the highest peak in Austria. The correlation between conquering Austria’s mountainous landscape and Strache’s political career is made by one Facebook user who comments “Do kommt da Haeupl nimmer rauf - muss im Wirtshaus mit der Fahne (vom Wein) schwingen. Net war?”<sup>314</sup>

<sup>313</sup> Strache, Heinz-Christian. *Facebook*. 27 Aug. 2015. Web. 24. Oct. 2015.

<sup>314</sup> Strache *Facebook* 27.

In describing the dramaturgy of the Austrian Far Right, Adi Wimmer comments that Haider also repeatedly portrayed himself as an alpine adventurer.<sup>315</sup> In his 'Rambo' guise, as Wimmer puts it, he would often be seen going rock-climbing, jogging, or scaling the highest peaks of his native Carinthia.<sup>316</sup>



**Figure 24.**

Haider in his 'Rambo' guise: demonstrating a fit and active lifestyle in the mountainous Austrian *Heimat*.<sup>317</sup>

Strache continues his media-savvy campaign by posting motivational imagery on Facebook of man's ascendancy of the mountain as a suggestive 'life philosophy'. The emotive, macho words of these images combine with the Alps to illustrate Austrian masculinity and bravery at its apex in mountain climbing:

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<sup>315</sup> Wimmer, Adi. "The Dramaturgy of the Political Right: Austria's Jörg Haider in Comparison with Pauline Hanson." *Overland*.160 (2000): 31 - 35. Print. 3.

<sup>316</sup> Wimmer 3.

<sup>317</sup> Image taken from Lux, Georg, Arno Wiedergut, and Uwe Sommersguter. *Jörg Haider: Mensch, Mythos, Medienstar*. Klagenfurt: Carinthia Verlag, 2008. Print. 85.





**Figure 25.**

Image taken from Facebook.<sup>318</sup>



**Figure 26.**

Image taken from Facebook.<sup>319</sup>

The authoritative language used in these phrases, such as powerful men conquering difficult paths, is typical of the machismo illustrated in Right-Wing populist narratives. The visual theme of man's battle to ascend the mountain and conquer nature is also entirely reminiscent of the *Bergfilme* of Peter Ostmeier, Arnold Frank

<sup>318</sup> Strache, Heinz-Christian. "Manchmal ist der Schwierigste Weg genau der Richtige Weg." *Facebook*. Facebook. 28 Sep. 2012. Web. 01 Jan. 2013.

<sup>319</sup> Strache, Heinz-Christian. "Nur starke Menschen bekommen schwere Wege." *Facebook*. Facebook 20 July 2015. Web. 2 Jan. 2016.

and Leni Riefenstahl, all of whom created movies with images of men and women scaling steep cliffs and battling the elements of nature.<sup>320</sup> Moltke notes that for many scholars, *Bergfilm* is perceived as “a general flight from modernity to heroic idealism.”<sup>321</sup> In this case of the Right-Wing populism today, it appears that images such as this one encourage the audience to turn away from the mainstream political spheres and into their own ‘heroic’ form of politics. Many Facebook users apparently share Strache’s vision, with such comments as: “ja, unser Weg ist steil und schwierig, aber haben wir den bezwungen...Hc, dann haben wir für immer gewonnen!”, and, “gerade die Herausforderung ist es, die uns den schwierigen Weg beschreiten läßt und schlußendlich zum Erfolg führt !!!!”<sup>322</sup> Moltke argues the images of *Bergfilm* investigate the Alps for their particular graphic qualities, that is, the self-reflexive exploration of space that takes on further significance with respect to the theorizations of the role of space and place.<sup>323</sup> Here, the Freedom Party encourage the virtues of machismo they believe are endemic to their side of the political struggle, meanwhile encouraging an Austrian identity based on alpine landscapes that are loaded with the heroic virtues of mountaineering.

The motivation behind the use of alpine landscapes in FPÖ publicity, then, is not only to celebrate the beauty of nature, but also to emphasise the perceived cultural significance of that landscape identity to the public. Thus the audience is encouraged to imagine the landscape through the symbolically charged perception of the man in the image, such as Strache or Haider, and not dwell only on its pictorial aesthetic. As a landscape symbolically charged with a cultural identity for all Austrians, the populist Right encourages their audience to see the Alps as a unique topography for a unique people, who together can boast a national identity that is constructed on the machismo of alpine adventurers who embody the virtues of a fit, athletic, versatile, and determined people. The mountains portray a rather heroic image of Austrians as an elevated people, free from the bonds of servitude or the faceless decrepitude of the lowland urban world – which through its cosmopolitanism and capitalism has lost its sense of place and identity with the natural topography of *Heimat*. While the Alps and

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<sup>320</sup> Moltke 44.

<sup>321</sup> Moltke 46.

<sup>322</sup> Strache *Manchmal*.

<sup>323</sup> Moltke 48.

the alpine adventurer is a popular image in the FPÖ's arsenal, it shares a place with an additional, equally important national landscape that is derived from the mist-shrouded, archaic ground of the forests.

#### **2.3.4 - Forest landscapes**

The final major landscape used in FPÖ publicity is the forest. Many FPÖ members go to great lengths to market their image alongside forested settings. FPÖ youth spokesperson Manfred Haimbuchner, for example, often chooses to use the forest as a location for his promotional media, such as the picture from his website:



**Figure 27.**

Image taken from Haimbuchner's website.<sup>324</sup>

Haimbuchner's persona as a clean and green member of the FPÖ and *Landeshauptmann-Stellvertreter* in the *Oberösterreich Landesregierung* (where he focuses primarily on *Naturschutz*), his self-proclaimed love of nature, fishing, and hunting, all fits in perfectly with his role as a true Austrian citizen that is in touch with the forests that he calls home.<sup>325</sup> The forest, for Haimbuchner, is valuable because of the national treasures it preserves. In his video promoting his service in the *Landesrat*, Haimbuchner celebrates the forests of Austria for the biodiversity of species, the clean water, and the prized natural environments and monuments.<sup>326</sup>

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<sup>324</sup> Haimbuchner *Naturschutz*.

<sup>325</sup> Haimbuchner, Manfred. "Landeshauptmann-Stellvertreter Dr. Manfred Haimbuchner (FPÖ)." *Land Oberösterreich*. Land Oberösterreich, n.d. Web. 22 Jan. 2016.

<sup>326</sup> Haimbuchner *Naturschutzlandesrat*.

For the FPÖ, however, the forest preserves more than just a vast array of flora, fauna, or resources. It is also from the forest that national identity and the sense of *Heimat* are preserved, developed, and even characterised. For example, FPÖ-Landesparteiobmann Markus Abwerzger asserts that forests, mountains, and meadows are not only an essential aspect of tourism, “sondern sie sind unsere Heimat, unsere Natur und unser Naherholungsgebiet”<sup>327</sup> The forests, in other words, hold a special significance for Austrians that transcends the banality of resources or tourism. Forests and nature define the *Heimat* and therefore the nation itself. Haimbuchner’s love of “heimische Natur”<sup>328</sup>, of which he speaks about at length on his website, is indicative of the FPÖ’s broader identity of place platform that characterises its national identity discourse. In his video showcasing nature as the “äußere Heimat” Haimbuchner asks the question “denn was wäre unser Land ohne Wälder...?”, before going on to state the “Erhaltung von Arten und Lebensräumen ist untrennbar mit meinem Verständnis von Heimat verbunden.”<sup>329</sup> For Haimbuchner, then, Austria would not be the same nation, and any understanding of *Heimat* not genuine, without the forest and its role in the national identity narrative. In the same manner that Austrians would not self-identify without their own culture, behaviourisms, history, mythologies, and common language, without native forests *Heimat* would cease to have its typical outward characteristics.

In the FPÖ’s *Heimat* discourse the ‘outer *Heimat*’, typified in this case by forested locales, also conflates with an inner sense of collective identity. The union of identity and the physic topography that helps to humanise the environment is derived through references to the long history the Germanic peoples (and, indirectly, Austrians too as a member of the German *Kulturgemeinschaft*) share with the forests. This cultural landscape identity, which combines the forest and grove with the Germanic warrior machismo of the past, is seen, for examplr, in the FPÖ’s comic *Der Blaue Planet*. One image, in particular, depicts Strache as a type of ancient Germanic

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<sup>327</sup> “LPO Abwerzger: „Wehret den Anfängen. Die Wälder, Gipfel und Auen sind nicht nur ein essentieller Faktor für den Tourismus, sondern sie sind unsere Heimat, unsere Natur und unser Naherholungsgebiet.“ *FPÖ Tirol*. FPÖ Tirol, 14 Apr. 2014. Web. 22 Jan. 2016.

<sup>328</sup> Haimbuchner *Naturschutz*.

<sup>329</sup> Haimbuchner *5 Jahre*.



god or warrior-hero: a muscular example of Germanic *Mannestum* who is rising forth from the sacred groves of the *Heimat*:



**Figure 28.**

Image taken from *Der Blaue Planet*.<sup>330</sup>

It is interesting to note that while Strache and his fellow Austrians are derived from such sacred forests, the foreigners of the European Union, who Strache is rising against, are from the faceless urban sprawl of the '*Zentral Planet*'. Applegate explains that the German retreat into nature, so endemic in the use of *Heimat*, represents a search for a source of collective identity not to be found in the urban environment. Only nature "could be the appropriate symbol as well as source of Heimat feeling."<sup>331</sup> For members of the *Heimat* movement, there was an *Allegemeingut*, and their redefinition of nature and man's relationship to it had come to see the forest as a commonly held treasure of the people.<sup>332</sup> The forest, as a result, was symbolically charged with the history and cultural identity of the people who dwelt there.

The image of Strache, which symbolically depicts the 'man in nature' avatar, has deep historical roots in Germanic culture. The forest holds a very mystic and

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<sup>330</sup> FPÖ *Der Blaue Planet*, 13.

<sup>331</sup> Applegate 77.

<sup>332</sup> Applegate 78.

integral role in the German-speaking world's cultural landscape identity imaginary, and this key concept has endured into the modern worldview of the Austrian populist Right. The Roman historian Publius Cornelius Tacitus (AD 56 – 117) describes the Germanic people in his book *Germania* a warrior culture of pure blood that lived beyond in the Rhine in bristling, deep forests.<sup>333</sup> Significantly, the Germanic people did not like to confine their religious ceremonies indoors, and “Their holy places are woods and groves...”<sup>334</sup> Furthermore, Simon Schama highlights that the metaphoric use of the forest has deep roots in Germanic mythology. Schama recounts in his book *Landscape and Memory* the cult initiation of the god Wotan, in which Germanic tribes celebrated their collective identity, rebirth, and renewed strength in sacred groves by committing sacrifices on tree trunks.<sup>335</sup> This act is believed to stem from the rites of the Germanic deity Wotan, identified in Norse mythology as Odin, who hanged himself on the ash tree *Yggdrasil* (the Nordic symbol of the universe) in a ritual death and resurrection, in order to obtain the archaic wisdom of the runes, or ‘mysteries’, of life and the universe.<sup>336</sup> Odin's runic incantations demonstrate that from a very early inception, culturally determined identity characteristics were closely connected to the realm of nature in the pre-Christian Germanic world.

From the mystic ethnogenesis of the forests, Germanic identity continued to imagine and develop. As we have seen in the previous chapter, the fifteenth century spelling *Heinmut* is a compound noun constructed of the two German words *Hein/Hain* and *Mut*.<sup>337</sup> This clearly illustrates an interesting etymological example of the synthesis of nature mysticism and masculine cultural elements in the development of Germanic identity. As the ancient Germanic tribes had originated in the forests, so too would the modern Germans find their warrior identity within the sacred groves of their ancestors. By the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century a tendency toward

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<sup>333</sup> Tacitus, Publius Cornelius. *The Agricola and the Germania*. Trans. Mattingly, H. London: Penguin, 1970. Print. 103 – 104.

<sup>334</sup> Tacitus 109.

<sup>335</sup> Schama 58.

<sup>336</sup> In stanza 137 of Odin's rune song ‘Havamal’, the god recounts his self-initiation into a greater understanding of the meaning of the universe: “I know that I hung on the windy tree for nine full nights, Wounded with a spear, and given to Odin, myself to myself, On that tree of which no one knows, where the roots run.” See *The Poetic Edda*. Trans. Bellows, Henry Adams. Princeton: Princeton UP, 1936. Print. 38.

<sup>337</sup> Blickle X.

*Naturbegeisterung* continued to transform the German forest, the grove, and the oak in particular, to natural monuments of national significance. The primordial and natural geographical dimensions of Germany became symbolic of the German people as a whole, with the fatherland as the central paradigm to that collective unity. For example, in his play *Hermannsschlacht* (1769), the German poet Friedrich Gottlieb Klopstock described the German *Vaterland* by evoking symbolic depictions of oak forests and sacred groves that housed the united Germanic armies of the Cheruscan warlord Arminius:

You are the thickest, shadiest oak,  
In the innermost grove,  
The highest, oldest, most sacred oak,  
O fatherland.<sup>338</sup>

The result of the developments of these Germanic ‘forest-feelings’ was a collective belief that the local forests represented a cultural landscape identity that preserved the virtues of a proud and militant warrior society - with the oak and the grove/forest as the most sacred manifestation of imaginary.

Although these examples speak of a Germanic forest consciousness that helped to indirectly shape the character of Germans and later of Germany itself, it does not retract from the FPÖ position. Although the FPÖ, as we have seen, go to great lengths to define themselves as culturally separate to Germans, the party does recognise the Austria’s modern day cultural origins through referring to an Austro-Germanic ethnogenesis.<sup>339</sup> A dominant political of the FPÖ, furthermore, is to successfully oscillate between pro-German nationalist imagery and a determined pro-Austrian platform of exceptionalism. Through the recognition of Germanic ethnic and cultural roots, the FPÖ can celebrate stereotypical German nationalist imagery while also maintaining a distinct degree of Austrian distinctiveness.. While Austria has developed its own unique identity, it is still seen to contribute to the broader German cultural community due to the strong historical and cultural links its citizens

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<sup>338</sup> Murdoch, Adrian. *Rome's Greatest Defeat: Massacre in the Teutoburg Forest*. London: The History Press, 2009. Print. 164.

<sup>339</sup> See for example FPÖ *Graz Parteiprogramm*, 5.

supposedly share with Germans. The template of the valiant Germanic freedom fighter of prehistory who fought hard to defend his or her forested homeland, therefore, can easily apply to modern day Austrians due to the cultural and ethnic link they share with their forebears and the ‘man in nature’ avatar their legacy has bestowed upon them.

The Germanic warrior of prehistory, therefore, rises again in these symbolically charged landscapes, as the populist Right use cultural landscape identity to extol the virtues of manliness exhibited by both ancient Austrians in the forests, and modern Austrian patriots. On the 29<sup>th</sup> of September Strache posted a picture on his Facebook profile celebrating his party’s relationship with ‘our’ beautiful *Heimat*.<sup>340</sup> The defiant body language says much of Strache’s desired public image. Strache is at his peak, and very much at home in forest and the Alps:



**Figure 29.**

Image taken from Facebook.<sup>341</sup>

The paradox of the forest as a cultural landscape identity is complimented through the staging of folk festivals that achieve a synthesis of human character and forest landscape. For example, Heinz Christian-Strache posted images on his

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<sup>340</sup> Strache, Heinz-Christian. “Unsere wunderschöne Heimat und Naturlandschaft!” *Facebook*. Facebook, 29 Sep. 2011. Web. 29 Sep. 2011.

<sup>341</sup> Strache *Heimat und Naturlandschaft*.

Facebook profile of himself in the forest at Plöschenberg in Kärnten to celebrate the *Sommersonnenwendfeier* of 2012:



**Figure 30.**

Political banners, state *Wappen*, and the forest as locale. “Sonnwendfeier 2012 in Kärnten.”<sup>342</sup>



**Figure 31.**

The local flags of Kärnten alongside local beer, fire, forest, and the FPÖ “21.6.2012 - Gestrige Sommersonnenwendfeier.”<sup>343</sup>

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<sup>342</sup> Strache, Heinz-Christian. “Sonnwendfeier 2012 in Kärnten.” *Facebook*. Facebook. 23 June 2012. Web. 14 July 2012.

<sup>343</sup> Strache, Heinz-Christian. “21.6.2012 - Gestrige Sommersonnenwendfeier.” *Facebook*. Facebook. 22 June 2012. Web. 15 Aug. 2014.





**Figure 32.**

“Flamme Empor :-)” It is interesting to note that the mysticism of the forest setting alongside almost pagan festivities is recognised by a Facebook user, who comments on the photo “Natur gibt Kraft.”<sup>344</sup>



**Figure 33.**

Participating in the forest festival in quintessential Austrian *Tracht*. “War ein toller Abend gestern :-)”<sup>345</sup>

<sup>344</sup> Strache, Heinz-Christian. “Flamme Empor :-)” *Facebook*. Facebook, 22 June 2012. Web. 15 Aug. 2014.

<sup>345</sup> Strache, Heinz-Christian. ““War ein toller Abend gestern :-)” *Facebook*. Facebook, 23 June 2012. Web. 5 Dec. 2013.



**Figure 34.**

Full moon and fire ritual in the Carinthian forests. “Sonnenwende 2012 :-) Plöschenberg in Kärnten!”<sup>346</sup>



**Figure 35.**

Full moon forest mysticism: an almost pagan avowal of *Heimat Österreich*. “Ich wünsche euch eine harmonische und positive Vollmondnacht :-)”<sup>347</sup>

<sup>346</sup> Strache, Heinz-Christian. “Flamme Empor :-)” *Facebook*. Facebook, 22 June 2012. Web. 15 Aug. 2014.

<sup>347</sup> Strache, Heinz-Christian. “Ich wünsche euch eine harmonische und positive Vollmondnacht :-)” *Facebook*. Facebook, 29 Dec. 2012. Web. 19 Mar. 2013.

Popularising themselves with local festivals as well as natural aesthetics, the Freedom Party build upon old traditions to enact a sense of *Heimat*. The party are, in many cases, emulating the processions of older *Heimat* movements. In her discussion of the *Pfälzerwald Verein*, Applegate describes a scene that has become the contemporary epitome of the cultural activities of the Austrian Right-Wing populist movement. She explains that, in an attempt of local character, the *Verein* celebrated midsummer in an authentic traditional fashion, a unique blend of pagan bonfires and brass bands, joined together with poems that celebrated both the native forests and the word *Heimat* in their evocation of the poetry filled past of folksongs and fairy tale.<sup>348</sup> Today Austria's Right-Wing populist parties are also inviting their audience to enter their brand of Austrian identity that is at home in the landscape of the forest. The images depicting Strache's party in the forest attending folk festivities clearly demonstrate the type of solidarity typical of these outdoor festivals, where those of likeminded character join together to celebrate the Austrian forest, as national landscape, and Austrianness, as a human landscape. With the colours and *Wappen* of Kärnten behind him, surrounded by the green depths of the Carinthian forest, Strache is seen in the first image reaffirming his party's connection to the forest and the histories of the people that live in those regions. The power and mysticism of the looming fire in the darkness all but compliments his party's image as a powerful movement.

The forest adoration typical of both the contemporary Right-Wing populist parties and previous *Heimat* movements is also evident in the ideology of National Socialism. Adolf Hitler, Paul Joseph Goebbels, Hermann Göring, Heinrich Himmler, R. Walter Darré amongst others all wrote and spoke about humanity as a part of nature, and were therefore subject to her laws through the guidance of a 'Providence' which enacted its will through the rhythms of nature.<sup>349</sup> Robert A. Pois argues that the Nazi ideology of *Blut und Boden* demonstrated part of their larger tendency to venerate a kind of nature religion, attempting to supplant Western traditions and replace them with a mythology rooted in the indigenous Germanic concept of the *Volksgemeinschaft* and sacred soil.<sup>350</sup> The twentieth century Bulgarian born social

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<sup>348</sup> Applegate 83.

<sup>349</sup> Lee et al. 24.

<sup>350</sup> See especially chapters 2 and 3 in Pois, Robert A. *National Socialism and the Religion of Nature*. Kent: Croom Helm, 1986. Print.



psychologist Elias Canetti (1905 – 1994) also spoke of the importance of the forest in German society. Canetti explains that in no other modern nation has the ‘forest-feeling’ lived on like for the Germans, and it is with a deep and mysterious delight that “he loves to go deep into the forest where his forefathers lived; he feels at home in the trees.”<sup>351</sup> The German professor of forestry Franz Heske (1892 – 1963) also described this feeling in his book *German Forestry*, stating:

German culture sprang from the forest. It is a forest culture. In holy groves the ancient Germans worshipped their gods. Christian missionaries had to fell the mighty ancient oaks that were dedicated to the Thunder-God, before the new religion could take root. In the old forests, the present generation seeks to recapture that reverential awe...<sup>352</sup>

The forest, as seen in this extract, is a sacred site to which the German people return in order to discover their roots, history, and identity. The ancient Germans and their gods had originated in the forests, so too would the modern Germans find their warrior identity within the sacred groves of their forefathers.

One film in particular, *Ewiger Wald* (Eternal Forest), released in 1936, stands out for its artistic ability to directly focus on a Germanic “forest feeling” as an example of an ethnically derived cultural landscape identity, based on the concept of a *Volksgemeinschaft* rooted in tribal traditions sourced from the organic and living forest. In *Ewiger Wald* the German forest also stands as a biological metaphor for the German people, as well as for the political nation, which are mythologized as natural and pure.<sup>353</sup> During the film the narration emphasises the symbolic relationship between the forest and the German people, stating, “We originated in the forest. We live like the forest. From the forest we built our living space. Our souls grow like the forest,” then later prophesizing “Deep in the forest will be born the nation’s knowledge, the nation’s victory.”<sup>354</sup> A pure, strong, and pagan German people are shown throughout the film, emerging from epic forest and mountain landscapes to

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<sup>351</sup> Canetti, Elias. *Crowds and Power*. New York: The Seabury Press, 1978. Print. 173.

<sup>352</sup> Heske, Franz. *German Forestry*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1938. Print. 180 – 181.

<sup>353</sup> Moltke 55.

<sup>354</sup> Cited in Lee et al. 28 – 29.

create a new *Reich* in harmony with nature and the biological race laws of National Socialism.

While references to the environmental politics and ideology of Nazism, as well as the links between forest imagery and Germanic warrior avatars, may seem tenebrous, it does appeal directly to a certain demographic that consistently votes for the FPÖ. Many young Far Right voters are swayed by references the Germanic heroism and machismo of prehistory, usually located with a forested setting. Emily Turner-Graham, for example, explains that for many in the Far Right, including a large number of young FPÖ voters, social groups are not only connected to local nature but are also a profound organic product of it.<sup>355</sup> Their collective identities are believed to develop from the long-standing relationship they have with historical and national topographies such as forests. Such an ideology can fuel arrogance and even in some cases dangerous extremism. The premise that nature, such as forests, continues to affect identity suggests that the social group is still endowed with the heroic, and even violent, tendencies of bygone, fierce eras. Thus the Far Right individual comes to see the forest as the conduit from which he or she may channel the powerful warrior avatars of long lost forebears, who fought perceived and real invaders with sword and shield. The emotive images of Strache as an ancient Germanic warrior-god are not without result in the minds of those that are eager to heed the, at least culturally, pan-German ethos. Members of the FPO's *Ring Freiheitlicher Jugend* in the Austrian province of Tirol, for example, composed footage of its members walking through forests and nature, with captions reading "Because we love our homeland, because its fun to fight for the homeland, because we are true patriots, will you also fight for your homeland? Because Tirol needs us."<sup>356</sup> The youthful members of the *Ring Freiheitlicher Jugend* thus rejoice in the heroic tales of nature and battle, of which, they attest, they are participants: a nationalist phalanx ready to do battle like those ancient Germanic warriors of the *Teutoburg* forest. The use of the forests as the Germanic 'ethnogenesis', therefore, appeals to this demographic in an innocent but rather direct way.

The racist manifestations of the forest as a cultural landscape identity in the German-speaking world, however, do not entirely retract from the validity of the

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<sup>355</sup> Turner-Graham *Enviroment*, 238.

<sup>356</sup> Cited in Turner-Graham *Enviroment*, 243.

concept. There existed, as we have seen, a pre-established Germanic ‘forest-feeling’, which since the earliest historical accounts of Germanic society had symbolically represented a sense of community and identity within the spatial confines of the forest. National Socialism took this concept and contorted it to suit a biologically derived sense of community that would prove to be a premise for war and subsequently devastate both Germany and Europe. This thesis does not suggest that Right-Wing populism shares such ambitions, only that the parties share symmetry with pre-existing notions of Germanic cultural landscape identity, the forest, and the virtues of *Mannestum*. Where National Socialism applied these avatars to the theatre of war, Right-Wing populist politicians seek to consolidate Austrian identity by once more evoking these avatars to demonstrate the idealised sense of the Austrian man. National Socialism sought to illustrate a pure ethnic group preserved within the confines of the forest as *Heimat*, the contemporary Austrian populist Right seek only illustrate the forest as a commonly held home that in both a spatial and temporal sense affirms collective identity. Machismo on the battlefield is no longer necessary in these debates, and as such the Right-Wing populists replace direct military with examples of heightened physical and philosophical aptitude. The forest has, however, continued to be used as a location by the populist Right in which they can advocate a sense of cultural landscape identity that is informed by the masculine virtues of the more ancient Germanic tribes.

## **2.4 - Conclusion**

The FPÖ’s use of *Heimat* relies significantly, then, on natural landscapes and simpler, rural lifestyles that typify a nostalgic and romanticised image of Austrian national identity. The identity of place narrative that underlies the landscapes of *Heimat* allow the populist parties to remind Austrians of deep biographical roots that they share with these locations. The physical landscapes of *Heimat* denote a demarcated and bounded territory, with which the Austrian social group identify and to which they feel they belong. The mountains, rivers, fields and farms of Austria are places of national value, whose inner meanings can only be comprehended by those who share a long, pre-established habitation in the territory. The resources that *Heimat* provide are also therefore only for the native population, and foreign intervention to accrue such capital must not be tolerated.

The FPÖ's perceived ownership over nature, and the nationalisation of quintessential Austrian landscapes, emboldens the party's image of identity and *Heimat*. It is a land that belongs only to Austrians, and speaks of their own unique identity and exceptionalism. The FPÖ's members, therefore, delight in photo opportunities in rural locations because they seek to exemplify the nature (local) versus urban (cosmopolitan/globalist) oppositional discourse typical of its *Heimat* discourse. The parties stand for traditionalism, masculinity, long established domicile, and a set of attitudes and knowledge bases that exemplify rural *Heimat* motifs. Cosmopolitanism, cultural pluralism, and the progressive attitudes that typify inner city rural life have no place in the party's self-appointed image. The FPÖ's adoration of natural, physical landscapes is also focused on preserving an 'intact' environment for the sake of sustaining an ethnoculturally 'pure' human landscape. Their belief in the close symbiosis of man and nature, accordingly, means that the natural and human landscapes of *Heimat* are but two sides of a singular concept.

## Chapter Three

### *‘Deutsch statt nix versteh’n’: Heimat as language and ethnoculture*

#### 3.0 – Introduction

During the campaign leading up to the 2010 regional election in Vienna, the FPÖ contributed to the Austrian national identity debate with the slogan *‘Deutsch statt nix versteh’n’*. The slogan was seen as a deliberate affront to migrant groups, as it contrasted the purity of the German language with a non-standard form of *Gastarbeiterdeutsch* that typically used such infinitive constructions.<sup>357</sup> Accompanied by an image of the Austrian flag, the slogan seemed to be suggesting, as Ruth Wodak explains, a link between Austrian identity and the German language.<sup>358 359</sup> For the FPÖ, language is more than just a means of communication. The FPÖ views language as instrumental to the national identity formula, and therefore sees linguistic identity as the key cultural feature in the human landscape of *Heimat*. In the FPÖ political programme, language is approached in a possessive sense, with the party stating that it is ‘our’ language, preserved in ‘our’ writers, thinkers, and traditions that make ‘us’ what ‘we’ are.<sup>360</sup> Defining national identity through common linguistic traditions supports the party’s conception of *Heimat* as ‘home’ to a human landscape that conforms to distinct ethnocultural boundaries. As established in the previous chapter, the physical landscape of Austria is connected to the human one through an imagined acculturation of nature and a belief in ownership over the land. Similarly, the human landscape of *Heimat* is characterised by the linguistic expressions of a culture that has long biographical roots to place, helping to justify the populist Right argument that speakers of a native language also exhibit the broader values and cultural identity of the language that is spoken.

*Heimat* is a concept that is shared specifically among German-language cultures.<sup>361</sup> Any attempt to divorce ‘Germanness’ from *Heimat* is therefore consistently marred by the important role language plays in the concept. Language

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<sup>357</sup> Wodak, *The Politics of Fear*, 91.

<sup>358</sup> Wodak, *The Politics of Fear*, 91

<sup>359</sup> Wodak, *The Politics of Fear*, 91

<sup>360</sup> FPÖ. *Handbuch 2013*, 259.

<sup>361</sup> Blickle 1.

has been the powerful vehicle of expression by which many *Heimat* enthusiasts since the nineteenth century gave poetic voice and character to the spatial dimensions and cultural idiosyncrasies of their native lands and populations. For the FPÖ, language continues to both form and inform *Heimat*, but with new additional Rightist implications for the Austrian national identity narrative. The FPÖ uses language to outline the borders of Austrian ethnoculture, which they believe shapes both national identity and *Heimat*. The ethnic boundaries of the human landscape of *Heimat* are defined through the FPÖ's appropriation of the term *Muttersprache*, which has been evolved by the party and given new meaning. A focus on *Muttersprache*, and the ethos that language and culture are transmitted through family lines, validates this monocultural, monoethnic image of *Heimat*. *Muttersprache*, and the affinity with a language acquired by birth and through conforming to the Austro-Germanic cultural group, offer the FPÖ a powerful way to demonstrate that language must be preserved as an example of Austrian ethnocultural identity. Neither the Right nor the Left, indeed, can deny that language is important to collective cultural identity. Many Left Wing groups actively campaign to support the language of minorities.<sup>362</sup> However, as this chapter will explore, the FPÖ's appropriation of the term *Muttersprache* is used in a platform that focuses on the Austrian majority, on the people whose parents both come from Austria and speak German. The party's desire to safeguard the German language in the nation, as this chapter will investigate, requires the promotion of an exclusive sense of cultural and linguistic belonging and a framework for national identity that is not extended to minority groups or immigrants.

The FPÖ's use of Austrian German dialect, and its more general celebration of High German as a root language, authenticates the party position that defines Austrians as a distinct, closed community with a consistent culture and ethnicity. Establishing cultural borderlines in order to determine national identity also permits the party to distinguish Austrians and their *Heimat* from 'Outsider' social groups and

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<sup>362</sup> Former Austrian chancellor and ex-chairman of the SPÖ Werner Faymann, for example, has actively supported the protection of Slavic and Roman linguistic groups in Carinthia, noting their historical presence in the region. The Green party of Austria has also extended this campaign of linguistic preservation to newly arrived immigrants as a basis of preserving their original cultural identities. See Cinar, Meral. *Collective Memory and National Membership: Identity and Citizenship Models in Turkey and Austria*. Houndsmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015. Print. 81 – 82.

lands. This division between native and other is founded on the premise that one cannot simply learn or acquire a *Muttersprache*, rather it is inherited through membership in an ethnocultural group from birth, or by long established domicile in a region. Such membership cannot be simply granted. This chapter examines the FPÖ's tendency to portray those that do not fit with the parties restricted body politics (*Kulturnation*) as degraded *Ausländer* who come to Austria only to exploit the nation's wealth. Language, as we shall see, plays an important part in the FPÖ's portrayal of these groups because those that come for nefarious reasons, allegedly, have no desire to learn the language or assimilate. These outside groups, as a result, dissolve the linguistic purity of *Heimat* as well as making native Austrians' lives increasingly difficult due an inability to reliably communicate. Central to this thesis is the idea that language says much about the identity, values, and national allegiances of the people who speak it. This explains, in part, why the FPÖ have very little to say about British, Australian, Swedish, or French migrants, for example, but have reserved entire aspects of their political programme to an attack on non-Indo-European, largely Islamic, cultural groups. The FPÖ, then, turns to language as a place for articulating a cultural critique of the distinctiveness and purity of the Austrian *Heimat* as an "imagined community"<sup>363</sup> that must be preserved from other non-European ethnic groups.

### **3.1 – The FPÖ's conceptualisations of Austria's human landscape**

Language is just one immediate feature of the overarching cultural community or social group who speak it. The FPÖ also imagines the 'human landscape' of *Heimat* through broader examples of ethnocultural similarities among 'true' Austrians. The term 'human landscape' refers in this thesis to the social group that, according to the FPÖ, identifies Austria as their native land: whether by birth right, shared cultural affinity, or by long biographical ties to place. This social group is therefore a part of the landscape of *Heimat* itself, and in every sense shapes the imaginary of that place through their linguistic traditions, cultural models, and historical narratives. The FPÖ stresses that the language, customs, values, history, and mythology of Austria inform national identity, and when imagined and performed

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<sup>363</sup> See Anderson, Benedict. *Imagined Communities: Reflections of the Origins and Spread of Nationalism*. Verso, 1991. Print.

together, they harmoniously govern a behaviour pattern that is typically ‘Austrian’. For example, when approaching the concept of Austrian identity and the character of the nation directly, the FPÖ consistently refers to national identity that has developed from a shared Germanic history, culture, and, more importantly, language.<sup>364</sup> Although Austrians are described as one part of the Germanic ethnocultural group, the FPÖ also notes that Austrian cultural heritage has developed from, and adheres to, what is described as core ‘European’ values and the European *Kulturraum*.<sup>365</sup> The FPÖ explains that European culture has its roots in the deepest antiquity, while Christianity, Judaism, humanism, and the enlightenment have also influenced this ethnocultural genesis.<sup>366</sup> With regard to Christianity, the FPÖ’s argument focuses primarily on the cultural roots of Christianity and values associated with the religion as distinct from other cultures and worldviews. For example, the FPÖ refer specifically to ‘*Kultur-Christentum*’, which has affected the European sense of identity, belief system, values, and inference of place in the world as distinct from others.<sup>367</sup> However, the slogan of the FPÖ’s 2014 *Bundesparteitag* in Graz, “Für ein freies Europa. Zuerst Österreicher, dann Europäer” demonstrates that the FPÖ principally identifies the nation and the people as Austrian, and only secondarily as European.<sup>368</sup>

The FPÖ discursively constructs its conception of a modern Austrian national identity through an assortment of these cultural elements derived from antiquity. The party use the uniformity of a shared culture to demonstrate the homogeny of the Austrians as an ethnic group. The FPÖ describes Austrians who conform to their definition of Austrian national identity as ‘*die heimischen Volksgruppen*’, and Austria as a nation informed by these cultural characteristics as ‘*Heimatland Österreich*’, all of which must be preserved for future generations.<sup>369</sup> Furthermore, the FPÖ seeks to emphasise the importance of preserving the ethnic and cultural integrity of native European ethnic groups, of which the Austrians are one example. This is seen, for

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<sup>364</sup> FPÖ Graz Parteiprogramm, 5.

<sup>365</sup> FPÖ Graz Parteiprogramm, 5

<sup>366</sup> FPÖ Graz Parteiprogramm, 5

<sup>367</sup> FPÖ Graz Parteiprogramm, 5

<sup>368</sup> FPÖ. *Für ein freies Europa: Zuerst Österreicher, dann Europäer!* Graz: FPÖ, 2013. Print. 1.

<sup>369</sup> FPÖ *Handbuch* 2013, 3.



example, in the FPÖ's political programme, where the party pledges itself to the "Schaffung eines europäischen Volksgruppenrechts auf ethnischkultureller Basis."<sup>370</sup> For the FPÖ, the preservation of the autochthonous ethnocultural identities requires an end to multiculturalism. Therefore in their political programme they emphasise their commitment to a "Europa der Vielfalt der historisch gewachsenen, autochthonen Ethnien" and reject any notion of „ein multikulturelles Europa.“<sup>371</sup> To negate the alleged incursions by agents of foreign culture and the resultant fragmentation of the native Austrian *Leitkultur* caused by multiculturalism, the FPÖ stresses the importance of place of birth and biological lines to its national identity formula, declaring that Austria is "kein Einwanderungsland" and that they therefore pursue "eine geburtenorientierte Familienpolitik."<sup>372</sup> These statements follow a typical Far Right bellwether, which commonly depicts the alleged decrepitude of native European cultures and links it to an encroaching or planned downfall of Western national identities and civilization through mass multiculturalism or the encouragement of cultural pluralism.

The FPÖ's examples of national identity given above describe the Austrian human landscape as a specific ethnic group, who has been shaped by the long cultural heritage that they share. The peppering of such terms as *der Kulturraum*, *das Ethnischkulturelle*, and *Volksgruppen* through their speeches and party literature demonstrate that the Right-Wing populist participants define the Austrian social group through the unison of a distinct culture and ethnicity. Cultural and ethnic heritage therefore lay at the foundation of the parties' perspective of national identity. Although they cite the influence of Judaism and Christianity, the Judeo-Christian religions are only supplementarily referenced to illustrate the common values of the greater Occident of which Austria is a part. While religion is important in Right-Wing populism, the *Kulturraum* to which Austrians primarily belong is German, and therefore 'Austrians' are firmly entrenched within the ethnocultural Germanic group. The primary example of this relationship, of course, is the linguistic identity all German-speaking nations share. While culture is the basis from which national identity is constructed, it is the linguistic tradition of Austria that preserves this

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<sup>370</sup> FPÖ *Handbuch* 2013, 284.

<sup>371</sup> FPÖ *Handbuch* 2013, 284.

<sup>372</sup> FPÖ *Graz Parteiprogramm*, 5.

cultural heritage. Language, as we shall now see, is the principal bearer of Austrian cultural identity and *Heimat*, and it is therefore through linguistic nationalism that the Austria's Right-Wing populist parties define who belongs in Austria, as well as identifies who does not.

### **3.2 - Linguistic nationalism: *Heimat* and language**

Language has always been central to the understanding of *Heimat*. Peter Blickle explains that *Heimat* is where one feels at home, and most importantly, where one's own language is spoken.<sup>373</sup> Language has been called the "tongue of *Heimat*" and is seen as the vehicle of expression by which *Heimat* is preserved, created, and discovered.<sup>374</sup> Kai Hammermeister explains that *Heimat* is not simply a region, a state, or a fatherland, rather *Heimat* is language, and as language is a place that is "stable and reliable, something into which we are born once and that afterwards remains a comforting surrounding."<sup>375</sup> The familiarity experienced through a common language draws people together as a group, allows them to express themselves, and gives an audial interpretation to otherwise silent spatial environments. The language of *Heimat*, in other words, confirms geographical affiliation through particularity and familiarity. *Heimat* is therefore not only an "optic identity" that one can perceive and perhaps touch, but is also an "oral identity" that one speaks in a shared language. The optic identity of *Heimat* is symbolically reproduced in language, orally shaping a familiar and beloved landscape that is immediately recognized as home. The oral identity of *Heimat*, therefore, is formed by the affinity between people and place, which is verbalized through a common language that is believed to belong to the land from which it was derived. Language is therefore not a single feature of *Heimat*, but the means by which the entirety of *Heimat* is made known and accessible.<sup>376</sup> As

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<sup>373</sup> Blickle 55.

<sup>374</sup> Bell, Michele Ricci. "Lyrical Redefinitions of *Heimat* in Mariella Mehr's "Nachrichten Aus Dem Exil" and "Widerwelten"." *The German Quarterly* 83.2 (2010): 189 - 211. Print. 207

<sup>375</sup> Hammermeister, Kai. "Heimat in Heidegger and Gadamer." *Philosophy and Literature* 24.2 (2000): 312 - 26. Print. 320 & 322.

<sup>376</sup> Bell 196.

Blickle explains, “Heimat is, in fact, so intimately connected to language that when all its property claims are stripped away, one may say ... that language is Heimat.”<sup>377</sup>

Language as *Heimat*, furthermore, symbolizes community and group identity overall. Blickle notes that in the *Heimat* concept there is a persistent and challenging interaction between language, identity, geography, politics and notions of self.<sup>378</sup> Language in the concept of *Heimat* nurtures the allegiances and commonality a social group requires in order to comprehend where, and with whom, they belong. Michelle Ricci Bell notes that *Heimat* and language preserves, and even signals, community specifically.<sup>379</sup> Nations are the largest and most successful political communities that have yet been devised. Language as *Heimat*, therefore, also has a powerful effect on national identity overall. The idea of common unity through language was taken by many nineteenth century German nationalists in order to define national identity. For example, in his *Addresses to the German Nation* Johann Gottlieb Fichte explains that the Germans of his time must thank their ancestors for their victory over the Roman invaders, because it allowed Germans to preserve their “language, and their way of thinking – for being Germans still, for being still borne along on the stream of original and independent life; to them we owe everything we have since been as a nation.”<sup>380</sup> Language, in other words, was the principle bearer of culture and national identity: the foundational pillar of identity from which the concept of being a German citizen developed. Fichte goes on to note that wherever the German language was spoken, one could consider himself both a citizen “of the state where he was born and to whose care he was in the first instance commended” as well as a member “of the whole common fatherland of the German nation.”<sup>381</sup> A common language, therefore, is not only at the centre of individual identities, but is also an assimilating force that assists to construct national identities and commonality through linguistic traditions.

In the context of national identities, Jan Blommaert and Jef Verschueren

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<sup>377</sup> Blickle 139.

<sup>378</sup> Blickle 8.

<sup>379</sup> Bell 195.

<sup>380</sup> Fichte, Johann Gottlieb. *Adresses to the German Nation*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2008. Print. 109 – 110.

<sup>381</sup> Fichte 147.

similarly explain that language “assumes the character of a clear identity marker.”<sup>382</sup> Furthermore, as Elie Kedourie explains, an “original language” was historically the most important element by which the nation was “recognised to exist and have the right to form a state of its own.”<sup>383</sup> Patrick Stevenson also notes that “language is seen to be central both to the practical, instrumental process of national building (for example, in relation to citizenship), and to the symbolic, integrative processes of developing a national culture (for example, in relation to national identity).”<sup>384</sup> The congruence between *Heimat* and national identity is demonstrated through the symbolic and integrative application of language in societies. A national identity and a sense of *Heimat* are both constructed, in part, by language similarities that help to encourage singular identity and even common purpose. As Stevenson notes, “Standard languages, in particular, are seen as both a vehicle for articulating and achieving common political goals and a manifestation of a common purpose and singular identity.”<sup>385</sup> The pursuit of common purpose and the establishment of a singular identity, furthermore, allows for the generation of shared feelings of patriotism for one’s culture, language, and national group. Much like language in the construction of national identities, the language of *Heimat* has, since the nineteenth century, encouraged national patriotism through cultural privatism, all of which has greatly affected the introspective self-understanding of the social groups who participate.<sup>386</sup> Thus common language means more than simply the ability to communicate; rather it also encourages group solidarity and community, cultural catharsis, and the linguistic identity by which national identities are arranged and the affinity with one’s *Heimat* is experienced.

Language also plays an important role in the formation of collective social identity because it dictates conformity with certain behavioral patterns that are informed by the social history and the culture from which the language is derived. The historically grounded and geographically rooted knowledge that informs social

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<sup>382</sup> Blommaert, Jan, and J Verschuere. “The Role of Language in European Nationalist Ideologies.” *Language and Peace*. Dartmouth, 1995. 137–160. Print. 358.

<sup>383</sup> Kedourie, Elie. *Nationalism*. New York: Wiley, 1993. Print. 64.

<sup>384</sup> Molinero, Clare, and Patrick Stevenson. *Language Ideologies, Policies and Practices: Language and the Future of Europe*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006. Print. 147.

<sup>385</sup> Molinero 147.

<sup>386</sup> Applegate 121.

identity is what Pierre Bourdieu calls our ‘habitus’.<sup>387</sup> ‘Habitus’ is a system of bodily dispositions, such as language, that are formed out of a desire to be, and to reflect what is.<sup>388</sup> For Bourdieu, our ‘habitus’, which is informed through historical and cultural knowledge, predisposes us to act, think, and behave in a certain way, as well as recognise the differences in others who do not follow the same habitus as us. In the context of language, our use of a mother tongue therefore affords us a wide spectrum of cultural knowledge and social history that defines us as a group, as well as affixing that group a geographical grounding as a homeland. As such, our ‘habitus’ is a unifying, constructing, and classifying power, which invests “socially constructed organising principles that are acquired in the course of a situated and dated social experience.”<sup>389</sup> These social histories, which are constructed and developed over generations, provide individuals with dimensions of social personae, such as belief systems, behaviour, and other sociocultural elements, which are all linked to epistemic stances on how groups identify themselves from others.<sup>390</sup> Language, in other words, exhibits group personae and is therefore a fundamental feature of group categorisation, which also potentially fosters a separatist narrative of ‘us’ and ‘them’.

The ‘language as *Heimat*’ narrative, so systematically detailed by *Heimat* enthusiasts and nationalists since the nineteenth century, continues in the rhetoric of the contemporary Austrian populist Right, who also look to language as a principal example of Austrian culture, national identity, and *Heimat*. The FPÖ cites a link between language and the conception of *Heimat* in its political programme, where language is identified as a crucial component of “unserer geistigen Heimat”, and something, therefore, to be both respected and preserved.<sup>391</sup> They also stress that in an age of “Identitätsvernichtung” and the “Entfremdung der Völker von ihren Wurzeln” at the hands of global “Großkonzerne” and worldwide “Finanzjongleure”, the protection of “Kultur und Sprache” requires special attention.<sup>392</sup> The FPÖ, as a result

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<sup>387</sup> See Bourdieu, Pierre. *Equisse D'une Théorie De La Pratique*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977. Print.

<sup>388</sup> Bourdieu 150.

<sup>389</sup> Bourdieu 136 – 137.

<sup>390</sup> Ochs, Elinor. "Linguistic resources for socializing humanity." *Rethinking Linguistic Relativity*, ed. by J. Gumperz & S. Levinson. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 407-438. Print. 424.

<sup>391</sup> FPÖ *Handbuch* 2011, 257.

<sup>392</sup> FPÖ *Handbuch* 2013, 258 – 259.

of these assertions, announces “der Schutz und die Pflege unserer Sprache” occupies the very centre of its “Kulturpolitik.”<sup>393</sup>

Strache reiterates this political position in a rap song he released during the 2008 Austrian general election. In the song, called ‘Viva HC’, Strache asserts that “wir”, presumably the FPÖ, stand for “Uns’re Heimat uns’re Leute” for “uns’re Sprache” and “Kultur.”<sup>394</sup> Language, as such, is seen by the FPÖ as the principal example of broader ethnoculture. In the chapter *Heimat und Identität* of the FPÖ’s political programme, for example, the party stresses that language is “die wichtigste Trägerin des kulturellen Ausdrucks.”<sup>395</sup> For this reason, language is given primacy of place in the FPÖ’s *Heimat* and cultural identity discourse, and the FPÖ describes language as one of the fundamental “identitätsstiftende Säulen.”<sup>396</sup> The German language, therefore, is at the center of the FPÖ’s identity and *Heimat* narrative. For the party, language is important to *Heimat* because it provides a clear ethnocultural boundary within which Austrians are afforded a distinct cultural identity.

The FPÖ justifies its Germanic interpretation of Austrian ethnoculture by reminding their audience that German is the Landessprache of Austria.<sup>397</sup> Austria’s constitution also recognises German as the official language of the nation, although certain rights are accorded to recognised linguistic minorities.<sup>398</sup> The FPÖ, however, is not interested in acknowledging minority groups. In the Graz party programme, the FPÖ describes true Austrians as those of ethnic German extraction, using language, history, and culture as markers of identity, stating that the “Sprache, Geschichte und Kultur Österreichs deutsch (sind). Die überwiegende Mehrheit der Österreicher ist Teil der deutschen Volks-, Sprach- und Kulturgemeinschaft.”<sup>399</sup> Here the FPÖ is speaking for ‘die überwiegende Mehrheit’, or the language and culture of the Germanic majority. As a result of this Germanic view of Austrian identity, any critical analysis of the non-Germanic linguistic traditions of Austria, such as Slovene, is

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<sup>393</sup> FPÖ *Handbuch* 2013, 259.

<sup>394</sup> Strache, Heinz-Christian. “Viva HC.” Vienna: FPÖ, 2008.

<sup>395</sup> FPÖ *Handbuch* 2011, 258.

<sup>396</sup> FPÖ *Handbuch* 2013, 258.

<sup>397</sup> FPÖ *Handbuch* 2013, 37 and 253.

<sup>398</sup> “Parliamentary Democracy: Federal Constitution.” *Austrian Embassy Washington*. Austrian Embassy Washington, n.d. Web. 10 Jan. 2016.

<sup>399</sup> FPÖ *Graz Parteiprogramm*, 5.

absent – despite the fact these languages play an important role in a number of regional Austrian dialects.

The renunciation of non-German languages in Austria is in fact a typical FPÖ policy. As early as 1977 the then 29 year old Jörg Haider ran an anti-Slovene campaign in his native Carinthia, with a particular interest in the prohibition of bilingual place name signs and schools, all of which assisted him in procuring a seat in federal parliament in 1979.<sup>400</sup> Such an anti-Slovene campaign was characteristically well received in Carinthia, as even today many ethnically Germanic Austrians look down on Slovenians.<sup>401</sup> The enduring debate around bilingual signage in Carinthia is testament to language's pivotal place in the identity of the region. As late as 2005, Haider was still actively engaged in campaigns alongside *Heimat* organisations to remove the presence of the Slovenian language in Carinthia, which also resulted in the 'Ortstafelsturm' – a procession of cars and convoys driven by ethnically Germanic Austrians, who stormed the region removing any place name signs in the Slovenian language.<sup>402</sup> By focusing on German cultural heritage, and language in particular, as the foundation of Austrian identity, the FPÖ ignores or rejects other ethnic minorities that reside within the nation - some of which, such as Slovenians, are not new migrants, but actually have long standing ties to the land.

The animosity between Slovenian and German Austrians is in actuality a negative manifestation of the important role language has played in the development of Austrian identity. Ruth Wodak et al explain that the Austrian constitutional stipulation of German as the official language illustrates that belonging to the German linguistic group has played and continues to play a significant role in the construction of an Austrian national identity.<sup>403</sup> She also notes that many Austrians imagine cultural ideas (mentality, character, behavioural patterns) alongside language to construct an identity of common descent and an "innate nationality."<sup>404</sup> Therefore

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<sup>400</sup> Hockenos, Paul. "Austria's Far Right Wunderkind." *World Policy Journal* 12.3 (1995): 75 - 80. Print. 76.

<sup>401</sup> Hockenos 76.

<sup>402</sup> McLaughlin, Eithne. "Cultural Memory and Regional Identities in Northern Ireland and Southern Carinthia: A Cross-Cultural Comparison." *Towards a Dialogic Anglistics*. Eds. Delanoy, Werner, Jörg Helbig and Allan James. Wien: Lit Verlag. 29 – 46.. Print. 43

<sup>403</sup> Wodak *Discursive*, 57.

<sup>404</sup> Cilla, Rudolf De, Martin Reisigl, and Ruth Wodak. "The Discursive Construction of National Identities." *Discourse & Society* 10.2 (1999): 149 - 73. Print. 169.

more than just the official national language of Austria, linguistic and cultural identity has helped to define the character of ‘Austrianness’. However this narrative has largely failed to recognise ethnocultural minorities who also live in Austria, some of which have done so for generations, and is also easily exploited in the Right-Wing populist discourse of linguistic nationalism, which uses the concept of *Heimat* and language in order to dictate who is a ‘true’ Austrian and therefore belongs in the nation.

The concept of language as *Heimat* and national identity also has the capability to demonstrate ethnicity and nativism, and therefore has a biological application in relation to the image it constructs of society and nation. The FPÖ also recognises this possibility, and implicitly alludes to ethnicity as *Heimat* through their special use of the term *Muttersprache*. Ruth Wodak notes that linguistics plays a large role in ‘border and national identity politics’, which are both increasingly defined through a sense that the national language is the ‘mother tongue’.<sup>405</sup> Policies, in other words, that advocate a return to or preservation of ‘the mother tongue’ or ‘national language’ see to illustrate or design the nation state by projecting a homogeneous culture, language, and territory.<sup>406</sup> Gillian Stevens explains that languages are repositories of culture as well as a symbolic feature of ethnicity, and therefore a “person’s mother tongue is a strong indicator of self-identification with an ethnic community.”<sup>407</sup> Similarly, the FPÖ defines the importance of *Muttersprache* as follows:

Die Muttersprache ist das Ergebnis einer biographischen und familiären Prägung. Sie ist daher die Sprache, in der man denkt, fühlt und träumt. Die jeweilige Muttersprache ist daher als Trägerin des kulturellen Ausdrucks das bestimmende Kriterium der Zuordnung zu einer größeren Kulturgemeinschaft. Sprache ist nicht nur ein Verständigungsmittel, sondern auch ein Hort der

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<sup>405</sup> Wodak, Ruth. *The Politics of Fear: What Right-Wing Populist Discourses Mean*. UK: Sage, 2015. Print. 74.

<sup>406</sup> Wodak, Ruth. *The Politics of Fear: What Right-Wing Populist Discourses Mean*. UK: Sage, 2015. Print. 74.

<sup>407</sup> Stevens, Gillian. "Nativity, Intermarriage, and Mother-Tongue Shift." *American Sociological Review* 50.1 (1985): 74 - 83. Print. 74.



geistigen Überlieferung – ein geistiger und ideeller Schatz, der von Generation zu Generation weitergegeben wird.

Here the FPÖ indicates that a person's *Muttersprache* is culturally derived from a single ethnicity because it is the result of a biographical and family character that is transmitted from one generation to the next. *Muttersprache* is also identity because it is at the core of our experience, and is therefore the language of one's inner sentiments, experience, and indeed world. Finally *Muttersprache* also acts as a conduit for cultural expression, and the refuge where heritage and tradition is stored and passed from forefathers to descendants. Therefore *Muttersprache* is also *mündlich überliefert*, and its purity implies continuity in the Austrian community, as well as an example of cultural identity that, if largely 'intact', demonstrates authenticity.

The FPÖ's emphasis on the importance of *Muttersprache* to identity imitates the popular thesis that being a native speaker of a language, and therefore possessing that language as your mother tongue, implies certain prerequisite criteria:

- a) Language is inherited through birth into a specific social group that is commonly associated with the language,
- b) Inheriting a language as a mother tongue means that you can speak it fluently,
- c) If one cannot speak the language proficiently one cannot claim it as a mother tongue,
- d) People are usually citizens of one country; therefore people can only be native speakers of one mother tongue.<sup>408</sup>

The Austrian FPÖ's demand for the preservation of the Austrian *Muttersprache*, which emphasises language's biological roots rather than its communicative function, demonstrates that they view language as a symbol of ethnic and cultural identification. *Muttersprache* is a native tongue that is shared by all Austrians and is therefore underscored by the party to be a common socio-cultural feature. The concept of 'mother tongue' has long been a salient prerequisite of belonging for all

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<sup>408</sup> Hampton, M. B. H. "Displacing the "Native Speaker": Expertise, Affiliation, and Inheritance." *ETL Journal* 44.2: 97 - 101. Print. 97.

Far Right groups.<sup>409</sup> One may only ever have German as their native tongue in Austria if they were born there (and be typically of Germanic extraction as a result). Therefore new migrants are denied membership of this *Heimat* and national identity narrative, because they can never truly claim German to be their first, or native, language. A *Muttersprache* requires fluency and genealogical ties to the social group, which is unfeasible for new migrants or people of non-Germanic ethnic heritage. Language, as a result, affords the Austria's Right-Wing populist parties a firm platform with which to demonstrate their perspective of the national 'in' ethnocultural group of Austria, as well as the validation for divisive politics that calls into question the right of ethnic minorities or migrants to live in the Austrian nation.

### **3.3 - Language and the national 'In' group in the FPÖ's comic series**

In order to further define native Austrians through linguistic features, the FPÖ utilises mythology as a political medium. This is seen in the party's comic series, which draws on the myths and legends of Austria, as well as fanciful portrayals of Austrian society both present and future. The three publications are "Der blaue Planet" (2009), "Sagen aus Wien" (2010), and "Sagen aus Österreich" (2013). The legends and cartoons in the series provide the reader with an Austrian social history that uses linguistic strategies and sociocultural activities to define Austrian identity and *Heimat*. The FPÖ explain the special relationship between language and mythology in their political programme:

Unsere Märchen, Mythen und Volkslieder künden vom Wesen unseres Volkes. Erzählen, Vorlesen und Singen sind somit schon in frühester Kindheit von großer Bedeutung für das Zusammengehörigkeitsgefühl.<sup>410</sup>

In other words, to speak one's myths and fairy tales aloud is to enact a shared cultural identity (located in both the myths and language that express them) and ritualistically experience a subsequent *Zusammengehörigkeitsgefühl* with your social group. The use of linguistic patriotism within a series that depicts an alleged shared ethnocultural history provides an interesting example of the role of language in nation building and

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<sup>409</sup> Wodak *The Politics of Fear*, 93.

<sup>410</sup> FPÖ *Handbuch 2011*, 257.

nationalism. Linguistic nationalism typically engages language in order to imagine a common past, which assists to strengthen the national conscious through features of linguistic purity, linguistic patriotism, and linguistic distinctiveness.<sup>411</sup>

Anthropologists and ethnologists have long cited the close link between mythologies and the phenomenon of language. The French ethnologist and anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss (1908 – 2009) explains that “myth is language: to be known, myth has to be told; it is a part of human speech.”<sup>412</sup> Mythologies have been passed down between generations through oral tradition, and therefore linguistic character and traditions have played and continues to play a pivotal role in their construction. Lévi-Strauss further stresses “Myth is language, functioning on an especially high level where meaning succeeds practically at ‘taking off’ from the linguistic ground on which it keeps rolling.”<sup>413</sup> Therefore the manner by which a myth is told, or the speech that articulates it, will indicate much about the origin of the legend, its meaning and purpose, and which group subsequently claim ownership over it. The Swiss psychiatrist Carl Jung (1875 – 1961) describes myth as a form of self-realisation, and that myth is, in fact, a “primordial language.”<sup>414</sup> The French linguist and mythologist Roland Barthes (1915 – 1980) also cites the relationship between myth and language, where he states, “the world enters language through a dialectical relation between activities, between human actions; it comes out of myth as a harmonious display of essences” and that myth is “depoliticized speech.”<sup>415</sup> Language, in other words, is derived from myth, and it is from a social group’s shared heritage and mythic past that a common language (and linguistic identity) develops.

The FPÖ’s comic series uses clear linguistic strategies in the myths to emphasise their understanding of language as *Heimat*. The FPÖ’s first comic, *Der blaue Planet*, provides the audience with a portrayal of two parallel worlds. The first, *Der blaue Planet* (a reference to a world that is governed by the FPÖ – whose party is

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<sup>411</sup> Karoulla-Vrikki, Dimitra. "Education, Language Policy and Identity in Cyprus: A Diachronic Perspective (1960 - 1997)." *Sociolinguistic and Pedagogical Dimensions of Dialects in Education*. Eds. Papapavlou, Andreas and Pavlos Pavlou 2007. 80 - 100. Print.

<sup>412</sup> Lévi-Strauss, Claude. *Structural Anthropology* New York: Basic Books, 1963. Print. 209.

<sup>413</sup> Lévi-Strauss 210.

<sup>414</sup> Jung, C. G., et al. *The Collected Works: Volume I-XX*. London: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2015. Print. 5550.

<sup>415</sup> Barthes, Roland. "Myth Today." *Visual Culture: The Reader*. Eds. Evans, Jessica and Stuart Hall. London: SAGE, 2005. 51 - 58. Print. 58.

the colour of blue in the Austrian political spectrum), depicts a community that is largely defined by the purity of its language. The homogeneous population, whose leader is a cartoon illustration of Heinz-Christian Strache, all follow the conventions of the German language, as well as displaying Austrian distinctiveness through the local provincialism demonstrated in regional vernacular. *Der blaue Planet* therefore maintains a distinctly Germanic view in relation to Austrian identity, and the lack of other competing cultures demonstrates a degree of social harmony and congruence for the national ‘in’ group. There are few indications, if any, of multicultural influences, and thus the local population still refer to each other through the local Austrian greeting, seen for example here:



**Figure 36.**

Image taken from *Der blaue Planet*.<sup>416</sup>

There are no foreign languages spoken in *Der blaue Planet* and therefore no ethnic minorities or indication of ‘alien’ culture or multiculturalism. The German language, rather, is the foundation from which the FPÖ’s stylized image of *Heimat* is conceived in *Der Blaue Planet*.

The importance of the purity of language, culture, and *Heimat* is made particularly clear when Strache visits the ‘*Zentralplanet*’, nicknamed ‘Absurdistan’.

<sup>416</sup> FPÖ *Der Blaue Planet*, 17.

‘Absurdistan’ is an Islamised, multicultural version of Austria ruled from Brussels by the European Union. The FPÖ’s image of ‘Absurdistan’ is a land where Socialist policies have taken over; illustrating a rather ‘absurd’ and foreign image of Vienna. The use of the Persian suffix *-stan*, or ‘place’, indicates that Austrian national and cultural identity has become either Islamic or pluralistic. This is demonstrated through the vanquishment of Christianity at the hands of the agents of Islam, the abandonment of local vernacular, the disregard for the German language, and the dominance of a multilingual society in its stead:




Figure 37.

Image taken from *Der blaue Planet*.<sup>417</sup>

The depiction of a *Bandenkrieg* is typical of the FPÖ’s association of foreigners with criminality and civil unrest. Immediately arresting in this image is the absence of the German language, with the exception of the bastardised form of “Sheysse Pub.” Instead, the heroes of the comic are confronted with civil war and an assortment of foreign characters, languages, and global corporations. The dichotomy of the peaceful tranquility of Strache’s *Heimat* and the destructive scenes in the multicultural and globalised ‘Absurdistan’ demonstrate the uniqueness of Austria as *Heimat*, and show what could happen if it were diluted or lost. The disappearance of the German language, as seen in the comic, is allegedly one such way this dystopia could occur.

<sup>417</sup> FPÖ *Der Blaue Planet*, 35.

As a result of the Socialist pandemonion depicted in the FPÖ's *Der blaue Planet*, the native Austrian population in 'Absurdistan' has become a minority. This is explained by the FPÖ in a dialogue between Strache and a freedom-fighting version of himself, a *Doppelgänger* from the *Zentralplanet* called Stra-Che<sup>418</sup>:



**Figure 38.**

Image taken from *Der blaue Planet*.<sup>419</sup>



**Figure 39.**

Image taken from *Der blaue Planet*.<sup>420</sup>

<sup>418</sup> The use of Stra-Che is undoubtedly a reference to the Argentine Marxist revolutionary Ernesto "Che" Guevara. This appears to be a coy attempt at irony and humour by the FPÖ. By adopting the title 'Stra-Che', Strache is referring to himself as a type of freedom fighter, whose struggle is against the corrupted political establishment, albeit from a Rightist position. For example, in the prologue to the comic Strache refers to himself as "Euer HC Stra-Che." See FPÖ *Der Blaue Planet*, 3.

<sup>419</sup> FPÖ *Der Blaue Planet*, 35.

<sup>420</sup> FPÖ *Der Blaue Planet*, 36.

As a representative of the self-governing *Heimat* that preserves a homogeneous ethnoculture, Strache as HC man is quick to linguistically express his identity of place with the traditional Austrian greetings of *servus* and *Grüß Gott*. Strache's Austrian salutations demonstrate his conformity to the ethnic and cultural identity his *Heimat* has taught him from birth. The FPÖ indicates here that the 'real' human landscape of *Heimat* is not just defined by citizenship (*ius soli*), but by a clear understanding and use of local vernacular. In other words, genuine Austrians are characterized by the nativist principles (*ius sanguinis*) that foster a cultural or even linguistic sense of 'belonging'.<sup>421</sup>

Conversely, Stra-Che's ominous warnings about the forbidden use of native dialect imply the gravity of the situation in 'Absurdistan', where autochthonous linguistic and cultural traditions have been displaced. The enforced proscription of local vernacular demonstrates applied linguistic tyranny brought about through multiculturalism. Instead of traditionalism and *Heimat*, the FPÖ illustrate a corrupted Austrian identity that is lacking any traditional cultural traits – vernacular included. While aspects of the language have failed to remain intact, so too have other customary forms such as clothing, with Stra-Che compelled to wear Islamic attire in a pluralistic society that has turned against, or simply overrun, the host population. The cartoon is therefore clearly reacting to the perceived threat of Islamic migration, as is noted in the Middle Eastern attire and minarets on *Stefansdom*. Although Stra-Che still speaks German, it is implied here that the term "Grüß Gott" – or any reference to Christianity or other non-Islamic cultural traits – are forbidden due to Islam being the dominant religious paradigm in 'Absurdistan' (the future Vienna). The archetypal Austrian greeting is no longer acceptable, therefore, presumably because of the ascendancy of Allah. Vienna has thus become Islamised due to the large amount of Muslims now living there. The minarets on churches and the Arabic script written on the walls of the city are all clear indications that the enemy is Islam, and those that defy Islam (such as Strache) will be killed under this system.

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<sup>421</sup> Wodak *The Politics of Fear*, 71.

### **3.3.1 – Mundart in the FPÖ's comic series**

While *Der blaue Planet* provides the audience with an ominous prediction of the future, the FPÖ's collection of *Sagen* returns to the past. The series is characterised by the use of regional dialects to illustrate a linguistic and cultural commonality between the audience and the protagonists or heroes in the myths. The party affirms the importance of provincial Austrian identity in its political programme, where it refers to a distinct Austrian linguistic identity by highlighting the diversity of regional dialect:

Zur Pflege der Sprache gehört ebenso das Bewusstsein über die Bedeutung der verschiedenen Mundarten und deren Weitergabe, da sie den Reichtum und die Vielfalt der Sprache sowie der Regionen widerspiegeln.<sup>422</sup>

While the FPÖ seemingly celebrate through dialect the regional distinctiveness of the Austrian linguistic whole, the party's acknowledgement of dialect has deeper implications. The party's desire to safeguard regional Germanic dialects in Austria is a part of a preservationist policy for Austrian identity. The use of dialect over standard German, however, affects the self-identifying narrative in Austria in two central ways. Firstly, the use of dialect rightly preserves the diversity of dialects that exist in the nation, albeit from a Germanic perspective only. However, the FPÖ are seemingly playing on the cultural divide between those who speak *Mundart*, namely the working class, farmers, and those from rural areas, and the Standard German spoken by the educated, professionals, and much of the urban demographic. It is well documented that the FPÖ attracts votes from the working class above all other demographics.<sup>423</sup> Intellectuals and professionals, accordingly, are known to vote for Centrist or Left-Wing parties. Perhaps, as is the case with Switzerland and Swiss German, the FPÖ are suggesting that real Austrians use their dialect (as a result of their identity of place), rather than the 'high brow' nuances of Standard High German. The politicians in the FPÖ, as a result, continue to play their 'one of the boys'

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<sup>422</sup> FPÖ *Handbuch* 2013, 260.

<sup>423</sup> Eatwell, Roger. "Ten Theories of the Extreme Right." *Right-Wing Extremism in the Twenty-First Century*. Eds. Merkl, Peter H. and Leonard Wienberg. London: Frank Cass, 2005. 45 - 70. Print. 50.



narrative, and thus appear, through the use of dialect for example, to represent genuine working class Austrians and their interests. The FPÖ's empathy toward the working class, therefore, manifests itself through the linguistic cues the party employs.

The use of dialect is particularly prevalent in the cartoons within the FPÖ's comic series. Although dialect is the vernacular of choice for the protagonists and the FPÖ figures in the comic, Standard German is not rejected overall. While the text from the legends in the comic series is all in Standard German and taken from various external sources, the additional dialogue in the cartoons written by the FPÖ utilizes local Austrian dialect and vernacular to demonstrate a distinct regional identity that is connected German but also distinctly Austrian. The FPÖ's comic series is an effective example of its celebration of distinctively 'Austrian' linguistic traditions, as opposed to only multi-national Standard German. The use of dialect designates the speakers as the group that is 'at home' in both modern Vienna and the city's imperial and mythic past. This approach of beginning their narrative of Austrian identity with Viennese provincialism and dialect is hardly surprising. During Austria's history, the urban dialect of Vienna influenced all Austrian language areas due to the prevalence of the imperial city, and the many people that flocked there during periods of urbanisation.<sup>424</sup> It is logical, therefore, that the FPÖ begin their imaginative construct of Austrian national identity here, both in relation to the city's history and to its dialect.

Regional dialect has long been celebrated in the German-speaking world as a pure form of language and of *Heimat*, and has also had a close relationship with the development and reception of native folklore. For example, Celia Applegate notes that German *Heimat* enthusiasts as early as the nineteenth century understood regional *Mundart* as a spirited form of folklore, "which in its forms of poetry, tale, dialogue, aphorism, essay, and even joke became the leading medium for the popular creation and celebration of folk identity."<sup>425</sup> The varying character of *Mundart*, furthermore, also helped to distinguish regional identities from the rest of the broader German

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<sup>424</sup> Maligin, Viktor T. "Austrian Phraseology as Display of Self-Developing of German in Austria." *Essays on Lexicon, Lexicography, Terminography in Russian, American and Other Cultures*. Eds. Karpova, Olga and Faina Kartashkova. Newcastle: Cambridge, 2007. 29 - 36. Print. 30.

<sup>425</sup> Applegate 80.

population.<sup>426</sup> Alon Confino also refers to the nineteenth century study of Swabian dialect, which according to one *Heimat* enthusiast embodied Swabian distinctiveness: “The language of our people offers one of the most important means to know its peculiarity ... (Our language) still streams in the localities of our Heimat with its blend of power, originality, nativeness, and simplicity.”<sup>427</sup> The German philosopher Martin Heidegger (1889 – 1976) also identifies dialect as both the origin and most pure form of language and *Heimat*:

The essence of language has its roots in dialect. If dialect is the mother’s language, the homeliness of the home, the homeland has its roots in it as well. Dialect is not only the mother’s language but, at the same time and still more so, the mother of language.<sup>428</sup>

For Heidegger, dialect speaks of rootedness and indigenesness. Hammermeister also explains that, according Heidegger, dialect brings into view “nature and people, a region and its inhabitants.”<sup>429</sup> Blickle refers to Heidegger’s concept of dialect as the “the language of Heimat.”<sup>430</sup> Dialect, therefore, helps to create an image of a people and their region or *Heimat*, and evokes an oral mythology and set of traditions that somehow speak of their collective identity and origins.

Christoph Hubner similarly notes that the FPÖ’s use of dialect in the comic is a clear attempt to show that the party is close to Viennese (and Austrian) traditions.<sup>431</sup> *Sagen aus Wien* is directed specifically to “Liebe Wienerinnen, liebe Wiener!” and the corresponding opening prologue reminds the Viennese of their long shared sense of tradition and history encapsulated in the myths of the region.<sup>432</sup> *Sagen aus Wien*, as the name would suggest, depicts many examples of central Bavarian Viennese dialect spoken by the native protagonists. This is seen, for example, in *der Heidenschuss*, a

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<sup>426</sup> Applegate 80.

<sup>427</sup> Cited in Confino *The Nation*, 118.

<sup>428</sup> Cited in Phillips, James. *Heidegger's Volk: Between National Socialism and Poetry*. California: Stanford University Press, 2005. Print. 204.


<sup>429</sup> Hammermeister 314.

<sup>430</sup> Blickle 65.

<sup>431</sup> Hubner, Christoph. *Comicanalyse der drei FPÖ-Wahlkampfcomics aus den Jahren 2009, 2010 und 2013*. Thesis. Universität Wien, 2014. Web. 3 Apr. 2015. 80.

<sup>432</sup> FPÖ. *Sagen aus Wien*. Vienna: FPÖ, 2010. Print. 4 – 5.

folkloric account of the 1529 Turkish siege of Vienna. In the cartoon the native Viennese defenders speak in local *Wienerisch*, referring to their group as “wir Wiena.”<sup>433</sup> The slightly altered version of *der Heidenschuss* in the FPÖ’s *Sagen aus Österreich* uses the even more traditional *Wienerisch* “wir Weana”, replacing the *i* for an *e*.<sup>434</sup> In the accompanying cartoon created by the FPÖ the native population are housed behind the walls of the city, with the Turkish army camped outside. Here, language and imagery assists to magnify the degree of separation between the Turks and the Viennese:



**Figure 40.**

Image taken from *Sagen aus Wien*.<sup>435</sup>

The foreigners are divided from the native population by an insurmountable ‘wall’ that is both a tangible structure as well as a cultural and linguistic partition. The walls of the city, as a result, are a symbolic representation of the differences in ethnoculture (of which language is one example) and collective identity between the two groups. No one questions the right of the Viennese to defend themselves from the Turkish invaders in seventeenth century. The image, however, is also powerful portrayal of the FPÖ perspective on who belongs in modern Austria and who does not. The use of

<sup>433</sup> FPÖ *Wien*, 49.

<sup>434</sup> FPÖ. *Sagen aus Österreich*. Vienna: FPÖ, 2013. Print. 2.

<sup>435</sup> FPÖ *Wien*, 48.

dialect allows the FPÖ to demonstrate the purity of the Austrian language and culture, both of which are neither directed to nor accessible to outsiders. The Austrians defenders therefore proudly assert, once again in Viennese dialect, that the Turkish invaders should leave: “Eh kloar! De solln sich schleichen.” The verb *schleichen*, which has different meanings in High German and Austrian dialect, is also used by the Viennese defenders in *die zweite Türkenbelagerung Wiens 1683*, a folkloric account of the second Turkish siege of Vienna in 1683:



**Figure 41.**

Image taken from *Sagen aus Wien*.<sup>436</sup>

The Austrian dialect meaning of *sich schleichen*, ‘go away’ or ‘get lost’, is used here rather than the High German meaning ‘to sneak’. The use of the Austrian dialect meaning infers that the Turks do not belong in Vienna’s past or the present, and should therefore leave. However, ‘dass sich jemand schleichen soll’ also appears as metaphor in *der Heidenschuss*, as the Turkish invaders are trying to ‘sneak’ in to the city, ‘sich in etwas schleichen’. Therefore it appears that the FPÖ are exploiting both the High German and dialect meanings. As Hubner notes:

Diese Metapher drückt Abneigung aus, wobei sie mehr aus dem Mundartlichen kommt, denn die Schriftsprache bringt dem Wort „Schleichen“

<sup>436</sup> FPÖ *Wien*, 9.

eine andere Bedeutung. Da aber in diesen Strache-Comics viel mit der Mundart ausgedrückt wird, fällt das Schleichen wohl eben auch in dieses Schema.<sup>437</sup>

There is also the possibility of interpreting *sich schleichen* as to lurk, to slink, or to creep as a snake, implying the threatening nature of the Turkish invaders. There is also the conjecture of ‘to crawl’, as if on one’s hands and knees, symbolising that the Turks are inferior to the native Viennese.

Heinz-Christian Strache is also illustrated in the comics engaging in dialogue with Austrian dialect. In *die zweite Türkenbelagerung Wiens 1683* Heinz-Christian Strache appears as the leader of the town and the purveyor of its defences. The reader’s understanding of who is native to the city and who is an outside threat continues to be directed through the FPÖ’s linguistic strategy. In this strategy, *Wienerisch* is once more employed to culturally demarcate those that belong in Vienna. For example, in the cartoons Strache, or ‘HC’ as he is referred to, directs his defensive campaign against the invading Turkish army with Vienna dialect and nomenclature:



Figure 42.

Image taken from *Sagen aus Wien*.<sup>438</sup>

<sup>437</sup> Hubner 80.

<sup>438</sup> FPÖ *Wien*, 10.

In the frame Strache rises as a mythic Germanic hero and defender of the city, finding his political moment in the enmity stirring between cultures and ethnic groups. With Viennese dialect he directs his campaign for the youth of the city to rise up against the Islamic threat at the gates, while his political opponent (and then mayor of Vienna) languishes in the background. Strache's insistence that the boy sling pork sausage at a Moslem is a symbolic attack on the culture and religion of Islam. Banned in the Islamic faith, the consumption of pork is a powerful way the FPÖ further contributes to the 'us' and 'them' dichotomy. Cuisine, and the regional dialect with which to name it, thereby becomes a powerful tool with which to antagonise the perceived incompatibility between Austrian and Islamic culture. Austrians eat pork, and the image from the comic symbolically suggests that Austrian identity and culture should be put directly into the face of all those that may believe differently, or, indeed, disagree with the culture of the Austrian majority.

The young boy is the embodiment of a 'true' Austrian and Viennese, and therefore wears the coat of arms of Vienna upon his armour. The simultaneous use of dialect by the Viennese youth and Strache indicate that they understand each other, recognise each other's purpose and goals, and are working together as native Austrians against a foreign ethnoculture. 'HC' directs the blonde Viennese boy to unload his slingshot at 'Mustafa', in a reference to the grand vizier of the Ottoman Empire, Kara Mustafa (1634 – 1683), who was the unsuccessful leader of the Turkish siege at Vienna in 1683.<sup>439</sup> 'Leiwand', Viennese dialect for the Standard German *sehr gut*, and the abusive Viennese-Austrian Schimpfwort 'Nudelaug', an 'idiot', directed against the Kara Mustafa, immediately demonstrate the native Viennese boy's native identity through localised, if not marginally adolescent, Viennese vernacular. But in addition to this, there are typical culinary-cultural artefacts in the cartoon that can be identified through language as both Viennese and Austrian. The FPÖ choose to use the local Vienna nomenclature instead of the High German *Burenwurst*, namely Hasse ('A hot one' – figuratively referring to the Viennese sausage) as well as the Vienna dialect Buckl instead of Standard German Brot. The FPÖ's aim is the preservation and popularisation of the Viennese sausage and the Viennese sausage-

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<sup>439</sup> Brantner, Cornelia, and Katharina Lobinger. "Campaign Comics: The Use of Comic Books for Strategic Political Communication." *International Journal of Communication* 8 (2014): 248 - 74. Print. 4.

stand culture with young people, all of which demonstrates local character through the use of local nomenclature, custom, and behaviour in the form of the preference for local cuisine.

The local dialect used by the FPÖ in their comic encourages the Viennese audience to empathise with the imagined collective identity preserved in the myths, thereby recognising their own distinctive language traits and shared social history as primary features of their collective self. Reading and understanding the Viennese dialect, therefore, reinforces the feeling of being a part of a national and cultural ‘in’ group. Dialect, therefore, reads like a code for the ethnoculture that understands it, and is therefore inaccessible to migrants or non-Germanic social groups. The use of coded dialect allows the FPÖ’s target audience to experience feelings of solidarity and distinctiveness, because Viennese dialect is something that they immediately recognize as something that belongs only to them – their own distinct cultural feature. To have pride in one’s shared cultural identity and common language, as a result, further justifies the collective expression of cultural and national patriotism in the public sphere. The use of familiar dialect, therefore, encourages a perceived commonality between the comic’s heroes, the FPÖ, and the ‘true’ modern Viennese.

Strache has persistently delighted in depicting himself in the image of a local Viennese man, and the use of dialect in the FPÖ comic series is one such way he achieves this for himself, his party, and the desired Austrian-Germanic demographic more generally. In his Lebenslauf on his website, Strache describes himself as “Ein echter Wiener” presumably due to the fact he was born there in 1969.<sup>440</sup> Strache’s assertion that he is truly Viennese by a matter of birth is therefore a parenthetical remark about new migrants to Austria, who were neither born in Austria nor understand or use the dialect, and thus do not fit the FPÖ’s *Heimat* and identity mandate. Jump forward to 2016 and Strache has updated his profile, describing himself as “ein echter Österreicher”<sup>441</sup>, therefore shifting from the regional to the national.

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<sup>440</sup> Cited in Turner-Graham, Emily. “Austria First”: H.C. Strache, Austrian Identity and the Current Politics of Austria’s Freedom Party.” *Studies in Language and Capitalism* 3/4 (2008): 181 - 98. Print., 183.

<sup>441</sup> Strache, Heinz-Christian. “Über mich.” *HcStrache*. FPÖ, n.d. Web. 2 Jan. 2016.

Although the comic attempts to depict the Viennese as an ethnocultural Germanic construct, the FPÖ's reliance on linguistic modes of identity in effect hinders their argument of the homogeneous Germanic cultural origins of the Viennese population. It is true that the Viennese dialect is, for the most part, an eastern central-Bavarian dialect.<sup>442</sup> However as hinted at previously, the historico-cultural development of Vienna as an imperial city home to many cultural groups has allowed for diverse linguistic influences to inform the dialect. For example, by the end of the XIX century, Vienna's Czech population was second only to Prague, and so it is not by coincidence that there is a large Czech influence in the Viennese dialect.<sup>443</sup> The linguistic heterogeneity of the language is of course not mentioned in the FPÖ's *Sagen aus Wien*, which instead leaves its audience with the impression that the local identity of Vienna has been entirely established upon the pure linguistic foundations of the Germanic ethnocultural group.


The FPÖ's second comic, *Sagen aus Österreich*, was released by the FPÖ during the general Austrian elections of 2013, and continues the theme of language and identity by applying localised provincial vernacular, dialect, and linguistic traditions to all of Austria's regional histories. For example in "der Schatz von Landskron" a local farmer of Carinthia engages in a conversation with local *Kärntnerisch*, demonstrating his long relationship and affinity with the region of northeast Carinthia:

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<sup>442</sup> Maligin 30.

<sup>443</sup> Maligin 30.





**Figure 43.**

Image taken from *Sagen aus Österreich*.<sup>444</sup>

The farmer's distinguishing use of the backing/rounding of a, demonstrated in the character â, is an example of the vowel phenomena attributed to the mix of the South Bavarian German linguistic tradition with the Slovenian dialect typical of the Carinthian region.<sup>445</sup> The backing/rounding of the vowel a in Carinthian dialect also demonstrates a sound change typical all over Austria, in which the point is made in popular dialect texts to write the phone as ä, despite having only a phonetic rather than phonemic significance in Austrian German.<sup>446</sup> In this conversation the native Carinthian farmer nostalgically reflects on the 'good old days' when Austria had its own national currency, and were thus not reliant on the transnational EURO currency. As well as demonstrating local Carinthian and Austrian linguistic tradition, the FPÖ are using regional dialect to advocate their platform for the reinstatement of Austria's own national currency, thereby displaying self-determined economic nationalism through the use of localised language traits.

The rich tapestry of local Austrian idiosyncrasies identified in the comics' regional dialect and nomenclature displays a distinct Austrianness, however the

<sup>444</sup> FPÖ *Österreich*, 9.

<sup>445</sup> Reindl, Donald F. *Language Contact, German and Slovenian*. Bochum: Brockmeyer, 2008. Print. 47.

<sup>446</sup> Reindl 47.

perspective of Austrian identity remains decidedly Germanic. The German language, as well as its regionally Austrian variations, remains for the FPÖ a valuable element of national identity. The FPÖ applies this thesis to demonstrate the risk of what may be lost if the characteristics of the *Heimat* are not preserved. In this case, language must be protected as the bearer of the cultural heritage and identity that informs the Austrian sense of *Heimat* and therefore makes the nation both decidedly ‘Austrian’ and a part of the German community of cultures. Therefore, those that conform to the German language, as well as Austria’s regional dialects, also follow the accepted culture, customs, and behaviour patterns deemed typical of Austria. These images provided by the FPÖ are significant, because they provide their audience with a visual cue to the FPÖ’s opinion of how a heterogeneous Austrian society looks when it conforms to the cultural knowledge and ‘habitus’ supposedly embedded in the German language. To understand German and the Austrian dialects as one’s *Muttersprache* is to both consciously and subliminally follow the conventions of Austrian cultural identity in all its forms – to be included in the FPÖ’s human landscape of *Heimat*. However, according to the FPÖ this traditional mode of *Heimat Österreich* is in danger from ‘Outsider’ groups, and the degeneration of language and complacency with Austrian culture in the modern multicultural nation is one way the FPÖ depict a ‘Heimat in peril’ in their literature.

### **3.4 - Language use and the ‘Outsider’ group in the FPÖ’s comic series**

Language also plays an important role in the direct marginalisation of other social groups that are identified as outsiders by the FPÖ. The comics, furthermore, depict those that do not follow the conventions of the German language as groups that in fact pose a danger to native Austrians. In each case the *Heimat* and the native Austrian population is at risk and in need of protection from these groups. The ‘Outsider’ groups are principally identified as the globalising agents in the ruling political establishment as well as the EU who advocate policies of mass immigration, and immigrants or foreigners that endanger the *Heimat* and intimidate native Austrians with direct violence and the indirect dissolution of the Austrian *Leitkultur*. In the comics, language represents more than a means of communication by the ‘Outsider’ groups. Instead, the variances in language between native Austrians and their enemies demonstrate a fundamental discordancy between native and ‘Outsider’

identities in the modern Austrian nation, as well as the alleged flaws of multicultural society.

The ‘Outsider’ group that attracts the most critical attention in the comics are the Turkish, who also symbolically represent Islamic religion and culture more broadly. The FPÖ continue to use their linguistic strategy to demonstrate the perceived unassimilable nature of Islam and ethnically Middle Eastern national subgroups into Austrian society. These groups, whether new migrants or second or third generation Austrians, do not speak the language as locals and therefore do not conform to the conventions of Austrian cultural and national identity. In *Sagen aus Wien*’s “Die zweite Türkenbelagerung Wiens 1683”, the Islamic threat of 1683 is repackaged by the FPÖ to depict the Muslim minority in Austria today, as well as the rising number of Islamic immigrants on the nation’s borders. The FPÖ’s cartoons must therefore be approached as a party-sanctioned discourse between “Austrian” and “Turkish” ethnicities in modern Austria, in which is developed a narrative of the ethnonational differences between the native Austrian majority and the Turkish ethnic minority.

In the cartoons, the first way the reader discerns that Muslims do not conform to the conventions of the Austrian way of life is in their corruption of the national language:



Figure 44.

Image taken from *Sagen aus Wien*.<sup>447</sup>

<sup>447</sup> FPÖ Wien, 6 – 7.

Members of the Turkish Army speak neither Standard German nor one of the many regional dialects. They also do not speak Turkish, as the invader force would have done in 1683. Instead the FPÖ have them speak a corrupted form of German typical of ethnic Middle Eastern groups in modern Austria, specifically Turkish migrants. The extended use of the character ü over almost all other vowel choices attempts to communicate to the reader the phonetic quality of the Austrian-Turkish ethnic dialect, or ‘ethnolect’, and its alien character from the accepted and traditional Vienna dialect exhibited by those native Germanic characters, such as Strache, who conform with Austrian *Leitkultur*. This is principally achieved by making fun of Turkish, in which ü appears frequently.

Ethnolect refers to language spoken by ethnic minorities that is unconventional or corrupted compared to the majority language. It is not a foreign language, but a ‘bastardisation’ of the native language that results from a mix of different ethnicities and cultures. Ethnolect refers, therefore, to “a variety of the majority language (or "host language"), which is used and regarded as a vernacular for speakers of a particular ethnic descent and is marked by certain contact phenomena.”<sup>448</sup> Here contact phenomena refer to the result of the social interaction between two different subgroups in the same nationality, which usually results in a merger of vernacular and a correspondingly new social identity. Ethnolect in German-speaking societies specifically is described as a merger of the foreign migrant and the native host languages, and is therefore:

characteristic of speakers from a migrant background who are born or raised in the host country ... I define ethnolects as ways of speaking that are associated, by speakers themselves or other social groups, with ethnic minority groups...”<sup>449</sup>

The corrupted use of the German language in the comic, the exaggerated use of umlauts, and the phonetically uncivilised character is at first glance a brazen attempt

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<sup>448</sup> Androutsopoulos, Jannis. "From the Streets to the Screens and Back Again: On the Mediated Diffusion of Ethnolectal Patterns in Contemporary German " *LAUD Linguistic Agency* A522 (2001): 1 - 24. Print. 2.

<sup>449</sup> Androutsopoulos 185 – 186.

at parody by the FPÖ, in which they depict the comical attempt of a foreign tongue to master Austrian-German vernacular. The result is a phonetically laughable depiction of German, in which the speakers are portrayed as either uneducated or uncouth. However as an ethnolect the language in the comic marginalises speakers from Turkish migrant backgrounds as invaders and outsiders, and therefore identifies this social group as one that is not integrated into the human landscape of *Heimat* Austria.

The Turkish ethnolect is also reminiscent of ‘Kanak Sprak’, which is a term loaded with xenophobic connotations against ethnic minority groups in German speaking societies.<sup>450</sup> The word ‘Kanak’ is derived from the indigenous inhabitants of New Caledonia, and was used in colonial times in a derogatory way, similar to the word ‘Nigger’.<sup>451</sup> However the term, and the style of ethnolect spoken in *Kanak Sprak*, came to imply a certain degree of pride and solidarity amongst ethnic minorities in the German and Austrian hip-hop scene. Their collective identity and sense of self-esteem is derived from their ‘foreignness’, as the Turkish rap artist ‘H-Run’ from Frankfurt explains:

Jeder Ausländer hier, sei es ein Türke, Jugoslawe, Marokkaner oder weiß ich nicht, ist eine Kanak für mich, weil er in seinem eigenen Land nicht akzeptiert ist und hier nicht... Wir sind ein eigenes Volk! Alle Ausländer, die in Deutschland leben. Unsere Eltern sind wiederum keine Kanaken, die sind Türken.<sup>452</sup>

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<sup>450</sup> In his article *Talking Kanak: Zaimoğlu contra Leitkultur*, Tom Cheesman explains that the phrase *Kanak*, which began as derogatory term for people of color, developed into a label for the pseudo-ethnicity and subnational identity of Turkish minorities in Germany. Cheesman argues that the term *Kanak Sprak*, taken from the title of Feridun Zaimoğlu’s book that recounts dialogue between ethnically Turkish youth in Germany to question the political narrative of a state sanctioned *Leitkultur*, describes a style of language typical of Turkish groups in German speaking societies that is neither correct German nor correct Turkish. For Cheesman, this demonstration of ethnic dialect is symptomatic of contrary identities developing within the German nation, and in particular, a new identity for Turkish minorities. This new identity is largely in opposition to the old policy of obligatory integration, which is applied by the forced conformity of German citizens to a national identity that is informed by a traditional, conservative German middle-class *Leitkultur*. See Cheesman, Tom. "Talking "Kanak": Zaimoğlu Contra Leitkultur." *New German Critique*.92 (2004): 82 - 99. Print.

<sup>451</sup> Güngör, Murat, and Hannes Loh. *Fear of a Kanak planet : HipHop zwischen Weltkultur und Nazi-Rap*. Höfen: Hannibal, 2002. Print. 27.

<sup>452</sup> Güngör 30.

*Kanak Sprak*, therefore, is the language of a different ethnoculture that is developing contrarily to the majority *Leitkultur* in German and Austrian society. In Austria, for example, terms used to antagonise the language of minority groups is not dissimilar from Germany, although it should be noted that public awareness of ethnic language varieties is much lower in Austria than that of Germany.<sup>453</sup> Nonetheless, terms found in Austria include *Türkenslang*, *Kanak Sprak*, *Türkendeutsch*, *Türkenpidgin*, *Dönerdeutsch*, and *Balkandeutsch* (a reference to the large amount of immigrants for the Balkans).<sup>454</sup> Indeed, in a similar way to the FPÖ's discourse on language, it is the expression of identity and culture in *Kanak Sprak* that illustrates its influence as a feature of the collective self of ethnic minorities in German speaking territories. As Yazemin Yildiz explains, *Kanak Sprak* is "the foregrounding of language in the articulation of marginalised social identities."<sup>455</sup> The manifestations of the *Kanak* phenomenon, demonstrates "the transgressive quality of their discourse, linked to some kind of non-normative use of the German language" and this subsequent linguistic representation of minorities looks to "the German language as a crucial site of this representation."<sup>456</sup> In Austrian public discourse surrounding ethnic linguistic variances, as a result, there are references to situation in Germany and fears are expressed that, like in Germany, parallel societies will emerge: an immigrant society and a native Austrian one.<sup>457</sup> Such anxieties play directly into the FPÖ's strategy to highlights linguistic variances as examples of separatism and accusations of a refusal to assimilate among ethnic groups.

The violation of the social and cultural boundaries of 'Germaness' or 'Austrianness' illustrated in *Kanak Sprak* (while perceived positively by ethnic minorities) is against the very core of the populist Right's *Heimat* and language politic. For the FPÖ, language must be preserved in its pure form, and the

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<sup>453</sup> Muysken, Pieter, and Julian Rott. "Ethnolect Studies in the German and Netherlandic Area: An Overview." *Multilingualism and Language Diversity in Urban Areas*. Eds. Siemund, Peter, et al. Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 2013. 177 - 208. Print. 186.

<sup>454</sup> Muysken and Rott 186.

<sup>455</sup> Yildiz, Yasemir. "Critically "Kanak": A Reimagination of German Culture." *Globalization and the Future of German: With a Select Bibliography*. New York: Mouton de Gruyter, 2004. 319 - 40. Print. 321.

<sup>456</sup> Yildiz 321.

<sup>457</sup> Muysken and Rott 187.

development of contrary social and linguistic or cultural identities is anathema. The FPÖ's use of *Kanak Sprak*, therefore, is not a celebration of the diversity of Austrian society, but a warning of the imminence of parallel immigrant societies establishing themselves in Austria. The purpose of ethnolect in the comics is provided as a cautionary tale about the future of the German language and the character of the *Heimat*. Yildiz explains that the threats to national and cultural identity posed by globalisation and linguistic diversity has led many German-speakers to perceive German as something that should be unchangeable, which leads "to the ideological fantasy of an organic and pure German which has remained untouched, as if it were outside of time and history."<sup>458</sup>

While it may be true that no language is totally pure and fixed, the defence of cultural boundaries is nonetheless the foundation the FPÖ's creed. It is from this ideological position that they expand upon the dangers posed by linguistic diversity in language and other cultural features of collective identity. The FPÖ are using the alleged break down of language to play a politics of fear with the Austrian population, and produce in the comics a dangerous 'Other' that is capable of violating the 'sanctity' of language and *Heimat*. The perceived threat of Islam is central to the Freedom Party's divisive strategy, which encourages separatism by fuelling anxiety of or antagonism towards migrant groups from Muslim nations. The variances in language between native Austrians and their enemies demonstrate a fundamental discordancy between native and 'Outsider' identities in the modern Austrian nation, as well as the alleged flaws of multicultural society and the threat it poses to the native autochthonous population. This incompatibility is established by portraying the hostility of the foreign cultural knowledge, behavioural patterns, and social histories the language represents, and in many cases this argument is directed against the religion and culture of Islam. The difference in language is, therefore, not only a disparity of communication, but an example of the inability of diverse identities to harmoniously coexist within the same nation, surmised from the imminent possibility of harm posed by the 'Outsider' group to the native one. A failure to conform to the national language, for the FPÖ, demonstrates a lack of appetite to integrate, or a refusal to accept the Austrian *Leitkultur* as identity, thereby posing a threat to its

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<sup>458</sup> Yildiz 322.



enduring survival. In addition, the threat posed by the Turkish army alongside its symbolism to current day issues shows the FPÖ's belief that migrant groups from Islamic countries would forcibly impose their way of life on Austrians.

One way that the FPÖ demonstrate the danger of Islamic groups is through the threat of ‘religious war’ – which is a central feature of their habitus and vernacular in the *Sagen*. It is religious war that drives the ambition of the Turkish invaders from 1683, and the FPÖ compares that historical fact to modern day ethnic Turks, whether citizens of Austria or migrants:



**Figure 45.**

Image taken from *Sagen aus Wien*.<sup>459</sup>

It is in ethnolect that the Turkish army declare their attack against the infidels, or unbelievers. Their language and vernacular therefore demonstrates their Islamic identity. The differences in language use between the Turks and the Austrians within

<sup>459</sup> In the image there are numerous cryptic nuances towards the answer of who is allegedly leading the enemies of Austrian Leitkultur and national identity. The violent scene depicts the crescent moon of Islam and the Turkish flag being held by invaders, who are ‘carried in’ by a horse that is branded with the Communist hammer and sickle. Presumably the heads of vanquished native Austrians, perhaps symbolic of their self-determination and identity, stand as an example of the existential crisis Vienna faces both today and in 1683. This image is symbolic of a typical narrative used by members of the Far Right, who claim cultural and ethnic pluralism is a policy of the Left in order to garner votes from new national subgroups. The horses (members of the Far Left) are therefore ‘carrying in’ the Turkish invaders (migrant groups). FPÖ *Wien*, 13.



the comic, therefore, is a sociolinguistic approach to national identity, which also attempts to illustrate the alleged unassimilable nature (and serious threat) of Islamic groups in European societies.

The use of such linguistic strategies to deny Middle Eastern ethnic groups in Austria, as well as newly arrived immigrants of similar cultural extraction, a place in the human landscape of the nation is symptomatic of the broader anti-Islamic rhetoric disseminated by the FPÖ, which gained significant momentum since Strache's ascendancy to leadership in 2005. As S. Rosenberger and L. Hadj-Abdou explain, since Strache's leadership Islam has increasingly become a discursive tool in the FPÖ's discourse to portray members of the Islam faith as a dangerous national subgroup that is a foreign threat to the Austrian people, to the imagined Austrian nation, to the *Heimat*, to as well as to the idea of 'Europe' by extension.<sup>460</sup> *Sagen aus Wien* was released as part of the FPÖ's campaign during the district council elections in Vienna, where the party had spoken at length about the link between Vienna's rising crime rate and professional foreign crime gangs and immigrants unwilling to obey the law or assimilate.<sup>461</sup>

Images such as the violent scene depicted in *Sagen aus Wien's* "Die zweite Türkenbelagerung Wiens 1683" are similarly provocative, and encourage society's distrust toward Islamic migrant groups. The Turks speak in an ethnolect, display a different culture, and are hostile to the host population. Their sultan wishes to convert Austrians to Islam, and transform Vienna's iconic *Stephansdom* into an Islamic mosque. The invader force in "Die zweite Türkenbelagerung Wiens 1683" is therefore symbolic of an ethnolect and foreign culture that is *taking over* Austria. The story's contextual parallels between historical and modern Austria converge in the FPÖ's comics to help establish the rejection of the unassimilable 'Other', demonstrated in the form of the Middle Eastern migrant ethnic groups and Islam as a culture and religion. The Turkish-Islamic ethnolect is therefore not only used to demonstrate a comedic portrayal of ethnic groups with an Islamic heritage, but also to encourage its readers to identify the imminent social threat posed by that group as the

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<sup>460</sup> Rosenberger, Sieglinde, and Leila Hadj-Abdou. "Islam at Issue: Anti-Islamic Mobilization of the Extreme Right in Austria." *Varieties of Right-Wing Extremism in Europe*. Eds. Mammone, Andrea, Emmanuel Godin and Brian Jenkins. London: Routledge, 2013. 149 - 64. Print. 153.

<sup>461</sup> Brantner 6.

‘Outsider’ either attempting to get into Austria, or living within the borders of the nation already. The FPÖ is using language, cultural differences, and history to play on deeply ingrained social anxieties directed toward Turkish minorities in Vienna. *The Guardian Online* explains that Austria is diametrically opposed to Turkey joining the European Union, and in an outburst the Turkish ambassador to Vienna stated that Austrians are largely xenophobic and treat their Turkish national subgroup “like a virus.”<sup>462</sup> This is the desire of the party - to encourage enmity between native and foreign groups, and to successfully use Islamophobia and the fear of cultural pluralism or the loss of national identity as political leverage.

It is from the alleged threat native Austrian culture faces, brought on by the invasion of foreign ethnoculture, that the FPÖ strongly stresses its ambition to defend *Heimat* and *Leitkultur*. Language continues to play an important role in this narrative, as seen in the FPÖ’s *Sagen aus Österreich*:



Figure 46.

Image taken from *Sagen aus Österreich*.<sup>463</sup>

In a cartoon on the final page, Strache warns of the ever-present encroachment of Islam in Austrian society that is facilitated from within by a treacherous political

<sup>462</sup> Traynor, Ian. "Austria Treats Turks 'like a Virus', Ambassador Claims." *The Guardian*. Guardian News and Media, 12 Nov. 2010. Web. 18 July 2016.

<sup>463</sup> FPÖ *Österreich*, 3.

establishment. Strache's statement is a reference to a political billboard that was written in Turkish and disseminated by the SPÖ around Vienna in 2013. The political background behind this comic is very important. The SPÖ and Greens had been campaigning on the platform that they would extend the right to vote to non-Austrians on a local level.<sup>464</sup> This premise was met with great outrage by the FPÖ, with Johann Gudenus stating that Austria is a democratic republic, and that rights should only be afforded to its own citizenry – not foreigners.<sup>465</sup> For the FPÖ, the Left are important votes by bringing in foreign groups from Islamic areas. The SPÖ's billboard is shown in the comic with its Turkish text above the FPÖ slogan *Daham statt Islam*. For the FPÖ, the dichotomy of the two opposing political placards demonstrates that one party recognises the *Leitkultur* and linguistic identity of Austrians, while the other seeks to foster 'Outsider' identities, such as Turks, over the native Austro-Germanic population. Strache's reference to '*Klartext*' in the comic frame is therefore also a reference to speaking in the native German language, which the SPÖ failed to do in this instance:

Wiennese: Schau, ein türkisches SPÖ-Plakat! Sollt ma nicht eigentlich Deutsch können, bevor man Stattsbürger wird und wählen darf? Eh kloar. Nur die Sozi und die Grünen kapiern das net!<sup>466</sup>

For the FPÖ the direct threat stems from ethnic groups from the Middle East region and the culture of Islam. However, the Austrian political establishment and the European Union are also identified by the FPÖ as foreign agents that seek to supplant Austrian *Leitkultur* and foster multiculturalism and a multiplicity of identities in modern Austrian society. This is seen for example in *Sagen aus Wien's die zweite Türkenbelagerung Wiens 1683*, where SPÖ major of Vienna Michael Häupl is portrayed as a drunken coward, and is seen describing his leftist principles, which are responsible for the establishment of multiple ethnic and cultural identities in the city, in particular Islamic and Turkish ones:

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<sup>464</sup> "FP-Gudenus: Klares Nein zum Ausländerwahlrecht." *APA-OTS*. APA-OTS, 20 Dec. 2013. Web. 20 Jan. 2017.

<sup>465</sup> APA-OTS *FP Gudenus*.

<sup>466</sup> FPÖ *Österreich*, 3.

Häupl: Die Verteidiger sind alle teppert! Mir is wurscht, wenn die Türken kommen, samt Minarett und Muezin und Kopftüchtlzwang! Ich bin schließlich ein Mann von Welt und ka Rassist! Und Wein-Saufen und Bratl-Essen tua ich dann heimlich im Keller. – Des Türkengwandl und die Wasserpfeifn hab ich mir eh schon zuglegt!

Like the Left-Wing rats elsewhere in the comic, although Michael Häupl is native and therefore uses Viennese dialect, a special and even more inflammatory role is reserved for him: the role of the native traitor. In the extract, Häupl is shown to support the foreign habitus of Turkish minorities over native Austrian *Leitkultur*. He does this through his claim that he is a man of the world and is therefore amenable to the diversification of cultures and new identities informed by foreign social agents. The FPÖ portray this ‘progressive’ and ‘modern’ type of heterogeneous identity formation as the new trend of socialisation perpetuated by the Left, which is antagonistic to the traditional mode of identity affixed to the land in which people, such as Häupl, are born. In particular, Häupl chooses the customs, culture, and behaviour patterns of the Turks over native Austrian ones, and implicitly suggests that Austrian *Leitkultur* will become a minority in the nation, thus Austrians will have to act out their native customs in their own houses and not in public. However, it is when Häupl talks of aiding the Turks to enter the city to his left wing colleagues, who appear as stoned half rat – half university students, that his true ambitions for the ethnic and cultural diversification of the autochthonous Austrian population is made apparent:

Häupl: Helft’s ma! Mach ma des Tor auf! Lass ma’s eine! Wien braucht a Zuwanderung! So lendenlahm, wia die Österreicher sind. Es braucht a frisches Bluat!

Left-Wing youth: Nur wennst uns fix versprichst, dass die Türken sofort Gemeindewohnungen kriagen und wöhl’n dürfen!<sup>467</sup>

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<sup>467</sup> FPÖ Wien, 14.

Häupl refers to the need for ‘fresh blood’ among the Austrian gene pool, which is an allusion to the desire for the ethnic diversity of the native population. Furthermore, the FPÖ explain in a footnote that the term *lendenlahm* is used in reference to the statements made by 1999 SPÖ-*Bundeskanzler* Viktor Klima, “der die Österreicher sinngemäß als *lendenlahm* bezeichnete, um so die Massenzuwanderung zu rechtfertigen.”<sup>468</sup> The request from the Left-Wing youth to first address the needs of the Turkish minority above the native Austrian majority is typical of the FPÖ’s ‘left-wing betrayal’ narrative, in which those of a Leftist persuasion are typically drug addicts, lazy, impotent, and commonly fostering a political mentality that is either treacherous, or hostile to traditional Austrian identity and *Leitkultur*. References to impotence further play on the fears that migrants (with a much larger birth rate) are ‘coming for our women’, and that they will ‘out-breed’ us. The Left is therefore portrayed as those that are willing to undermine the traditional “system” of *Heimat*, which is informed by *Leitkultur*, and diversify the nation through mass immigration in order to achieve their own corrupted ambitions. This is seen elsewhere, for example, in the lyrics to Strache’s 2010 rap song ‘*Wiener Blut*’, in which he seeks to demonstrate a clear link between Häupl, the political Left, Islamisation, and forced ethnocultural diversity:

Islamisten auf dem Vormarsch! Minarett samt Muezzin. Das wollen Rote  
installieren aber sonst kein Mensch in Wien!

Sozis woll’n mich mundtot machen, weil ich sag, was Sache ist! Du brauchst  
nur die Heimat lieben, schreit der Häupl gleich: Faschist!<sup>469</sup>

In contrast to the multicultural ‘chaos’ presided over by the political Left, the FPÖ urges a return to traditional modes of existence:

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<sup>468</sup> FPÖ *Wien*, 14.

<sup>469</sup> Strache, *Wiener Blut*.



Figure 47.

Image taken from *Sagen aus Wien*.<sup>470</sup>

The image is a rather *Heimat* kitsch illustration of an imagined traditional Viennese form of life. The society is directed by the German linguistic tradition, rather than multiculturalism or multilingual dialogue. The operetta *Wiener Blut* by Johann Strauss II (1825 – 1899) plays in the background, which indicates the rather artistic manifestations of Austrian culture. The dual meaning of *Wiener Blut* is not without design, as the FPÖ also implies that the blood (or ethnic community) of the Vienna must remain pure as well.

In his own rap song “Wiener Blut”, Strache further emphasizes the betrayal of native Austrian identity, stating that while other cultures and values are fine abroad, they are a foreign habitus in Austria and should never be competitive to the Austrian *Leitkultur*. Once again, Häupl and the political Left are identified as the conspirators that instigate a foreign habitus and identity within the Austrian nation: “Andre Länder, andre Sitten, gerne auch in Istanbul, Istanbul in Wien hingegen, findet nur der Häupl cool.”<sup>471</sup> Finally, Strache raps to his audience his explicit message that the preservation of a native Austrian identity and *Leitkultur* is predicated on the cessation of Leftist political and foreign cultural influences, because the Left are in a conspiracy

<sup>470</sup> FPÖ Wien, 16.

<sup>471</sup> Strache *Wiener Blut*.

against the native host population to supplant them with foreigners: “Zu viel Rot und zu viel Fremdes, beides tut hier niemand gut! Deshalb lautet die Parole: Mehr Mut für unser „Wiener Blut“.”<sup>472</sup>

The Right-Wing populist idea of *Heimat*, therefore, requires intact examples of culture and language that are authentic and unmixed. Multiculturalism is therefore anathema, and any new migrant would be theoretically required to undertake strict actions towards total assimilation. Language is the first step toward successful integration, and in *Sagen aus Österreich* the FPÖ stress the importance of this. The comic’s das Purbacher Türke recounts the 1532 Ottoman invasion of Austria, which according to legend resulted in one Turkish soldier being accidentally left behind near the town of Purbach. The soldier, as a result, was forced under threat of death to be baptised and enter serfdom in Austria. The soldier, as a result, abandoned his previous allegiances and identity, and, although forced, essentially integrated into Austrian society. The FPÖ eagerly utilise this myth in order to stress the importance of language and integration:



**Figure 48.**

Image taken from *Sagen aus Österreich*.<sup>473</sup>

<sup>472</sup> Strache *Wiener Blut*.

<sup>473</sup> FPÖ. *Sagen aus Österreich*. Vienna: FPÖ, 2013. Print. 6.



The image instructs new migrants of their obligations as Austrian citizens: to learn the language and to integrate. Although the Turkish migrant does not fully enunciate the purity of the language provided by the Austrian teacher, on the final page of the myth he does, despite the inability to speak German fluently, at least attempt to assimilate:



**Figure 49.**

Image taken from *Sagen aus Österreich*.<sup>474</sup>

In the image the Turk's ethnolect has not disappeared, but he has rejected his Turkish roots and attempted to transform into an Austrian citizen. He has shown enlightenment by realising things are better in Austria (because there is no Sharia law) and not only integrated, but positively disrespectful of his former religion. It is apparent in the comic that the Turk, who now dresses in Austrian clothes, drinks Austrian wine (an indication of his rejection of Islam and the ban of alcohol), and is riding a pig (a reference to the Islamic ban on the consumption of pork), is no longer his former Turkish self but rather a fully assimilated citizen of Austria. He speaks the language, and harbours no loyalty to his former Sultan or land. This attracts the approval of the Austrians, who in turn accept the Turk for his total transformation and integration. The FPÖ are therefore indicating the importance of total assimilation, of which language is the first step. Forced language and cultural acquisition indicates

<sup>474</sup> FPÖ *Österreich*, 7.



that the FPÖ does not want a diverse mix of new identities within the nation. As a result of this ethos, any new migrants must effectively transform themselves into ‘traditional’ Austrians. Total assimilation, however, is a difficult criterion to comply with. These requirements placed upon new migrants, such as a perfect command of the German language, would be largely unattainable – something Austria’s Right-Wing populists are arguably aware of.

### **3.5 - Language in FPÖ social policy**

In Austria, migrants from third-world nations must currently sign an Integration Agreement with a language requirement of level B1 (German) within two years of entering the country in order to be granted citizenship or residency.<sup>475</sup> According to the Common European Framework of References for Languages that designs the levels of grading, level B1 indicates:

1. Understanding main points of clear standard speech on familiar matters regularly encountered in work, school, leisure, radio, and Television.
2. Understanding texts that consist of everyday or job related language.
3. An ability to deal with most situations likely to arise whilst travelling in an area where the language is spoken. Aptitude to enter any conversation on topics that are familiar, of personal interests or everyday life (such as hobbies etc.)
4. Can connect phrases in a simple order to describe experiences and events, dreams, hopes, and ambitions. Can narrate a story or relate the plot of a book or film.
5. An ability to write simple, connected text on topics which are familiar or of personal interest.<sup>476</sup>

The guidelines indicate that language verification for residency or citizenship requires an above average level of German proficiency. German language skills are of course

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<sup>475</sup> *Willkommen in Österreich*. Fonds zur Integration von Flüchtlingen und Migrant/Innen  
Wien: ÖIF, 2016. Print. 9.

<sup>476</sup> “Common European Framework of Reference for Languages Self Assessment Grid.”  
*European Union and Council of Europe*. EU, 2017. Web. 21 Apr. 2017.

required for the employment of migrants or refugees, which through both work and socialisation rapidly progress the assimilation process of individuals. Such a process of language acquisition, with numerous courses and programmes, costs money. According to a report from *Breitbart* in 2016, Austria spends a total of 133 million euros per year on language courses to deal with the influx of asylum seekers during the refugee crisis, with the projection of two billion euros of taxpayer's money devoted to migrants in the course of 2017.<sup>477</sup> Such figures are met with outrage by the FPÖ. On his personal website, Strache attacks the 'integration' policies of the SPÖ and the Greens, which have funnelled funds through dubious channels into "integration societies" that do not work – all of which comes out of Austrians' own pockets.<sup>478</sup> According to Strache, the current language courses do not work, and while Austrians continue to pay, newly arrived Muslims do not integrate or learn the language, form parallel societies, and even radicalise against the host population.<sup>479</sup> In place of this "subvention of Left-Wing multiculturalism", the FPÖ also propose compulsory language classes for migrants and asylum seekers, with an additional focus on obtaining a clear understanding of the "heimischen Werte, Normen und Gesetze" in Austria.<sup>480</sup>

A command of the German language and understanding of Austrian values, then, is the foundation of the FPÖ's roadmap to successful integration. For the party, language expresses the common socio-cultural features of the native population, and an ability to communicate in German is a basic tenet of social assimilation for new migrants. For example, according to the FPÖ "Die Beherrschung der deutschen Sprache "must be a central requirement for „die Einbürgerung“ of all migrants and refugees.<sup>481</sup> A petition for the 'naturalisation' of new migrants and asylum seekers into traditional Austrian identity does not require German proficiency as much as it demands German as the first language (or only language spoken both privately and publically). Naturalisation therefore speaks more of total assimilation, and implies a

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<sup>477</sup> Tomlison, Chris. "Austrian 2017 Budget Will Spend 2 Billion Euros on Migrants." *Breitbart*. Breitbart, 13 Oct. 2016. Web. 15 Apr. 2017.

<sup>478</sup> Strache, Heinz-Christian. "Wien wählt: Heimatrecht für Wiener statt Fremdsein in der eigenen Stadt." *HC Strache*. HC Strache, n.d. Web. 21 Mar. 2017.

<sup>479</sup> Strache *Wien wählt*.

<sup>480</sup> Strache *Wien wählt*.

<sup>481</sup> FPÖ *Handbuch 2013*, 257.

demand upon migrants and asylum seekers to gain a fluency in German so that a native Austrian model, demonstrated through language in particular, finally replaces their original ethnoculture. The language of all Austrians both established and new, in other words, is German and must remain German. It is not enough for migrants or asylum seekers to achieve basic everyday German skills. Rather German must also become their *Muttersprache* – their only language of choice. As a result, the FPÖ rejects the diversification of linguistic patterns in Austria. New migrants must be naturalised as typical ‘Austrians’, and be precluded from adding their own ethnoculture to the human landscape of the homeland.

Language use in Austria is at the core of a debate over immigration and assimilation. It is central to a discussion that transcends language as communication alone, digressing at every turn into the abstract realms of culture and national identity. Josef Bucher, leader of the BZÖ until 2013, explains in his political manifesto that the government of Austria should only accept those immigrants and refugees who want to assimilate with Austrian culture and learn the German language.<sup>482</sup> The FPÖ similarly demand that all refugees and migrants must accomplish an active ‘Erwerb von Sprachkenntnissen.’<sup>483</sup> To enforce this, the FPÖ assert that there should be no more than 30% of students per class that do not have German as their mother language, no students in school without base German language skills, no access to housing for those that cannot speak German, and the expulsion of those migrants who fail to assimilate.<sup>484</sup> The FPÖ further defend the figure of 30% by stating that a command of the German language is necessary to follow instruction in schools and to participate in a normal education.<sup>485</sup> To enforce this the FPÖ insists that persons without Austrian citizenship or without German as their mother tongue must pass a German test one year before school commences.<sup>486</sup> However, a solicitation to limit students in Austrian schools with a non-German linguistic background to a specific figure also demonstrates that the language policies of the populist Right have deeper socio-political implications. Identifying an ‘Outsider’ demographic, as well as restricting their ability to access basic institutions such as schools, demonstrates the desire to

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<sup>482</sup> Bucher, Josef. *Mein Weg*. Vienna: BZÖ, 2010. Print. 25.

<sup>483</sup> FPÖ *Handbuch* 2013, 34.

<sup>484</sup> FPÖ *Handbuch* 2013, 34.

<sup>485</sup> FPÖ *Graz Parteiprogramm*, 14.

<sup>486</sup> FPÖ *Handbuch* 2013, 38.

regulate foreigners in the nation as a whole. The implication underlying such statements, for example, is where any surplus students might be housed, or whether they would indeed be ejected from the nation. The request that migrants and refugees should also be denied housing or schooling entirely if they do not achieve the assimilation mandate further illustrates an apparent direct attack on migrant groups' rights under Austrian law. The language policies of the populist Right, therefore, are not only created to preserve the German language and corresponding *Leitkultur*, but also to reject and marginalise the influence or presence of foreign ethnoculture in the nation by restricting or controlling their numbers and their rights.

The demand for German language use in is not only limited to Austrian schools. In the FPÖ's political programme it states that while the German language must always be the language of instruction in German schools, this process begins with the family and in the home.<sup>487</sup> In other words, true Austrian families should be speaking German at all times, regardless of ethnocultural backgrounds, and irrespective of private or public domains. In a recent Facebook post Strache reiterated the catchphrase "Zuerst Deutsch, dann Schule! Und Deutsch auch als Pausensprache!" alongside an image with the slogan '*Deutsch statt nix versteh'n*':



**Figure 50.**

Image taken from Facebook.<sup>488</sup>

<sup>487</sup> FPÖ *Handbuch* 2013, 259.

<sup>488</sup> Strache, Heinz-Christian. "Zuerst Deutsch, dann Schule! Und Deutsch auch als Pausensprache!" *Facebook*. Facebook, 18 Mar. 2015. Web. 31 Dec. 2015.

Strache's statement indicates that German should be used in all facets of societal life in Austria: as a first language in the home, in one's leisure time, as well as in the school.<sup>489</sup> Additionally, the use of such statements alongside an image that condescendingly mocks the German language inefficiencies of minorities further marginalises those groups that do not have German as their mother tongue.

The FPÖ, however, justifies these language policies by referring to a logical request that migrants should respect Austria's native culture. In their political programme the FPÖ assert that the Austrian *Leitkultur* is formed by a pride in 'our' *Heimat*, language, history, and traditions, and a respect for these examples of 'Austrianness' is a prerequisite for any case of migrant integration.<sup>490</sup> The FPÖ believe that all Austrians, including migrants or new citizens, must abide by Austrian societal laws and cultural norms. Therefore it is not the duty of Austrians to adapt to new ethnocultures or migrant groups, "sondern die Aufgabe eines jeden Fremden."<sup>491</sup> Language is an important example of conforming to the desired society because if one sounds Austrian, one is also a step closer to behaving and thinking as an Austrian should, and therefore experiencing an affinity with Austrian *Leitkultur* while also identifying with the nation.<sup>492</sup> While the argument that the native culture and identity of the host nation must be preserved is a valid one that is expressed throughout many Western nations, there is also a persistent politics of exclusion that dictates the terms of the populist Right's solutions to immigration and cultural pluralism. For example, the FPÖ end their discussion on integration with a rather ominous warning to those who they believe do not conform, stating that they have "Null-Toleranz" for "Integrationsverweigerung" and that the party would persistently monitor the integration of migrants and enact strict deportation measures for non-compliance."<sup>493</sup>

The social group most cited by Austria's Right-Wing populist parties to be incapable of integration is the Turkish minority in Austria, and a great amount

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<sup>489</sup> This assertion is not only the personal opinion of Strache. In their party programme the FPÖ also insist that all Austrian citizens should speak German: whether at school, in the work place, in one's leisure time, or at home. The enforcement of German as the nation language is, for the party, also the active preservation of cultural identity in Austria. See FPÖ *Handbuch 2013*, 259.

<sup>490</sup> FPÖ *Zuerst Österreicher, Dann Europäer*, 11.

<sup>491</sup> FPÖ *Handbuch 2013*, 38 - 39.

<sup>492</sup> FPÖ *Handbuch 2013*, 267.

<sup>493</sup> FPÖ *Handbuch 2013*, 38 – 39.

of party literature is dedicated to justifying this assertion. In their political programme the FPÖ provide an article from the daily Viennese newspaper *Der Kurier*, which under the title “Türken fällt die Integration schwerer” explains that the great majority of migrants to Austria feel well integrated and willing to abide by the rules, however “Unter den Türken gibt es aber nicht unbeträchtliche Vorbehalte.”<sup>494</sup> For the FPÖ, the reason for this is clear. Turkish immigrants are incapable of integration because they are disinclined to observe the culture and laws of the nation. This inability to assimilate is, according to the FPÖ, due to the Turkish community being restricted by Islamic religious belief, rather than the laws and values of the host population alongside whom they reside. In other words, Turkish minorities do not actually identify themselves as ‘Austrians’. To justify this argument the FPÖ turn to statistics, stating that more than half of Turks in Austria want Sharia law over secular law, while three quarters believe that following the commandments of their religion is more important than democracy.<sup>495</sup> To reverse or control the influence of Islamic culture the FPÖ also return to language use. In their party programme the party insists that German must be the language of instruction in all Islamic prayer houses in Austria.<sup>496</sup> To speak in Arabic, therefore, is seen as a direct affront to Austrian identity, and a means of encouraging foreign ethnoculture over the host population, and must therefore be negated. This populist, Rightist thesis goes to the core of their perspective on the integration of Islamic groups, who they believe are hostile to the Germanic language and culture of Austria. For example, in a Facebook post Strache angrily posted an image of a newspaper title, in which a Turkish integration consultant to Austria stated that obligatory German courses are a provocation to Turkish minorities:

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<sup>494</sup> FPÖ *Handbuch* 2013, 39.

<sup>495</sup> FPÖ *Handbuch* 2013, 39.

<sup>496</sup> FPÖ *Handbuch* 2013, 54.



**Figure 51.**

Image taken from Facebook.<sup>497</sup>

Statements such as these fuel the flames of Far Right resentment. Strache is justifying the party's position on immigration and cultural pluralism by giving strong evidence to indicate that new ethnocultural groups have little desire to assimilate with the native Austrian population. Indeed, in this example even the German language itself is allegedly viewed as negative incitement for minorities with definitively non-Germanic, non-Austrian identities.

For the FPÖ, the action needed against such unassimilable and allegedly 'criminal' groups is clear: "Wer als Fremder in Österreich wegen eines Verbrechens verurteilt wird ist in sein Heimatland auszuweisen."<sup>498</sup> Those people that do not conform to the rules of the host language, culture, and society, are therefore seen to be foreign to the human landscape of *Heimat Österreich*. Foreigners or migrants have their own *Heimatland* and their own *Muttersprache*. They are therefore not identified as Austrians and as a result can be expelled for crime, prolonged unemployment, and also for the inability to assimilate. Those that do not conform or assimilate, then, are

<sup>497</sup> Strache, Heinz-Christian. "Ohne Worte!" *Facebook*. Facebook, 18 Feb. 2012. Web. 31 Dec. 2015.

<sup>498</sup> FPÖ Graz Parteiprogramm 13.

grouped together by the FPÖ alongside those who have become “kriminell”, and must be deported for not respecting the values and ethnoculture of Austria.<sup>499</sup> This is bold rhetoric by Austria’s populist Right, who attempt to compare a failure to integrate with criminal status, suggesting that not conforming to traditional Austrian *Leitkultur* is akin or as bad as breaking the law. Such a political philosophy demonstrates not only the will to preserve Austrian German language and culture, but is also a justification for the marginalisation of foreign ethnocultures and the expulsion of ‘undesirable’ social groups that do not conform to the Austrian human landscape ethos. Language use, therefore, becomes imperative in both the definition of Austrian identity and the rights and expectation of every citizen according to the FPÖ.

### **3.6 - Conclusion**

The FPÖ, then, uses the party programme and other publications like comics to promote language purity as crucial in the defence of *Heimat* and national identity. The party uses language as a domain from which to articulate their cultural critique on *Heimat*, and therefore discursively construct a national identity and sense of community that appeals to their monoethnic, monocultural narrative. If language remains unadulterated and autochthonous, the collective Austrian identity and image of *Heimat* does as well. The objective in the FPÖ’s language as *Heimat* narrative is to validate the interconnectivity between language and behavioural patterns, in order to demonstrate the inner *habitus* they believe typifies Austrian identity. The prominence of language in their political ideas and literature is used to determine ‘true’ Austrians as members of the German cultural community, as well as demonstrate Austria’s contribution to that community in the form of regional dialect. Native dialect, always within the parameters of Alemannic linguistic traditions, is used by the FPÖ to establish an intersection between language, culture, and society, and the party use that intersection to discursively construct an Austrian national identity and *Heimat* that is informed by native ethnocultural elements. This construct, which uses linguistic traditions to depict real Austrians as those that are of Germanic ethnocultural extraction, therefore attempts to categorise *Heimat Österreich* and modern Austria as an ethnic nation. Austria as *Heimat* is an ethnic nation because its members require a

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<sup>499</sup> FPÖ. *Handbuch 2011*, 34.



shared common descent, a long biographical relationship to the land in which they are born, a shared social history, and a common culture. These elements in unison allow Austrians to imagine their *Heimat* and nation through the presumption of common descent, which also undermines the feasibility of multiculturalism and mass immigration.

Language is, as the intergenerational vessel for a social group's *habitus*, a foundational cultural element in the FPÖ's conception of the Austrian collective self and ethnic nation, and as such requires strict protocols for its preservation. The political policy of language preservation allows the FPÖ a course to justify their anti-immigration policies. The party achieves this by attempting to draw attention to the unassimilable and even hostile character of other ethnic groups in Austria, who are shown to refuse to conform to the conventions of the Austrian-German language, and therefore to the nation's way of life. Such degrees of 'foreignness' can result in a multiplicity of identities in Austrian society and the eventual demise of the traditional identity of the host nation, which the FPÖ argue is the clandestine ambition of immigrants, the European Union, and the current Austrian political establishment. It is upon this argument that the FPÖ continues to canvass the idea of forced language acquisition for migrants, as well as the need to preserve a monocultural, and indeed monoethnic, image of *Heimat*. Denying migrants access to school unless they can adequately speak German further prevents them from ever learning the language and thus ensures, albeit indirectly, that their migration is ultimately unsuccessful both personally and psychologically. Without adequate access to resources, migrants can never hope to reach the adequate language levels of B1 required for residency.

Language, therefore, is used FPÖ to characterise, as well as draw a boundary around, the native Austrian ethnoculture. Language as ethnoculture, furthermore, informs the parties' understanding of *Heimat* and discursively constructs the identity of the *legitimate* human landscape that dwells there. The FPÖ uses language, and the preservation of native linguistic traditions, as an example for why it is necessary to defend Austrians as a social group and community with a consistent culture and ethnicity. For the human landscape of *Heimat* to be a unique and distinctive ethnoculture, it requires the existence of an unbroken and largely intact (or unmixed) lineage that is informed by culture and the values of its own social history. Linguistic traditions, therefore, must be respected and never altered, and foreign ethnolects (as well as foreign identities more generally) must be limited or negated entirely. If

language represents the social history, cultural knowledge, values, and the identity of ‘cultural nations’ such as Austria, then it is also important to establish the origins and application of the FPÖ’s conception of cultural identity in their *Heimat* discourse. The formative cultural elements in the FPÖ’s definition of Austrian identity, as we shall see, are largely defined by the social history, myths, and traditions of the Germanic *Kulturgemeinschaft*.

## **Chapter Four**

### ***In Österreich lebt die Tradition: Heimat, history, and mythology***

*It is a serious question whether a political community can achieve a political order without developing a foundation myth.*<sup>500</sup>

#### **4.0 – Introduction**

‘Narrative’ has been a pervasive term among academics over the past two decades that is commonly used for uncovering the cultural theory of the past.<sup>501</sup> However narrative in this context refers to a form of representation that communicates a story as well as a method of discursively constructing reality to an audience. This chapter explores the linking of modern concepts of *Heimat* with more anachronistic models as outlined in the FPÖ’s definition of Austrian history and myth. The link between antiquity and modernity will be explored through the FPÖ’s paradigm of historical continuity, which is established through party literature that links *Heimat* with a deep and sentimental nostalgia for the past.

As has been established in previous chapters, maintaining a culturally homogeneous Austria informed by Austrian-German characteristics is an essential part of the FPÖ’s political objectives. In their particular view of Austrian identity they use nativist historiography and myth building to clearly demarcate the cultural boundaries of the Austrian nation. Their *Heimatrhetorik*, therefore, uses a ‘politics of the past’ to demonstrate a ‘pure’, autochthonous community and *Heimat*. This definition of people and *Heimat* is antagonistic by design towards outsiders, who through the lens of myth and history are illustrated as a disparaged or threatening ‘Other’. The parties achieve this argument of ethnocultural separatism by suggesting that experiencing an affinity with one’s *Heimat* can only be achieved by identifying with Austrian history and traditions. As we shall see, only a very specific type of ‘Austrian’, who exhibits the necessary biographical character, and who conforms to

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<sup>500</sup> Friedrich, C.J. *Man and his Government: An Empirical Theory of Politics*. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1963. 96.

<sup>501</sup> Eckel, Jan. "Narrativizations of the Past: The Theoretical Debate and the Example of the Weimar Republic." *Nationalizing the Past: Historians as Nation Builders in Modern Europe*. Eds. Berger, Stefan and Chris Lorenz. UK: Palgrave. 26 - 48. Print. 26.

this historical discourse, is permitted a place in the Right-Wing populist definition of *Heimat*. The parties' use of *Heimat* is therefore entirely exclusive, and employs the sentimentality of a 'wholesome' and 'uncontaminated' antiquity in order to indirectly reject notions of cultural and historical pluralism, as well as multiculturalism. This collective, repackaged past is produced to encourage patriotism and a sense of belonging, as well as a general distrust towards those foreign groups that are either nonconformist or a threat to this identity mandate.

#### **4.1 - Heimatgeschichte**

Although history is an important feature in the FPÖ's definition of *Heimat* and identity, the use of the past to illuminate the present is by no means a contemporary Right-Wing populist invention. History has played an important role in concepts of *Heimat* since the nineteenth century. Although the *Heimat* imaginary does not require history, it is greatly enhanced by it. As a feature of *Heimat*, the purpose of history is to provide a compendium of the past with which people can readily identify and accordingly experience patriotism for their social group and geographical location. *Heimatgeschichte*, or the recording and celebration of previous modes of native life and custom, played an integral role in fostering this sense of local belonging, and was also successful in uniting various regions into a cohesive national identity narrative. Far from observing the orthodox conventions of disciplined historical research, *Heimatgeschichte* provided a special, localised form of history with which ordinary people could readily identify and feel empathy.

Celia Applegate's research into the local German *Heimat* movement in the Pfalz provides good evidence of history's ability to construct a *Heimat* imagination and sense of collective identity. Applegate explains that during the nineteenth century, *Heimatgeschichte* arose in the Historical Association of the Pfalz as a popular medium to promote local historical, archaeological, and ethnographic research.<sup>502</sup> Applegate concludes, rightly so, that through the popularisation of *Heimatgeschichte*, history now contributed alongside nature and folklore "to the emergence of a popularly held local identity, attesting both to the distinctiveness of the Pfalz and its participation in a broadly German culture."<sup>503</sup>

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<sup>502</sup> Applegate 16 – 17.

<sup>503</sup> Applegate 87.

*Heimatgeschichte*, or ‘the history of *Heimat*’, however, was far from a scientific approach to historical data and past events. Alon Confino explains that:

...while history is detached from the concerns of the little people, *Heimat* history is empathetic; while history explores impersonal trends, *Heimat* history focuses on everyday life; while history is a science, *Heimat* history is an art; while history is an artificial construct, *Heimat* history is an authentic, popular discourse.<sup>504</sup>

*Heimatgeschichte*, therefore, was the popularization of bygone provincial and family-orientated landscapes, often incorporating kitsch narratives that bestowed upon its audience feelings of nostalgia, sentimentality, and belonging. Despite *Heimat* history’s lack of scientific objectivity, it rather authentically illustrated a popular past for the people it served.

*Heimat* history also claimed the authority of ancient pasts, which helped to inform and authenticate collective cultural identity. Between 1890 and 1918 in particular, regional *Heimat* associations, museums, and publishers evoked the distinctiveness of the regional past, while at the same time establishing a link between ‘Germanness’ and the identity of the nation.<sup>505</sup> The significance of *Heimat* museums was their specific capacity to exhibit the past as a site of identity.<sup>506</sup> *Heimat* museums were portals for *Volkskunde* and designed specifically to recall the past by recording communities’ previous ways of life.<sup>507</sup> Everything from old farming equipment, to local costume, or scenes of every-day life and habitation, *Heimatgeschichte* aroused empathy and a nostalgic sense identity through an assortment of items, stories, or images about days of yore. In his *Heimat* book about Stuttgart, Wilhelm Seytter states:

*Heimat* studies ... enter affectionately into people's simple and daily life, down

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<sup>504</sup> Confino, Alon. "Edgar Reitz's *Heimat* and German Nationhood: Film, Memory, and Understandings of the Past." *German History* 16.2 (1998): 185 - 208. Print. 194 – 195.

<sup>505</sup> Confino, Alon. *Germany as a Culture of Remembrance: Promises and Limits of Writing History*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006. Print. 38.

<sup>506</sup> Confino *The Nation*, 140.

<sup>507</sup> Confino *The Nation*, 150.

from the ivory tower of scholarship into the valleys and meadows of civil, family, and even personal life.... Heimat is not a prosaic system of concepts, and Heimat studies are not a logical theory. Heimat has been given to us by the disposition of our ancestors.<sup>508</sup>

*Heimatgeschichte*, in other words, provided audiences with a narrative on the character and temperament of their forefathers as well as a window into nostalgic scenes from the past, all of which also indirectly affected their own self-identification. In a modern world that had experienced a rapid divorce from traditionalism, or the past from the present, *Heimat* museums and the concept of *Heimat* more generally were used as tools to lessen this existential divide. The various regional identities depicted in *Heimatgeschichte* illustrated a unified assortment of German heritage, and this amalgamated custom became the typical way the past was evoked in *Heimat* conceptions. The compendium of German heritage illustrated in *Heimat* history, therefore, functioned as an example of ‘sameness’ among German speaking communities. Confino calls this uniformity of heritage a “national common denominator”, with each region being the sum of its parts in the entire national community, and all Germans therefore sharing “a particular relationship to one another, sharing a past and a future.”<sup>509</sup>

*Heimat* historians, as a result, succeeded in merging local pasts to greater German national identity. History, therefore, was not only instrumental in the forging of *Heimat* conceptions, but also national identity in a politico-cultural context. In a political climate that saw the emergence of a greater German nation that was forged on many smaller identities, *Heimat* historians not only compiled local pasts to contribute to the national character, but *to preserve*. Rapidly changing environments, political orders, and national sovereignties and borders could as easily been perceived as hazardous to the longevity of smaller, local identities as it was about ensuring national identity and stature in the world. Much like the FPÖ’s desire to preserve the local identity of a small nation like Austria from the globalizing force of the European

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<sup>508</sup> Seytter, Wilhelm. *Unser Stuttgart. Geschichte, Sage und Kultur der Stadt und ihrer Umgebung*. Stuttgart, 1904. Print. 4 – 5. Translation in Confino *Germany as a Culture*, 38.

<sup>509</sup> Confino, Alon. "The Nation as a Local Metaphor: Heimat, National Memory and the German Empire, 1871- 1918." *History and Memory* 5.1 (1993): 42 - 86. Print. 50.

Union, many *Heimat* historians diligently set about the task of documenting local identity so that it would not disappear as the world rapidly progressed and transformed around them. *Heimat* historians, in other words, sought to repel the homogenization of identity in the German-speaking areas of Europe, much as the FPÖ claim to be the last line of defense in a battle to save national and cultural identity from cultural pluralism and the political dominance of the European Union.

#### **4.2 - The historical constructions of national identity**

The reconstruction of history, while significant to *Heimat* conceptions, is also instrumental in the building of cohesive and enduring national identity discourses. Although the architects of *Heimatgeschichte* used the past to recreate a ‘commonplace’ and altogether ‘ordinary’ example of the everyday national self, national identities are also, in fact, consistently constructed around historical narratives. By the term ‘nation’ we do not refer directly to the political sense of an internationally recognized governmental body, population, or state; rather to an ethnocultural unit that has “meaning apart from the shape of political boundaries.”<sup>510</sup> History plays a significant role in the construction of nations and shared identities outside the direct realm of conventional political science. The idea of a nation, much like the concept of *Heimat*, is based upon certain integral ideas. The nation assumes a commonality that binds people together and demonstrates, from politically to socio-culturally, that they are a single unit. This notion of collectivism can, as we have seen, be derived from language and territory, but can also be formed from shared ‘culture’ and history.<sup>511</sup> History, however, is a loaded term with various applications. In the context of national identity constructions, history is applied as both an academic discipline and a form of ‘collective memory’.

As many scholars show, the discipline of history was regularly used to promote a collective national self, as history was merged with the present, albeit in a recurrently repackaged form, to help nurture national allegiances. Communities require histories in order to define themselves. Histories are valuable to identity

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<sup>510</sup> Kelman, Herbert C. "Nationalism, Patriotism, and National Identity: Social-Psychological Dimensions." *Patriotism: In the Lives of Individuals and Nations*. Eds. Bar-Tal, Daniel and Ervin Staub. Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1997. 165 - 89. Print. 168.

<sup>511</sup> Bruckmüller, Ernst. *The Austrian Nation*. California: Adriadne, 2003. Print. 30.

formation because of the cultural narratives they preserve.”<sup>512</sup> For example, Stuart Hall refers to the nation as a “system of cultural representations”, of which history is one example. Hall explains that national cultures conceptualise identities by manufacturing meanings about the nation “with which we can identify; these are contained in the stories which are told about it, memories which connect its present with its past, and images which are constructed of it.”<sup>513</sup> The ‘narration of national culture’ utilises what Hall calls ‘discursive strategies’, one of which is:

*A narrative of the nation* that is told (and retold) in national histories, providing a set of “stories, images, landscapes, scenarios, historical events and rituals” all of which represent the combined experiences that give meaning to the nation.<sup>514</sup>

Stefan Berger and Bill Niven similarly explain that the “rise of history as a professional discipline in the nineteenth century was intimately connected with the rise of the idea of the modern nation” and that history itself “became national history.”<sup>515</sup> Montserrat Guibernau too argues “history contributes to a certain image of the nation and represents the cradle where national character was forged.”<sup>516</sup> Uri Ram similarly defines the concept of ‘nationality’ as a collective narration: a story that people recount about themselves in order to give authenticity and meaning to their present social world.<sup>517</sup>

Anthony David Smith also concludes that a common historical memory is the primary feature of national identity within a named population (a nation).<sup>518</sup> For Smith, national identity “involves some sense of political community, history,

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<sup>512</sup> Ricœur, Paul. "Myth and History " *Encyclopedia of Religion*. Ed. Eliade, Mircea. Vol. 10. New York: Macmillan, 1987. Print. 276.

<sup>513</sup> Hall 613.

<sup>514</sup> Hall 613.

<sup>515</sup> Berger, Stefan, and Bill Niven. "Writing the History of National Memory." *Writing the History of Memory*. Eds. Berger, Stefan and Bill Niven. London: Bloomsbury, 2014. 135 - 56. Print. 136.

<sup>516</sup> Guibernau, Montserrat. "Anthony D. Smith on Nations and National Identity: A Critical Assessment." *Nations and Nationalism* 10.1 (2004): 125 - 41. Print. 137

<sup>517</sup> Ram, Uri. "Narration, Erziehung und die Erfindung des jüdischen Nationalismus." *Ostereichische Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaften* 5.2 (1994): 151 - 77. Print. 153.

<sup>518</sup> Smith, Anthony David. *National Identity*. London: Penguin Press, 1991. 14.



territory, patria, citizenship, common values and traditions.”<sup>519</sup> Smith further cites the ‘ethnic’ variant of nationalism, in which the proto-national ethnic origins of nations are seen to predate modernity, and be possessed of a “nativist history – a belief in the virtues of indigenous history and its special interpretation of the history of the nation and its place in the world.”<sup>520</sup> The world, therefore, is divided into nations “each with its own history, destiny, and character.”<sup>521</sup> Smith argues that one original prerequisite of what we define as modern ‘nations’ is a collective sense of *primordialism*, which through cultural attributes such as historical territory, kinship, language, and custom dictate self-identification, and resultantly create the sense of communal belonging “we call ethnicity and ethnic community.”<sup>522</sup> The nation, therefore, is made up of members who “are bound together by a myth of common origins and a shared historic culture, and they form a single cultural community living according to vernacular codes in a historic homeland.”<sup>523</sup> Although the concept of the political nation is a modern construct, it does find its roots in the distant personal histories of European groups. Both a ‘homeland’ and ‘nation’ are home to a ‘we’ group, and it is the continuity of ethnic allegiances that has played an important formative role in the formation of modern nations.<sup>524</sup> Nations, then, are arguably rooted in a pre-modern assemblage, and therefore history plays a decisive role in their transmission over time. Indeed, history’s efficacy in the construction of national identity is due to the cultural narratives of sameness that it preserves.

Nations also require well-defined territories, and these spaces are commonly given a unique character and meaning through their historical narratives. The spatiality of the landscape, in other words, is characterised by its own, distinct, temporality. The territory of the nation, as a result, must be a specific ‘historic land’. The historic land is a ‘homeland’ to those that dwell within it, and “becomes a repository of historic memories and associations, the place where ‘our’ sages, saints, and heroes, lived, worked, prayed and fought. All this makes the homeland

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<sup>519</sup> Smith *National Identity*, 9.

<sup>520</sup> Smith, Anthony David. *The Cultural Foundation of Nations: Hierarchy, Covenant and Republic*. Oxford: Blackwell, 2008. Print. 17.

<sup>521</sup> Smith *Foundation of Nations*, 16.

<sup>522</sup> Smith, Anthony David. *The Nation in History*. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000. Print. 23.

<sup>523</sup> Smith *Nation History*, 23.

<sup>524</sup> Bruckmüller *Austrian Nation*, 30.

unique.”<sup>525</sup> It is the historic land with its tales of the ancestors that provides group identity and communal belonging, because it authenticates the existence of one distinct national identity and connects it to a territory and nation. Berger similarly cites the persistent use of ‘national histories’ in the construction of national identities, which legitimate “diverse forms of nationalism and feelings of national belonging.”<sup>526</sup> Berger goes on to emphasise that historians were as willing as other participants in national identity discourses to “anchor the present in a viable past, thereby guaranteeing the future of the nation.”<sup>527</sup> Modern histories, therefore, have since the nineteenth century consistently been written to cover the origin of nations and their linear march towards the future, to the point that it has been said that modern history was “bonded to nations.”<sup>528</sup>

The selective use of histories as narratives of national identity assists to create a sense of community around which nations and identities are forged. Guibernau cites that a discerning use of history provides national groups with a “collective memory” with “transcendental moments” that allow people “to increase their self-esteem by feeling part of a community which proved capable of great things and that might also be ready to become again a beacon in the world.”<sup>529</sup> History, Guibernau continues, provides members of nations with examples of why they are ‘superior’, and, as a result, “contributes to the construction of a certain image of the nation and represents the cradle where national character was forged.”<sup>530</sup> The historiographical quest to source meaningful events from history and reproduce them as examples of the nation’s grandeur demonstrates that, on a sociological level at very least, the past is often selectively constructed or retold in order to be applicable or perceived as valuable to the present.<sup>531</sup>

In the context of national identity, then, history is not an objectively applied discipline, but rather a selective process of ‘valuable myth building’ in order to

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<sup>525</sup> Smith *National Identity*, 9.

<sup>526</sup> Berger, Stefan. "On the Role of Myths and History in the Construction of National Identity in Modern Europe." *European History Quarterly* 39.3 (2009): 490 - 502. Print. 3.

<sup>527</sup> Berger *Role of Myths*, 5.

<sup>528</sup> Berger, Stefan, Chris Lorenz, and Billie Melman. *Popularizing National Pasts : 1800 to the Present*. New York: Routledge, 2012. Print. 2.

<sup>529</sup> Guibernau 137.

<sup>530</sup> Guibernau 137.

<sup>531</sup> Ram 153.

validate, authenticate, and disseminate modern national identity narratives. History, therefore, is not always entirely a factual affair, and can be utilised for various national objectives – some of which may be fictional or even, at times, nefarious in their designs. Many groups, including political bodies, can manipulate the events of history to suit their agenda: images of past soldiers may be evoked as examples of present day power, institutions long resolved or forgotten can be resurrected, previous political positions (especially in relation to foreign policy) revisited, and, most importantly, the descendants of foreign threats from recorded history sworn once more to be contemporary enemies. To capture the imagination history must be emotive, not necessarily factual. The chronology the of dates, or the factuality of the descriptions, pales into insignificance when faced with the efficacy of impassioned story telling that draws people together as groups and provides them a history, a purpose, and an identity. As Walker Connor concludes, national identity does not “draw its sustenance from facts but from perceptions; not from chronological/factual history but from sentient/felt history.”<sup>532</sup> History, as a result, always maintains a potent role in the construction of national identities by providing participants with an emotive past that in many ways glorifies or authenticates the present.

#### **4.3 - Collective memory: Imagining national communities**

The French historian Ernest Renan (1823 – 1892) in his famous lecture on ‘What is a nation?’ explained history as a prerequisite to the formation of national identity, and that a nation required “the possession in common of a rich legacy of memories.”<sup>533</sup> The faculty of memory, however, differs from history. ‘History’ as a database of national myths and what is known as ‘collective memory’ is far more useful in the construction of national identities than an objective, scientific discipline. Maurice Halbwachs (1877 – 1945) was the first major theoretician of the concept of ‘collective memory’, where he noted the juxtaposition between history and memory. Halbwachs argued that collective memory is plural – it is experienced and imagined as a group - and thus different from the singular notion of history as the pursuit of an

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<sup>532</sup> Connor, Walker. "The Timelessness of Nations." *Nations and Nationalism* 10.1 (2004): 35 - 47. Print. 45.

<sup>533</sup> Renan, Ernest. "What Is a Nation?" *Nationalism: A Reader*. Eds. Hutchinson, John and Anthony David Smith. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994. 17. Print.

objective analysis of the past. Collective memory, therefore, affects a social group's identity through narratives and traditions that help to foster for its members a sense of community:

It is in society that people acquire memories. It is also in society that they recall, recognize, and localise their memories... We appeal to our memory only in order to answer questions which others have asked us... We note, moreover, that in order to answer them, we place ourselves in their perspective and we consider ourselves as being part of the same group as they do.<sup>534</sup>

The divorce of official history from more emotive and collective national memories was seen most noticeably from the nineteenth century, where professional history as a discipline sought integrity through an analysis of the past that was neither selective nor subjective.<sup>535</sup> Collective memory contrarily reproduced the past in a way that could be imagined, and therefore indirectly experienced, by the audience, and this helped to encourage national ties and loyalty. For example, Jay Winter explains 'collective memory' is the interpretation, embodiment, and repetition of scripts about the past that "galvanize the ties that bind groups together and deposit additional memory traces about the past in their own minds."<sup>536</sup> Halbwachs, as well as other historians such as Pierre Nora, therefore, attested that 'history' and 'memory' are different ways of dealing with the past.<sup>537</sup>

However, it is more credible that history and memory are in fact two ways of imagining and making sense of the same, and otherwise unfathomable, past – of which both are utilised to achieve different objectives. The discipline of history is still memory, but it is perceived through and analysed with the assistance of many documents. History is therefore a discipline that teaches and supports learning, whereas memory is a faculty that is experienced and therefore perceived

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<sup>534</sup> Halbwachs, Maurice. *On Collective Memory*. Trans. Coser, Lewis A. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1992. Print. 38.

<sup>535</sup> Berger *Writing*, 136.

<sup>536</sup> Winter, Jay. "The Performance of the Past: History, Memory, Identity." *Performing the Past*. Eds. Tilmans, Karin, Frank van Vree and Jay Winter. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2010. 11 - 34. Print. 11.

<sup>537</sup> For example see Nora, Pierre. "Between Memory and History: Les Lieux De Mémoire". *Representations* 26 (1989): 7–24.

subjectively.<sup>538</sup> Indeed, it is argued that memory is the emotional charge that gives history its life and value, and this emotive force cannot be eliminated without also eliminating the roots of history itself.<sup>539</sup>

The thesis that national identities are susceptible to influence and alteration through the manipulation of historical narratives is largely founded on the works of modernist and post-modernist scholars such as Eric Hobsbawm, Ernst Gellner, and Benedict Anderson. Hobsbawm, for example, identifies traditions (and, as such, culture and history) as systems utilized by capitalism and political elites to create an artificial social bond in the community, which assist in national harmony and social cohesion for the sake of (largely economic) progress. Hobsbawm explains this thesis in his work *The Invention of Tradition*, where he attests:

‘Invented tradition’ is taken to mean a set of practices, normally governed by overtly or tacitly accepted rules and of a ritual of symbolic nature, which seek to inculcate certain values and norms of behavior by repetition, which automatically implies continuation with the past. In fact, where possible, they normally attempt to establish continuity with a suitable historic past.<sup>540</sup>

This argument does not identify history as artificial *per se*, rather that “insofar as there is such reference to the historic past, the peculiarity of ‘invented’ traditions is that the continuity with it is largely fictitious.”<sup>541</sup> To justify this position, Hobsbawm cites the modification of existing pre-national practices, such as traditional folksongs, toward more progressive national purposes – thereby altering their original meaning. The resultant conclusion is the underlying question of whether there is any legitimacy to culture and traditions as a means of defining modern national identity, or whether they are in fact imaginaries constructed to suit specific political narratives. As Ernst Gellner also concluded in his book *Nations and Nationalism*, “Nationalism is not the

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<sup>538</sup> Winter 12.

<sup>539</sup> Berger, *Popularizing*, 5.

<sup>540</sup> Hobsbawm, Eric. *The Invention of Tradition*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990. Print. 1.

<sup>541</sup> Hobsbawm 2.

*awakening of nations to self-consciousness: it invents nations where they do not exist.*"<sup>542</sup>

For postmodernists such as Benedict Anderson, nations and their histories are also seen as imagined constructs. This does not mean that the nation itself is totally artificial, rather that the way it is imagined by those it encompasses is not entirely genuine. Anderson describes all communities larger than those that are face-to-face, including nations, as "imagined communities", and are "distinguished not by their falsity-genuineness, but by the style in which they are imagined."<sup>543</sup> Nations are imagined communities in the way they are constructed through a series of symbols and representations that allude to a sense of collective identity, without, necessarily, any real validation to those claims. The solidarity members of a nation experience with one another is false, because these members may never meet and therefore cannot claim any specific social bond outside of the national narrative provided them. The difference in nations, in other words, is simply constructed upon the different ways they are concocted and imagined.

For Anderson, the efficacy of the imaginary of the national community lies in the social group's cultural roots as formative elements in a common national culture. The larger cultural systems that preceded nations are the foundations from which patriotism arises for the nation, and therefore is a key to nationalism's success with the people.<sup>544</sup> Culture, as such, plays a persistent role in how one imagines and constructs meaning around the image of the nation, and thereby feels a certain sense of solidarity with other members of the national community. National culture is therefore a discourse – a way of constructing meaning that in this case constructs identities by providing "meanings about the nation with which we can identify."<sup>545</sup> The nation, therefore, is imagined through the cultural roots it encompasses, which are then redesigned and amalgamated into specific national identity narratives. As the British politician and classical scholar Enoch Powell (1912 - 1998) put it, "the life of nations no less than that of men is lived largely in the imagination."<sup>546</sup>

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<sup>542</sup> Gellner, Ernst. *Nations and Nationalism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983. Print. 48.

<sup>543</sup> Anderson 6.

<sup>544</sup> Anderson 12.

<sup>545</sup> Hall 613.

<sup>546</sup> Powell, Enoch. *Freedom and Reality*. London: Batsford, 1969. Print. 245.

The concept of collective memory is also a form of cultural memory, which, when preserved in selected histories, continues to influence the contemporary identity of social groups. Jan Assman defines cultural memory as such a process, describing the concept as ‘the concretion of identity’, stating that:

Cultural memory preserves the store of knowledge from which a group derives an awareness of its unity and peculiarity. The objective manifestations of cultural memory are defined through this kind of identificatory determination in a positive (“We are this”) or in a negative (“That’s our opposite”) sense.<sup>547</sup>

Cultural memory, as such, has the power to encourage solidarity as well as preserve the beauty and diversity of individual social groups (often as nation states derived from ethnic communities). It can, however, also provide the justification for exclusionary politics, as group identification formed around cultural affiliation can create sharp distinctions between those who belong within a community and those who do not. As Assmann explains, collective memory and cultural identity oscillate between images of “oneself and what is foreign” and through its cultural heritage, as a result, “a society becomes visible to itself and to others.”<sup>548</sup>

#### **4.4 - Mythology and folklore as features of *Heimat***

Folklore and mythology has also greatly affected the *Heimat* imaginary. Folklore differs from the discipline of history because it refers to three principal features: a body of knowledge, a mode of thought, and a kind of art.<sup>549</sup> Folklore, in other words, preserves a certain amount of knowledge about the past, but is also affected by the thoughts and the cultural modes of the people who remember, imagine, and disseminate it. As a field that is largely defined by social context, time depth, and transmission, folklore is not believed to exist without the enduring presence of a ‘self-knowing’ social group.<sup>550</sup> Folklore, therefore, belongs to a

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<sup>547</sup> Assmann, Jan. "Collective Memory and Cultural Identity." *New German Critique* 65 (1995): 125 - 33. Web. 130.

<sup>548</sup> Assmann 133.

<sup>549</sup> Ben-Amos, Dan. "Toward a Definition of Folklore in Context." *The Journal of American Folklore* 84.331 (1971). Print. 5.

<sup>550</sup> Ben-Amos 5.

community of people and, subsequently, is used by that group as a means of self-categorisation. It is the representation of a people's past that is produced in such a way as to be instructive (the scholarship of the people), as well as an example of the folk's erudition (the common intellectual property of the folk or the community).<sup>551</sup> It is also, above all, an example of imagining the past in order to formulate an ethos and identity for the present based on the customs, values, and deeds of the ancestors.

Myths too relate directly to identity. Myths are defined as a group's 'traditional tales' that have a symbolic function in relation to providing anthropological and cultural insights into the group they represent.<sup>552</sup> Myths therefore also function as a nucleus for group identity, as myths and memories are what provide identity to communities.<sup>553</sup> Ernst Bruckmüller explains that myths are a form of cultural memory that usually includes stories of origins and beginnings.<sup>554</sup> The function of myth is to "express man's understanding of himself in the world in which he lives. Myth should not be interpreted cosmologically, but anthropologically, or better still, existentially."<sup>555</sup> Myth is also, however, open to interpretations and reconfigurations to suit existing social, or indeed political, systems. As Roland Barthes explains, it is possible for anything in the world to "pass from a closed, silent existence to an oral state, open to appropriation by society, for there is no law, whether natural or not, which forbids talking about things."<sup>556</sup> Myth, as such, is a discourse<sup>557</sup>, which, like the concept of *Heimat*, has the propensity to affect group identity through a discussion about group customs, values, events, and 'culture' more broadly. Although myths can describe fanciful tales about origins and catastrophe, they can also equally be adopted to validate an existing social system and not only

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<sup>551</sup> Ben-Amos 6.

<sup>552</sup> Bouvrie, Synnøve. *Myth and Symbol I: Symbolic Phenomena in Ancient Greek Culture; Papers from the First International Symposium on Symbolism at the University of Tromsø, June 4-7, 1998*. Bergen: Norwegian Institute at Athens, 2002. Print. 21.

<sup>553</sup> Stråth, Bo. "Introduction: Myth, Memory and History in the Construction of Community." *Myth and Memory in the Construction of Community: Historical Patterns in Europe and Beyond*. Ed. Stråth, Bo. Brussels: Peter Lang, 2000. 19 - 46. Print.

<sup>554</sup> Bruckmüller *Austrian Nation*, 14.

<sup>555</sup> Bultmann, Rudolf. "New Testament and Mythology." *Kerygma and Myth*. Ed. Bartsch, Hans Werner. New York: Harper, 1953. Print. 10.

<sup>556</sup> Barthes, Roland, and Susan Sontag. *A Barthes Reader*. London: Vintage, 1993. Print. 94.

<sup>557</sup> Barthes and Sontag *Reader*, 93.



preserve, but also justify, traditional customs and behaviours.<sup>558</sup> The memories, values, and symbols contained in myths therefore have a sociological function in the construction of communities, and it is here that myth gains its political efficacy.

The effectiveness of myth to characterize communities is seen in the nineteenth century *Heimat* movement, which similarly focused on the study of ethnography and the preservation of local mythologies in order to legitimate their distinct sense of community. As a result, local mythologies and folklore enhanced feelings of local patriotism by exemplifying the distinctiveness of *Heimat*. For example, Confino notes that *Heimat* enthusiasts in Württemberg sought to encapsulate their local way of life by encouraging ethnographic consciousness through the celebration of *Heimat* ‘folklore’:

that encompassed every aspect of traditional manners, customs, and life-style. Heimat folklore added to Heimat history and nature an important human factor by concentrating on the ways in which people in Württemberg lived and thought. Simultaneously, looking back to traditions helped define the origins of Württemberg society.”<sup>559</sup>

Similar to collective memory in the construction of national identities, Confino also asserts that ‘truth’ was never the goal in *Heimat* folklore. Rather, *Heimat* folklore encouraged patriotism and group identification through a “system of sentiments” and invented traditions that resulted in a perceived “collective character” (*Volkscharakter*).<sup>560</sup> In her book on the *Heimat* movement of the Pfalz, Applegate also concludes that “through scholarly investigation and popular festivity” *Heimat* enthusiasts “established folklore alongside nature as a defining, constitutive element of Pfälzer identity.”<sup>561</sup>

It is the myths that reside within collective folklore that play an important role in the construction of national identities. Duncan S. A. Bell defines ‘nationalist myth’ as a story that in many cases “simplifies, dramatizes, and selectively narrates” the

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<sup>558</sup> Graves, Robert. *Introduction to New Larousse Encyclopaedia of Mythology*. London: Hamlyn, 1972. Print. V.

<sup>559</sup> Confino *The Nation*, 115.

<sup>560</sup> Confino *The Nation*, 116 - 117.

<sup>561</sup> Applegate 78 – 80.

nation's "past and its place in the world, its historical eschatology: a story that elucidates its contemporary meaning through (re)constructing its past."<sup>562</sup> Smith also defines national identity by referring to a specific population and territory with common myths.<sup>563</sup> The fascination with myths and their efficacy for nation building is by no means new, and is most commonly seen during the Romantic period. For example, during the nineteenth century many Romantics argued that myths were able to capture the 'inner truth' of peoples, and were therefore in many cases more authentic and conclusive than any historical study of the past.<sup>564</sup> Indeed, the interconnectivity of historiography and mythology in building national identities led to the conclusion that an inter-textual approach to national identity studies is needed – one that recognises the futility of discerning between myth and history in a national context.<sup>565</sup>

#### **4.5 – History and *Heimat* in the FPÖ's discourse**

History, as we have seen, is a powerful and emotive feature of national identity conceptions. The legacy of that which was is charming, mysterious, and nostalgic. It matters little if the 'golden age' of the past is real or imagined. Imagining antiquity as a collective memory allows communities to reconnect with their forefathers, and this continuity of history and identity provides justification for their (real or imagined) collectivism. A community's history, therefore, is imagined as a possession: a mutual treasure that is exclusive of and accessible to all within the group, and inaccessible to those that are omitted as outsiders. History as an exclusive paragon of identity and *Heimat* also subsequently becomes a powerful political tool with which to garner empathy from voters, who, through the persuasive effect of populist *Heimatrhetorik*, feel that their exclusivity as a social group is being recognised and preserved by the Right-Wing populists.

Daniel Oesch explains that one success of Right-Wing populist discourse in Europe is the parties' ability to tap into "disaffected and alienated voters who articulate their deep-seated disenchantment with contemporary politics", and who also

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<sup>562</sup> Bell, Duncan S. A. "Mythscape, Memory, Mythology, and National Identity." *British Journal of Sociology* 1.62 (2003): 63 - 81. Print. 75.

<sup>563</sup> Smith *National Identity*, 14.

<sup>564</sup> Berger *Role of Myths*, 491.

<sup>565</sup> Berger *Role of Myths*, 498.

feel that their national identity is undermined by foreign cultures, and therefore see “immigration and foreign cultures as greater threats to their identity.”<sup>566</sup> In response to such concerns, the FPÖ focus on the collective native history of all Austrians, and depict these narratives as a feature of their identity. The advantage of this is that history does not require wealth or status to obtain, and is accessible to all Austrians by birthright. History, therefore, becomes a national common denominator and is used by the populist parties to facilitate a narrative of belonging and collective identity that is informed by specific, mono-ethnocultural markers. Central to this populist argument is the narrative ‘while the establishment have abandoned you or let you down, you still possess that one feature that makes you unique and binds you to your identity and the spatiality of your geographical *Heimat* – your history’.

The FPÖ define Austria as a *Kulturnation*, and use history to demonstrate Austria’s close cultural relationship to Germany. This position also informs their sense of *Heimat*. In the FPÖ’s Graz political programme German history is clearly described as a feature of identity and homeland.<sup>567</sup> By ‘German’, the FPÖ refers to not only a common “Sprache, Religion, Kunst sowie Kultur”, but also a “über Jahrtausende gemeinsamen Geschichte sind wir in die deutsche Kulturgemeinschaft” in which members are bound.<sup>568</sup> The long history that Austrians share is equally as important as other cultural manifestations – precisely because it is within the history that cultural identity is preserved and passed forward to future generations. The FPÖ characterizes ‘culture’ as antiquated, most commonly through an argument of Austria’s a long biographical roots. The FPÖ considers “Kultur”, such as religion and language, to be “identitätsstiftende Säulen”, and “Tradition, Sitten und Gebräuche” are “wesentlich für unser Kulturverständnis.”<sup>569</sup> History, then, is as much a feature of Austrian identity and *Heimat* as other, contemporary cultural or political facets because history records and maintains the traditions and customs that the FPÖ designates as pillars of identity. The FPÖ demonstrates a practical commitment to history and cultural identity by encouraging the further establishment of modern day

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<sup>566</sup> Oesch, Daniel. "Explaining Workers' Support for Right-Wing Populist Parties in Western Europe: Evidence from Austria, Belgium, France, Norway, and Switzerland." *International Political Science Review* 29.3 (2008): 349 - 73. Print. 352 – 353.

<sup>567</sup> FPÖ Graz Parteiprogramm, 5

<sup>568</sup> FPÖ Handbuch 2013, 258.

<sup>569</sup> FPÖ Handbuch 2013, 258.

*Heimat* museums. Similar to nineteenth century *Heimat* enthusiasts, the party promotes the “Schaffung des Hauses der Geschichte”, which they believe will preserve Austrian cultural identity and make it accessible to the population.<sup>570</sup>

The FPÖ’s German version of Austrian history and identity exposes the party’s Right-Wing, pan-German origins. Their thesis rests on the assumption that Austria’s close relationship with German and Germany, both culturally and historically, is a well-established fact. To validate this thesis one need only look at some pivotal dates in Austria’s recent history. In 1848 the banner of German unity flew from Vienna’s Stefansdom, and some thirty years later Heinrich Friedjung’s best-selling novel *Der Kampf um die Vorherrschaft in Deutschland* reflected popular opinion by prophesising the unity of the two nations.<sup>571</sup> By 1938, thirty-five percent of Austrian citizens were believers in National Socialism, and this was clearly expressed in the reception they gave Adolf Hitler in Vienna’s *Heldenplatz*, which “represented (at least momentarily) a genuine outpouring of German nationalist feeling that was shared by virtually everyone in the interwar period.”<sup>572</sup>

Unsurprisingly, German defeat and the failure of National Socialism in Europe brought new perspectives and different attitudes to Austria’s immediate history. Austrian researchers and scholars have strongly contested the conception of Austria as a German nation since the formation of the Second Republic. A populist myth portrayed Austrians as “the *better Germans*”, and that in order to achieve distance from the history of German National Socialism “all Austrian roots in German history became taboo, Austria’s *very own and separate historical past* had to be utilized for identity formation.”<sup>573</sup> The ongoing post-war struggle to avoid ‘Germanness’, however, and the belief that Nazism in Austria was a German import, led to these cataclysmic failures to accurately define the Austrian collective self and nation. The varying interpretations of what constitutes Austrian history and identity, all of which are arguably a result of these contradicting founding myths, have complicated any

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<sup>570</sup> FPÖ *Handbuch* 2013, 261 & 264.

<sup>571</sup> Ritter, Harry. "Austria and the Struggle for German Identity." *German Studies Review* 15 (1992): 111 - 29. Print. 112.

<sup>572</sup> Bukey, Evan B. "Nazi Rule in Austria," *Austrian History Yearbook* 23 (1992): 202 – 233. Print. 206.

<sup>573</sup> Bischof, Günter. "Introduction." *Austrian Historical Memory and National Identity*. Eds. Bischof, Günter and Anton Pelinka. London: Transaction, 1997. 1 - 19. Print. 1 – 5.

clear linear and uncontested position on Austrian identity. Despite one thousand years of history, the past has contributed very little to Austrian identity, and in many cases has obstructed an identity from either being established or enduring.<sup>574</sup> The Austrian Second Republic, as a result, is built on a biased and rather politically motivated view of historical reality.<sup>575</sup> The quest to demarcate the borders of a unique Austrian identity was as much about avoiding ‘Germanness’ as about celebrating the beauty of Austrian heritage. The past, as a result, was explored and imagined with equal degrees of bias as was witnessed in the earlier pan-German era. The failure to address Austria’s past has left the question of Austrian cultural identity unresolved, and the image of Austria as *Heimat* incomplete. This allows for a wide spectrum of perspectives to fill the gaps. The door has thus been left open to the increasingly prevalent Right-Wing populist voice, and their definition of Austrian history has begun to dominate the debate once again.

Despite the taint of National Socialism in the German identity, the prevalent narrative in Right-Wing populist discourse stresses the German origin identity. The close relationship between Austrian and German identity is not, in fact, an argument confined to the discourse of populists. Indeed, the FPÖ reaches similar conclusions to many Germanist historians. For example, the German historian Karl Dietrich Erdmann (1910 – 1990) asserts that Austria is a part of the German *Kulturnation*, and that despite the failures of National Socialism, it is nonetheless deeply entrenched in German history and identity:

The traces of Austria in German history all point simultaneously to the degree to which Austrian history in all its shifting political forms has also been part of German history, and to the fact that the Anschluss imposed under Hitler was no accident in the German history of Austria, but can only be understood in the context of a mutually collective history.<sup>576</sup>

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<sup>574</sup> Mathis, Franz. "1000 Years of Austria and Austrian Identity: Founding Myths." *Austrian Historical Memory and National Identity*. Eds. Bischof, Günter and Anton Pelinka. London: Transaction, 1996. 20 - 31. Print. 20.

<sup>575</sup> Pelinka, Anton. "Taboos and Self-Deception: The Second Republic's Reconstruction of History." *Austrian Historical Memory and National Identity*. London: Transaction, 1997. 95 - 102. Print. 95.

<sup>576</sup> Erdmann 86 – 87.

Although not a dominant narrative in academia today, it does indicate that the Germanist view of Austrian history endures. Austrian identity and history, therefore, are by no means fixed. The pervasive speculation over the roots of Austrian identity and the paragon of history leads to the conclusion that a *single* Austrian identity has never truly existed.<sup>577</sup>

Austria's relationship with the broader European continent is also incorporated into the FPÖ's concept of *Heimat* and identity. This is a complex problem, because it is difficult to conceptualize an Austria that is 'European', but not 'German'. According to the FPÖ, the basis for the preservation of Austrian history as *Heimat* is due to the alleged cultural fabric recorded in histories, which also make Europe both diverse and unique – while simultaneously homogeneous and European. According to Right-Wing populist discourse, distinct histories, as well as the cultural features that are preserved within them, define individual European nations such as Austria, and any attempt at assimilating the identity of these separate nations is in fact code for a 'soft' cultural genocide. The FPÖ argues that "Geschichte und die regionalen Unterschiede der verschiedenen Länder" in Europe cannot be denied, and therefore cannot be replaced by an "abstrakte europäische Identität" that, according to the FPÖ, the centralizing forces of the European Union seek to clandestinely implement in Europe.<sup>578</sup> This European diversity is not the same type seen in multicultural or cosmopolitan models (the FPÖ stated in a 2005 billboard that "*Wien darf nicht Istanbul werden*" thereby rejecting a multicultural capital), but rather a rich tapestry of histories and cultures that, while different, remain decidedly 'European'. Individual European homelands, with their own histories, and diverse (as well as autochthonous) identities, are consequently argued to be the "Charakter unseres Kontinents."<sup>579</sup> Austria is therefore one piece in the larger European framework of identity, and must be preserved as such from the perspective of the FPÖ.

'European' identity as a distinct Christian-Occidental model dominates the FPÖ's definition of the continent. Austria and Europe, furthermore, have a symbiotic relationship that has allowed for a *mélange* of cultures and ideas to permeate the

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<sup>577</sup> Ritter 111.

<sup>578</sup> FPÖ *Handbuch* 2013, 280.

<sup>579</sup> FPÖ *Handbuch* 2013, 280.

continent giving it a 'greater' identity model. In their Graz party programme, the FPÖ emphasises the importance of 'Western' and nativist cultural identity:

Sie verbindet die europäischen Kulturnationen. Der Erhalt unserer Kulturdenkmäler hat dabei für uns hohe Bedeutung.<sup>580</sup>

The FPÖ elaborates on their definition of 'Western' cultural history by referring back to thousands of years of distinctly German and European cultural and historical development. For the FPÖ, Austria is a part of the "broader europäischen Kulturraums", and European culture "hat ihre ältesten Wurzeln in der Antike."<sup>581</sup> Here, the FPÖ emphasises the timelessness of the Austrian culture, identity, and *Heimat*, which are all rooted in antiquity and developed from homogeneous and unique origins. Elsewhere, the FPÖ stresses the importance of preserving the "Erbe der Kulturen" in Europe and the "Traditionen der europäischen Zivilisation."<sup>582</sup>

To further establish and refine a collective European identity, the FPÖ refers to Austria's Christian and secular heritage. The FPÖ are forever enthusiastic to display Austria's Christian heritage. According to their political programme, 'our', presumably Austrians, "abendländische Kultur ist reichhaltig und vielfältig."<sup>583</sup> For the FPÖ, European identity was formed through the religious teachings of "Christentum", "Judentum", other unspecified non-Christian "Religionsgemeinschaften", and then gained secular development through the age of humanism and the Enlightenment.<sup>584</sup> As a result, the FPÖ stresses a definition of Austrian history and identity that is largely guided by the "Grundwerten" of both "Kultur-Christentum" and the European "Weltbild."<sup>585</sup> The BZÖ also support this position on Austrian history and identity, and claim that Austrian society and state is based on "christlich-abendländischen Tradition", and new migrants must therefore conform to this identity and associate with Austrian history rather than their own.<sup>586</sup>

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<sup>580</sup> FPÖ Graz Parteiprogramm, 17.

<sup>581</sup> FPÖ Graz Parteiprogramm, 5.

<sup>582</sup> FPÖ Handbuch 2013, 258.

<sup>583</sup> FPÖ Graz Parteiprogramm, 17.

<sup>584</sup> FPÖ Graz Parteiprogramm, 5.

<sup>585</sup> FPÖ Graz Parteiprogramm, 5.

<sup>586</sup> BZÖ Grundsatzpositionen, 15.

It is within the historical background of Christianity and European secularism that an Austrian national myth begins to develop. Much like previous examples of *Heimatgeschichte* and nation building, researching the cultural heritage preserved in history is not a pursuit to discover the truth of past events and peoples. Rather, the Right-Wing populist parties selectively choose history as examples to validate their epistemological stance on how the modern Austrian *Heimat* and population should look, based on a carefully organized historical narrative. Beyond the more conventional realms of history, native Austrian mythologies also play a powerful role in the dissemination of their argument, providing their audience with tales with which they can empathise and, as a result, feel pride in a collectively shared and distinctly Austrian antiquity.

#### **4.6 - Mythology in the FPÖ's concept of *Heimat***

Right-Wing populist *Heimatrhetorik* is greatly enhanced by the use of mythologies in order to demonstrate a collective national self. Their strategy is to engage in 'myth-building' for the purposes of forming a centralised national and cultural identity for the nation. Mythologies, as a result, become valuable anthologies of *Heimat* and a historical medium with which to characterise the homeland. The FPÖ stresses in their political programme that 'our', presumably Austrian, "Märchen, Mythen und Volkslieder" bear witness to the "Wesen unseres Volkes."<sup>587</sup> Myths are, after all, considered to be a specific cognition, a way of life, or a system of thought.<sup>588</sup> In the case of the FPÖ's *Heimatrhetorik*, then, myths provide an example of Austrian cognition, character, and an image of their interpretation of *Heimat* that is informed by a politics of traditionalism.

Conceptualising mythological texts as a compendium of national character and identity, however, is by no means a new ideological development of Right-Wing populism. Mythology has always had an important role in the identity discourse of nationalists and the extreme Right. The combination of the mythological and the national is, from a German-speaking perspective, derived from the antiquarian pursuits of *völkisch* nationalists. Johann Gottfried Herder's (1744 – 1803) concept of

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<sup>587</sup> FPÖ *Handbuch* 2013, 259.

<sup>588</sup> Bajon, Bronislaw. "Sociological-Ideological Expression and Affirmation of Social Reality in Myth." *Michigan Sociological Review* (1982): 25 - 42. Print. 26.



romantic or organic nationalism arguably laid the foundation for this style of political thought. In Herder's thesis, mythologies were instrumental to nations as a portrait of a people that tied individuals together as a *Volk* through shared tradition and culture.<sup>589</sup> Herder, however, was more interested in promoting German as the language of literature over French and Latin, which were the dominant languages of publication at the time, than he was about promoting ethnocultural nationalism or racism. In a time when Germans were not unified, Herder attempted to explain what they had in common. Nevertheless, many nationalists subsequently applied Herder's ideas to their own perceptions of Germanic mythology, which were then heavily infused during the nineteenth century with *völkisch* nationalism, as many *völkisch* writers sought to define German identity through the veneration of Germanic antiquity.<sup>590</sup> By 1881, the Swiss Germanist Andreas Heusler (1865 – 1940) coined the term *Germanentum* to describe the cultural superiority he believed was personified in the heroic mentality of Norse-Germanic legend and Viking militancy.<sup>591</sup> The belief that Germanic myth preserved a superior culture was then carried forward into National Socialism. It is well documented that Nazi philosopher Alfred Rosenberg (1893 – 1946) and *Reichsführer* Heinrich Himmler (1928 – 1945) were avid promoters of Germanic mythology as national identity.<sup>592</sup> The 'political myth' of National Socialism and the state, however, eventually consumed mythology and history - perverting it towards Nazi political objectives.

Despite the Nazi adaptations of Germanic myth leading to the demonization of an otherwise interesting example of early Teutonic culture (or perhaps because of it), mythology remains a popular theme in the literature and worldview of the contemporary extreme Far Right. In the Far Right *Rechtsrock* music scene, for example, there is a vast array of Skinhead, Rap/Hip-Hop, Black Metal and Darkwave music with lyrics dedicated to Germanic mythology, Viking sagas, and the adoration of the militancy of Norse-Germanic gods such as Odin (Wotan) and Thor (Donner).<sup>593</sup>

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<sup>589</sup> Snyder, Louis L. *Roots of German Nationalism*. London: Bloomington, 1978. Print. 37.

<sup>590</sup> Mees 256.

<sup>591</sup> Mees 258.

<sup>592</sup> See Kamenetsky, Christa. "Folklore as a Political Tool in Nazi Germany." *The Journal of American Folklore* 85.337 (1972): 221 - 35. Print. 221. Mees 256.

<sup>593</sup> Dornbusch, Christian, and Jan Raabe. *RechtsRock: Bestandsaufnahme und Gegenstrategien*. Hamburg: Unrast, 2002. Print. 110 & 143.

The Right-Wing populists also look to the martial character of mythological heroes in order to demonstrate their own machismo, as well as the mythic legacy of the European people. During the 2007 *Kongress der Republikaner* in the German town of Mainz, for example, Strache made a speech about European identity and the continent's future that was rich in mythological references and symbolism. His tone was decidedly polemical, and much like past nationalist forays into mythology, Strache evoked the themes of myths for their militancy and machismo. Addressing his Right-Wing populist political colleagues from the German Die Republikaner and Flemish Vlaams Belang, Strache warns that 'we', the European people, and the Right-Wing populist movement more specifically:

...müssen zum Drachentöter werden und uns gegen die Auflösung unserer nationalen Identitäten entschieden demokratisch zur Wehr setzen... (und) ein neues nationales Selbstbewußtsein für freie Völker in Europa zu entwickeln...<sup>594</sup>

In this speech, Strache evokes the myth of Sigurd the Volsung (German Siegfried)<sup>595</sup>, and compares the European Right-Wing populist movement with the machismo and power of this legendary Germanic dragon slayer. Sigurd appears in the Norse *Völsunga Saga*<sup>596</sup> and the German *Nibelungenlied*.<sup>597</sup> In all the legends, Sigurd is a famous Nordic-Germanic warrior-hero, who defeats and kills a dragon but in both accounts meets a tragic demise. Later, the composer Richard Wagner also used the Siegfried legend in both the *Siegfried* and *Götterdämmerung* operas. Strache's direct reference to the tale of Sigurd the Volsung and Europe's national identity and *Selbstbewußtsein* clearly demonstrates the important role mythology remains to play in constructing European identities in Right-Wing populist discourse. The celebration of past heroes and monumentous sagas in the construction of new national identities indicates that the legacy left by antiquity is crucial in the contemporary Right-Wing

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<sup>594</sup> Die Republikaner. "Pressemitteilung Nr. 39/07 Vom 06.10.2007." *Die Republikaner. Die Republikaner*, 2007. Web. 07 Aug. 2010.

<sup>595</sup> See Morris, William. *The Story of Sigurd the Volsung and the Fall of the Niblungs*. Hamburg: Tredition, 2012. Print.

<sup>596</sup> Originally written in Icelandic (Old Norse) in the thirteenth century A.D., by an unknown hand. See "The Story of the Volsungs, (Volsunga Saga)." *Project Gutenberg*. Project Gutenberg, 7 Aug. 2008. Web. 14 Jan. 2017.

<sup>597</sup> Anonymous. *Nibelungenlied*. Translated by A.T. Hatto. London: Penguin Classics, 1962.

populist imaginary of ‘regenerated’, powerful, and culturally pure European homelands.

The congress location at Rheingoldhalle on the bank of the Rhine River similarly refers both intuitively and symbolically to the legendary myths of Germanic antiquity. Such a location lures one back to the assembly to the Old Norse *Eddas*, retold in Richard Wagner’s *Das Rheingold*. In this tale the Germanic gods Wotan, Donner and Loge are entangled in a mythic struggle against an external enemy, while hastening to make ready the defences of *Valhalla* - the great hall of the Aesir gods.<sup>598</sup> The Rhine River itself also conjures histories of an ancient alliance of Germanic tribes that used the river land topography as a fortification with which to defend themselves from Roman incursions from the south. For example, the Roman historian Tacitus noted the Germanic tribes north of the Rhine were “indigenous”, “of pure blood”, and were a martial people that had no taste for peace.<sup>599</sup>

Not surprisingly, then, Strache also uses the mythology associated with the Rhine to stir his audience into feelings of audacity that resultantly facilitate a commitment to the cause of defending Europe’s identity and borders. The populations of the present day German-speaking lands must rise against the “unverantwortliche Zuwanderungspolitik der letzten Jahrzehnte“ and the “Islamisierung Europas“, which Strache describes as a “gefährliche Bedrohung.“<sup>600</sup> The message of the speech is polemic and uses history to draw attention to a past Islamic enemy that is still perceived as a great threat today. For Strache, it is once again the time “Europa zu retten, so wie 1683 als Wien von osmanischen Armeen belagert wurde.“<sup>601</sup> This time, however, the use of myth to indicate the machismo of Europeans as soldiers and warriors is used as a symbolic weapon with which to smite the modern day Islamic social group that resides within the borders of Europe. Myth, then, as we shall now see, is not only valuable for collective identity management, but also as a ‘quasi-historical’ narrative that demonstrates the root causes of those that are perceived as, or even desired to be, enemies of both the native people and their homeland.

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<sup>598</sup> Guhl-miller, Solomon. "Literary Influences in the Sketches of *Das Rheingold* and *Die Walküre*." *Forum of Modern Languages Studies* 50.4 (2014): 482 - 500. Print. 492.

<sup>599</sup> Tacitus 101 and 113.

<sup>600</sup> Die Republikaner.

<sup>601</sup> Die Republikaner.

#### **4. 7 - The FPÖ's *Sagenbücher***

New Right-Wing political groups all demonstrate a special form of 'ethno-nationalism' that is rooted in myths from the distant past.<sup>602</sup> The important role that mythology plays in the Austrian Right-Wing populists' use of *Heimat* and definition of identity is seen most noticeably in the FPÖ's *Sagenbücher*, which provides legends as Austrian ethnogeny together with a political narrative that compares antiquity and history to contemporary issues such as immigration and the preservation of national identity. The FPÖ released *Sagen aus Wien* during the 2010 Viennese elections, and *Sagen aus Österreich* during the 2013 federal elections. The FPÖ's *Sagenbücher* are compendiums of historiographical discourse and mythical tales, which, according to nativist principles, describe the landscapes, heroes, protagonists, and antagonists of Viennese and greater Austria's past. The FPÖ included their own written and pictorial narrative in the form of a prologue and epilogue, which were presented in conjunction with comic styled images with speech bubbles. The cartoons also introduce "HC-Man", a heroically depicted Strache who is illustrated as a character in comics.

The legends in the FPÖ's *Sagenbücher* are not written by the party, but are sourced from pre-existing publications that record the myths and histories from various regions of Austria. In its original form *Sagen aus Wien* is a valuable source of Viennese ethnography and *Volkskunde*, available in book format<sup>603</sup> and online.<sup>604</sup> *Sagen aus Österreich* has also been previously released as a book by Käthe Recheis.<sup>605</sup> As the name suggests, the folklore is more inclusive of Austria in its entirety, bringing for example other districts such as *Kärnten* and *die Steiermark* into the text. As a source of ethnographic data, the legends in *Sagen aus Wien* and *Sagen aus Österreich* provide in their original forms a useful source of Viennese and Austrian heritage, compiled through a collection of folk tales and history relevant to the forests, rivers, castles and various cities of the Austrian landscape. The FPÖ's version of *Sagen aus Wien* is 56 pages in total. The titles of the *Sagen* are "Die zweite Türkenbelagerung Wiens 1683", "Das Basiliskenhaus", "Der liebe Augustin", "Das Donauweibchen", "Das Wunderkreuz", "Meister Hans Puchbaum", "Die

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<sup>602</sup> Rydgren 242.

<sup>603</sup> See Hofbauer, Friedl. *Sagen Aus Wien*. Berlin: G & G Kinder, 2000. Print.

<sup>604</sup> Morscher, Wolfgang. "Sagen aus Österreich." *Datenbanken Zur Europäischen Ethnologie / Volkskunde*. n.p., 2000. Web. 21 Oct. 2012.

<sup>605</sup> See Recheis, Käthe. *Sagen Aus Österreich*. Vienna: Ueberreuter, 2001. Print.

Gefangennahme von Richard Löwenherz”, “Der Heidenschuss”, and “Der Stock im Eisen”. Eight of the nine stories are versions derived from these traditional myths, however the ninth story “Die zweite Türkenbelagerung Wiens 1683”, (which is produced as the first legend in the book) deals with the actual history of the Ottoman siege and is also the most important legend in this thesis. Both original publications are paperbacks and include a significantly larger number of legends, with the FPÖ presumably only using those legends that would suit their specific political commentary. The slightly curtailed FPÖ version of *Sagen aus Österreich* is only 24 pages. The title of the legends are “Der Heidenschuss”, “Der Purbacher Türke”, “Der Schatz von Landskron”, “Die übergossene Alm am Hochkönig”, “Das Pferd des Teufels”, “Die Sage von der ‘Frau Hitt’”, “Die Drei Schwestern”, “Richard Löwenherz”, and “Die Entstehung des Grazer Schlossberges”. Two of the nine legends, “Der Heidenschuss” and “Richard Löwenherz”, are repeats from *Sagen aus Wien*, albeit with new cartoon narratives.

The mythic context of many of the legends in the FPÖ’s *Sagenbücher* provides the reader with examples of Austrian cultural heritage that dates back to antiquity. The first objective of the FPÖ is thus to implement a strategy that connects the party with the beauty, heroism, and legacy of Austria’s unique past. In achieving this aim, the FPÖ further demonstrate that they are the sole party that cares only for Austria, with no other clandestine interest or agendas. Other publications of Austria’s *Sagen* fittingly demonstrate the world that the FPÖ lures the readers into. For example, in the *Produktbeschreibung* for Wolfgang Morscher and Berit Mrugalska’s version of the *Sagen aus Wien*, called *Die schönsten Sagen aus Wien*, the reader is invited into the fantastic world of Austrian legend and tradition:

So eröffnen sie uns den Zugang zu einer Welt der Legenden und Traditionen, die im Laufe der Jahrhunderte gewachsen ist und deren geheimnisvolle Ausstrahlung uns nach wie vor umgibt.<sup>606</sup>

*Sagen aus Österreich* is similarly described in Recheis version as a *Sagenschatz*, a collection of folklore that in its entirety speaks of the ancestry and identity of Austria:

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<sup>606</sup> Morscher, Wolfgang, and Berit Mrugalska-Morscher. *Die schönsten Sagen aus Wien*. Vienna: Haymon, 2010. Print.

“Jede Region, jeder Landstrich hat seine Sagen, die von Generation zu Generation weitergegeben wurden und so bis heute lebendig geblieben sind.”<sup>607</sup> The primary purpose of these releases, then, was to introduce the reader to the archaism and beauty of Austrian history and tradition, a position which, incidentally, does not stray far from the Right-Wing populist political and emotional dominion over perceptions of mythology and *Heimat*.

The ‘official’ objective of the FPÖ’s *Sagenbücher* is also to make Austrians aware of, and be empathetic towards, their history. To achieve the bond between group identity and history the FPÖ uses the popular myths of the Austrian nation to reconnect the desired audience with an alleged collective past. This is seen, for example, in an interview with *The Guardian*, where Strache stresses that the party’s motivation behind releasing *Sagen aus Wien* was a desire to encourage Austrian youth to reconnect with their past:

Wir haben das Historisch-real-stattgefunden: die Geschichte, die Sagen, die Geschichte real auch wieder wiedergegeben unserer Jugend, damit man auch Geschichte und Geschichtsbewusstsein hat, und haben daneben in Comics die damalige Zeit illustriert - also nicht die heutige, die damalige Zeit...<sup>608</sup>

Strache further stresses that the cartoons should be seen in an innocent and fun way: “Das Comic ‘Sagen aus Wien’ ist ein sehr gelungenes Comedy, mit lustigen Karikaturen und Geschichten aus der Wiener Vergangenheit.”<sup>609</sup> FPÖ *Generalsekretär* Herbert Kickl also states the booklet is simply “alte Sagentexte” with no contemporary meaning or assertions.<sup>610</sup> Kickl goes on to say: “Vielmehr habe die FPÖ-Broschüre ‘das Wissen der Wiener über ihre Geschichte und ihre Sagen vertiefen wollen.’”<sup>611</sup> *Sagen as Österreich* is similarly viewed by the FPÖ as exposé of

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<sup>607</sup> Recheis.

<sup>608</sup> The Guardian. “The Rise of Vienna’s Far Right.” Online video clip. *Youtube*. YouTube, 23 Feb. 2011. Web. 14 July 2012.

<sup>609</sup> Der Standard. “Ich würde den Kindern in den Schulen Wiener Liedgut näher bringen.” *Der Standard*. 29 Sep. 2010. Web. 14 June 2011.

<sup>610</sup> “FPÖ-Comic sorgt vor Wien-Wahl für Aufregung.” *oe24*. oe24, 25 Sep. 2010. Web. 16 Feb. 2012.

<sup>611</sup> Kopf, Bernhard. *Vergleich der Politikcomics der FPÖ und SPÖ im Wiener Wahlkampf 2010*. Vienna: University of Vienna, 2010. Print. 5.

Austrian history and tradition. On his website Strache describes *Sagen aus Österreich* as a *Sagenheft* that references the legends from many regions of Austria: “Aus jedem Bundesland ist was dabei.”<sup>612</sup> The FPÖ, however, changed its official description of the *Sagenbücher* with the release of *Sagen aus Österreich*. By 2013 Strache was frank in relation to the use of political comics in the *Sagenbücher*, where he stated “*Sagen aus Österreich* it da”, and naturally it comes “mit den Bewährten Comic-Zeichnungen, die den Bezug zu aktuellen politischen Themen herstellen.”<sup>613</sup> It is also noted on their website that the FPÖ have once more introduced comics alongside the text in *Sagen aus Österreich* as a means of highlighting current political and social issues in Austria, such as immigration, integration, multiculturalism, and the alleged corruption of the European Union.<sup>614</sup>

The *Sagenbücher* were designed by the FPÖ to target Austria’s youthful demographic. Although Right-Wing political perspectives were, in the past, perceived to be the domain of the over fifties voters, this is no longer exactly the case. It has been noted in many media circles that eighteen to thirty years olds are now, in many cases, far more Right-Wing than their parents, leading to the question on whether generation Y is, in fact, the new Right-Wing voting age group.<sup>615</sup> The FPÖ strategy to appeal to the younger generation appears to confirm this thesis. For example, Strache clearly describes *Sagen aus Österreich* as *Comic-Zeichnungen* reproduced for young readers.<sup>616</sup> The FPÖ also distributed 550,000 copies of *Sagen aus Wien* to households with young voters.<sup>617</sup> Thus in a political sense the purpose of the comics was to illustrate the FPÖ’s perspective to young voters in the Viennese *Gemeinderatswahl* of 2010.<sup>618</sup> With the introduction of stylised action comics alongside traditional folklore, the FPÖ’s *Sagenbücher* have been described by many as a characteristic Right-Wing populist strategy to gain more popularity and influence among young Austrians, and have therefore attracted accusations that the books are solely politically motivated.<sup>619</sup>

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<sup>612</sup> Strache, Heinz-Christian. “„Sagen Aus Österreich“ über Integration und Euro.” *FPÖ*. 22 Sep. 2013. Web. 19 Oct. 2013.

<sup>613</sup> Strache „*Sagen Aus Österreich*“

<sup>614</sup> Strache „*Sagen Aus Österreich*“

<sup>615</sup> “Is this Generation Right?” *BBC*. BBC, 17 June 2014. Web. 31 May 2016.

<sup>616</sup> Strache „*Sagen Aus Österreich*“

<sup>617</sup> Kopf 5.

<sup>618</sup> Kopf 10.

<sup>619</sup> Brantner 251.

Kickl conceded after the release of *Sagen aus Wien* that use of cartoons in the *Sagenbücher* was a new form of “verkürzten politischen Kommunikation” directed at “Menschen, die keine Lust auf trockene Inhalte haben.”<sup>620</sup> However FPÖ politicians have stayed true to their *Sagenbücher*, and persistently claim that the purpose of these myths, despite the contemporary resemblances, is first and foremost to illuminate the beauty of Austria’s history and mythology.

The FPÖ’s public admission that the repackaged myths were infused with illustrated political messages demonstrates the high amount of media publicity and political attacks the *Sagenbücher* attracted. The use of Austrian myths, and the focus on Austria’s belligerent and perilous history with the Ottomans in particular, was received in many circles as either racially and culturally provocative, or directly xenophobic. Rather than receiving the FPÖ’s books as *Sagenbücher*, the Austrian media and political reaction to the releases was unfavourable. Much of the media and political establishment mutually concurred that the shared sense of belonging advocated in the FPÖ *Sagenbücher* glorifies a certain ‘Germanic’ image of Austrians while excluding or even demonising ethnic minorities.<sup>621</sup> The release of *Sagen aus Wien* in 2010 coincided with contentious FPÖ slogans, advertised in Vienna and federally, such as *Daham Statt Islam*, *Deutsch statt nix versteh’n* and *Wien darf nicht Istanbul werden*, seen as direct political attacks against alleged unassimilated Turkish minorities in Vienna and Austria more generally.<sup>622</sup> Online newspaper oe24 defines the texts as Far Right political propaganda aimed at a specific xenophobic voter base, naming *Sagen aus Österreich* “das provokante blaue Comicheft” with anti-Islamic messages: “Sie (the FPÖ) strotzen nur so von Anti-Islam-Ressentiments.”<sup>623</sup> Similarly, the *Österreich* newspaper accused the Freedom Party of taking advantage of an electoral campaign to disseminate messages of resentment against foreigners, particularly Turks, but also Islam and the European Union, all in the guise of *Sagen*.<sup>624</sup> *Der Standard* describes *Sagen aus Österreich* as an anti-Turkish *Sagenbuch*, an effective means with which to reach young voters with the party’s

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<sup>620</sup> Kopf 5.

<sup>621</sup> Daniel, Isabelle. “FP provoziert jetzt mit Anti-Islam-Comic.” *Österreich.at*. *Österreich.at*, 21 Sep. 2013. Web. 1 Dec. 2013.

<sup>622</sup> Turner *Austria First*, 188.

<sup>623</sup> Daniel *FP provoziert*.

<sup>624</sup> Daniel *FP provoziert*.



anti-Brussels, anti-European Union and anti-foreign message.<sup>625</sup> The image of the FPÖ's *Sagenbücher* in the media, then, overwhelmingly depicts the books as xenophobic, populist and anti-Islamic.

The negative reaction to the *Sagenbücher* is not only resigned to circles of the media, but is also voiced by the Austrian political Left. The Greens party confronted the FPÖ for using the 1683 Turkish siege of Vienna in *Sagen aus Wien* to encourage racial and religious agitation against Muslims in Austria.<sup>626</sup> SPÖ *Landesparteisekretär* Christian Deutsch told *Die Presse* in 2010 that "Dieses Hassblatt, das von der FPÖ an junge Menschen versandt wurde, ist reine Menschenhetze und der bewusste Versuch, das Klima in Wien zu vergiften. Es ist eine klare Anstiftung zu Gewalttaten hier und jetzt, ein bewusstes Spiel mit dem Feuer."<sup>627</sup> Indeed a negative reaction to the FPÖ's *Sagenbücher* is seen across the entire Austrian political spectrum. SPÖ *Bundesgeschäftsführer* Norbert Darabos complained "Strache betreibt Hetze der übelsten Sorte gegen Ausländer", Alev Korun from the Green Party claimed that the FPÖ is remaining intellectually "im 16. Jahrhundert bei der Türkenbelagerung", while fellow moderate Right ÖVP *Generalsekretär* Hannes Rauch lamented a "seriösen und sachlichen Umgang mit dem Thema Integration."<sup>628</sup> With accusations of FPÖ hate speech thinly veiled in the guise of *Sagen* filing the media and political spectrum in Austria, alleged links between the FPÖ's *Sagenbücher* and National Socialist undertones was an inevitable result.

The controversial nature of the FPÖ cartoons has brought accusations of similarities to the racially derived notions of homeland and folk typical of National Socialism, as well as an alleged attempt to incite Austrian youth to racial violence through a subversive text that amounts to hate speech.<sup>629</sup> The Green Party went so far as to accuse the FPÖ of breaking the law, specifically a clause that forbids "feindseligen Haltung gegen eine Kirche, Religionsgemeinschaft, Angehörige einer

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<sup>625</sup> "FPÖ: Zwangstaufe als 'gelungene Integration'." *Der Standard*. *Der Standard*, 22 Sep. 2013. Web. 10 Jan. 2014.

<sup>626</sup> oe24 2010.

<sup>627</sup> "FPÖ-Comic: Grüne erstatten Anzeige." *Die Presse*. *Die Presse*, 27 Sep. 2010. Web. 4 Feb. 2012.

<sup>628</sup> "Islam-Comic: 'H.C. Man' sorgt für Aufregung." *Kurier*. *Kurier*, 21 Sep. 2013. Web. 1 Dec. 2013.

<sup>629</sup> *Die Presse* 2010.

Rasse, eines Volkes oder eines Volksstamms.”<sup>630</sup> This refers specifically to alleged hate-speech against Muslims. FPÖ-Generalsekretär Herbert Kickl rejects such accusations, referring to the Left as a "humorlose Chaotentruppe", reiterating that, whether the Greens accept it or not, the two Turkish sieges of Vienna are simply a fact of history.<sup>631</sup> The negative reception to the texts in some corners of the media and politics were undoubtedly expected, as the Freedom Party has kept the illustrator of the comics anonymous, so as to hide his or her identity.<sup>632</sup> However Strache laughs off such accusations of racism or ‘tastelessness’ on his website, stressing that rather than inciting racism or religious intolerance, the text is simply a loving account of Austrian history dedicated to the nation’s youth.<sup>633</sup> Strache’s testimony coincides with the statements of many other FPÖ politicians, such as Gernot Darmann from Kärnten, who proclaims: “Wir wollen unsere eigene Identität erhalten. Für uns sind unsere Traditionen, Bräuche und die Kultur einzigartig und schützenswert.”<sup>634</sup> It is this argument, therefore, that the Right-Wing populists use to counteract any accusations of religious, cultural or racial intolerance. The use of fictionalised comics allows the FPÖ to engage in a ‘strategy of calculated ambivalence’, through which the party obscure the differences between fiction and reality, thus permitting the FPÖ to deny any accusations of xenophobia or discrimination.<sup>635</sup>

#### **4. 8 – Historical continuity, uniqueness, and exclusion in the FPÖ’s *Sagenbücher***

Underpinning the FPÖ’s *Sagenbücher* is the key questions of which group these legends allegedly belong to, how this Austrian national group is defined, and in what terms is the history selectively repackaged and illustrated by the party to justify their argument for an end to immigration. In the context of the party’s *Heimatrhetorik*, this helps to determine which collective myths the party believe are valuable to true Austrians, their homeland, and why. The themes identified within the *Sagenbücher* are the longevity of *Heimat* through a deeply rooted history that remains

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<sup>630</sup> Brickner, Irene. "'Mustafa'-Comic: Verfahren gegen Strache eingestellt." *Der Standard*. *Der Standard*, 19. Jan 2011. Web. 21 Dec. 2012.

<sup>631</sup> Die Presse 2010.

<sup>632</sup> Kopf 12.

<sup>633</sup> Strache „*Sagen Aus Österreich*“.

<sup>634</sup> Damann, Gernot. “Politik der ‘Nächstenliebe’ heißt: Bewahrung der Identität, Kultur und Eigenständigkeit.” *FPÖ. FPÖ*, n.d. Web. 20 Aug. 2015.

<sup>635</sup> Wodak *Embattled Vienna*, 232.

contemporarily relevant (therefore historical continuity), the purity of ‘the people’ and the national community, and the foreignness (or undesirability) of outsiders. In unison these themes direct the reader to the foundation of the populist definition of *Heimat*: a homeland that signifies a pure community informed by an inward-looking national history and mythology. This introspective view of community and *Heimat* excludes outsiders by its very design. The FPÖ’s compendium of myths is intended to create a distancing of contiguity between the ‘native’ Austrian people and the demonized, foreign ‘Others’, who are antagonised as either threatening or inferior.<sup>636</sup>

In order to demonstrate the purity of ‘the people’ to whom the legends belong, the FPÖ carefully applies colour schemes and images to produce a highly symbolic front cover for *Sagen aus Wien*:



**Figure 52.**

Image taken from *Sagen aus Wien*.<sup>637</sup>

The background in blue, the title *Sagen aus Wien* in white, and the Viennese flag in red and white symbolically combine in order to demonstrate a distinct social unit. Red and white represents the coat of arms of Vienna. Blue and white are colours associated with the FPÖ, and red and white represent the nation of Austria. Thus by

<sup>636</sup> Wodak *The Politics of Fear* 26.

<sup>637</sup> FPÖ *Wien*

its very design the cover of *Sagen aus Wien* figuratively assembles the ‘Us’ group: the Austrians, the Viennese, and the FPÖ who represent them.<sup>638</sup>

The second way that the FPÖ discursively demonstrates a distinctly Viennese, and therefore Austrian, social group is through the evocation of a collective name that enhances historical consciousness. When a group decide that they are a community, usually because of shared myths and collective memories that are associated with a specific territory, they will almost always decide upon a collective title in order to strengthen their solidarity and establish their culture.<sup>639</sup> The prologue in *Sagen aus Wien* is dedicated specifically to the “Liebe Wienerinnen, liebe Wiener”,<sup>640</sup> thereby suggesting there is a distinct Viennese ‘group’ to whom these legends speak. The mythology associated with specific states is a powerful way to encourage group solidarity and patriotism. City based mythologies, such as those in Florence or Venice, encourage a local form of patriotism alongside feelings of separateness, uniqueness, and historical difference.<sup>641</sup>

The use of the personal pronoun ‘we’, including dialect forms and possessive pronouns, is also a powerful linguistic strategy to assist in the cultural demarcation of a national group. In their research into the discursive construction of national identity in Austria, De Cilla, Reisigl and Wodak note the use of the personal pronoun *wir*, as well as all other possessive pronouns, as a linguistic strategy employed by Right-Wing populists to establish and strengthen a national ‘in’ group.<sup>642</sup> In the FPÖ’s *Sagen aus Wien* prologue the party adopt this linguistic approach, taking every opportunity to emphasise pronoun use, such as the second person plural familiar form “*Ihr* wisst es sicher schon” (generating a camaraderie between the FPÖ and their audience), “*worüber* heut’ oft *wir* reden”, the group identification of ‘we’ “*Wir* wünschen Euch mit dem Gedichte viel Freud und Spass mit Wiens Geschichte”, as well as Strache also signing off with a possessive pronoun “*Euer* HC Strache” (Italics are my own).<sup>643</sup> The use of personal pronouns to reinforce a definitive Viennese identity (and populace) that belongs within the city is seen elsewhere in the *Sagen aus*

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<sup>638</sup> Wodak *Embattled Vienna*, 242.

<sup>639</sup> Smith, Anthony David. *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*. Wiley-Blackwell, 1987. Print. 31.

<sup>640</sup> FPÖ *Wien* 5

<sup>641</sup> Smith *Ethnic Origins*, 61.

<sup>642</sup> Cilla *Discursive*, 163 – 165.

<sup>643</sup> FPÖ *Wien*, 5

*Wien* with the phrase “*Unser Wien für unsere Leut!*”(Italics are my own)<sup>644</sup> The use of the personal pronouns *ihr* and *wir* immediately implies there is a communal and familiar advocacy at work here, a means of drawing “we Austrians” together, in order to reflect upon “our” shared tradition and history. Strache, furthermore, is described in the extract above from *Sagen aus Wien* as ‘your’ representative; thereby inferring his party represents true Austrians (as well as their myths and history). This is also seen in *Sagen aus Österreich*, where Strache states: “Hallo Leute! Ihr wisst ja, wir Freiheitliche sind stolz auf Österreichs Geschichte und Tradition.”<sup>645</sup> Utilising the pronoun ‘we’ invites individuals to position themselves within that group, in this case the true Viennese, at the expense of those ‘Others’ that do not necessarily fit the national identity mandate. The use of pronouns is thus a linguistic procedure to organise a national ‘we group’ through particular modes of reference<sup>646</sup>, such as ‘we-Viennese’, or ‘we-Austrians’.

The use of a collective name also has a powerful role in the promotion of communities that are seen to be either ethnically or culturally homogeneous. When the title of a people is spoken it evokes in the imagination the grand history, drama, and character of the social group it describes. Smith, for example, argues that a collective name is an emblem of an ethnic community, and it conjures “an atmosphere and drama that has power and meaning for those whom it includes, and none at all (or quite a different resonance) for outsiders.”<sup>647</sup> Although it has already been established that the Austrian Right-Wing populist parties are decidedly pan-German, at least in their views on Austrian identity, their corpus of *Sagen* does cater to a form of distinctly ‘Austrian’ patriotism that has been particularly evident since the beginning of the Second Republic. In order to disassociate with German history, the Second Republic turned to the so-called artificial *Ostarrîchi* myth which allowed Austrians to enjoy the benefits of an ancient past by connecting the roots of the nation to the Middle Ages.<sup>648</sup>

The FPÖ’s *Sagen aus Österreich* also uses the potency of its title to appeal to the desired audience. Austria’s own unique historical past is being utilized in the

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<sup>644</sup> FPÖ *Wien*, 15.

<sup>645</sup> FPÖ *Österreich*, 24.

<sup>646</sup> Cilla *Discursive*, 169.

<sup>647</sup> Smith *Ethnic Origins*, 23

<sup>648</sup> Lamb-Faffelberger 290.

*Sagenbuch*. The compendium of legends is designed to charm the Austrian reader by drawing him or her into this fantastic and ancient portrayal of their own homeland and heroic forefathers. Thus the FPÖ utilises the *Ostarrîchi* myth to great effect, by emphasising the more ancient roots of Austria's history while ignoring more recent (and more difficult) developments alongside Germany. For example in *Sagen aus Wien* the audience is reminded that Austria has a long history and tradition that is "nicht wenige", and the recording of these momentous events for the sake of longevity and preservation was recognised by the party as a worthy endeavour.<sup>649</sup> The FPÖ's compendium of myths provides an anthology of tales that Austrians can, and should, be proud of – as it is the legacy left by their forebears. The historian David Lowenthal remarks that historical memory is instrumental to identity conceptions, in which "nations and individuals habitually trace back their ancestry, institutions, culture, ideals to validate claims to power, prestige, and property,"<sup>650</sup> as well as, one may add, definitions of *Heimat*, culture, and national identity. A focus on tradition and myth allows Right-Wing populist parties to concentrate on underscoring Austrians as a homogeneous ethnic group who are strengthened by returning to traditional values.<sup>651</sup> The vibrancy of their conception of *Heimat* is thus reinforced by the atmosphere and drama of that which came before. The FPÖ's prologue for *Sagen aus Wien* introduces the Viennese to their heritage, and explains that the name Wien summons a "lange Tradition", which has been preserved in the panoply of myths as a "Zeugnis dieser früheren Welt."<sup>652</sup> The *Zeugnis* of the legends, therefore, is the living testimony of which true Austrians should be aware and be guided by.

The symbiosis between ancestors and descendants (and the link between former glory and contemporary power) is established in the *Sagenbücher* through the Austrian Right-Wing populist *topos* of historical continuity. The modern concept of historical continuity is derived from Arthur Schopenhauer's argument in which nothing in history that is essential ever changes, except names and dates.<sup>653</sup> Historical

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<sup>649</sup> FPÖ *Wien*, 5

<sup>650</sup> Lowenthal, David. *The Past Is a Foreign Country*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988. Print. 52.

<sup>651</sup> Wodak *The Politics of Fear*, 27.

<sup>652</sup> FPÖ *Wien*, 5

<sup>653</sup> Schopenhauer, Arthur, and Arthur Hübscher. *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*. Stuttgart: P. Reclam, 1987. Print. 1216 – 1219.

continuity therefore refers to the idea that while many things may change through the course of time; there are some invariable elements of history that eternally endure.<sup>654</sup> The ever-lasting themes in history guide human development and endeavour like a divine providence throughout the ages. Through the continuity of history elements such as culture, belief systems, values or characteristics can be argued to be persistent and unchanging throughout the course of history. Understanding history in continuous terms requires emphasizing the recurrent nature of history, its capacity to instruct modern behavior and identity, as well as repeat similar outcomes.

When history endures largely unchanged it becomes a *living* past. This allows the lessons of antiquity to be reanalysed, and forefathers to symbolically rise up and once more walk among their descendants. Thus new life is given to the past, and its world can be said to be alive once more. It is not simply antiquarianism that inspires the rediscovery of the past, nor is it the disciplined pursuit to uncover history as it really was, but rather a desire to remigrate to a *living* past that acts in response to our contemporary needs.<sup>655</sup> A living past teaches us our own identity as a link in a chain between ancestors and descendants, as well as often teaching us ‘where we are’ and ‘who we should become’ as ordained by our ‘community of fate’.<sup>656</sup> Myths, for example, contribute to the continuity and identity of society by providing a framework of memories that influence existent societies.<sup>657</sup> The mythical world, as a result, is often illustrated with stark similarities (or lessons) for the contemporary world that imagines it. The most important aspect of myth, therefore, is “its character of a retrospective, ever present actuality.”<sup>658</sup> In FPÖ discourse, myths are not simply tales that relate to an unfathomable antiquity, but are discursive examples of genuine identity, carefully illustrated as a valuable specimen of cultural inheritance.

Mythology’s efficacy, then, rests in its ability to inform national identity conceptions through its application as a *living* narrative. The myths, in other words, are still relevant to contemporary Austria. In the FPÖ’s prologue in *Sagen aus Wien*,

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<sup>654</sup> Gerschenkron, Alexander. "On the Concept of Continuity in History." *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society* 106.3 (1962): 195-209. Print. 195.

<sup>655</sup> Smith *Ethnic Origins*, 180.

<sup>656</sup> Smith *Ethnic Origins*, 180.

<sup>657</sup> Bajon 29.

<sup>658</sup> Malinowski, Bronislaw. *Magic, Science and Religion and Other Essays*. Boston: Beacon, 1948. Print. 102.

for example, the reader is encouraged to have a good, fun time while reading the *Sagen*, but is also warned “dass vieles heut’ noch wahr sein kann.”<sup>659</sup> The temporal divide between the historical and mythic discourse in the *Sagenbücher* and present day Austria is thus diminished by the FPÖ, allowing the audience to further comprehend and appreciate the interrelation between past and present. By suggesting that ‘much might be still true today’ the FPÖ stresses that the sagas are still relevant to the present. The party, therefore, utilises the *topos* of history as an instructive narrative.<sup>660</sup> This argument is related to a typical Right-Wing populist assertion that the past should be preserved so that those in the present may learn from it.<sup>661</sup> This is seen in the prologue where the FPÖ claims that although times change quite rapidly, “bleibt doch gar vieles aktuell.”<sup>662</sup> Historical continuity is the central theme of this statement. The FPÖ are reminding their audience that the essential features of the historical narrative never change and endure throughout the course of time. The FPÖ’s argument for historical continuity continues in *Sagen aus Österreich*, when Strache as the cartoon hero ‘HC’ stresses that ancient history has “auch heute noch seine Gültigkeit!”<sup>663</sup>

The FPÖ strengthens its argument of an interconnected past and present In *Sagen aus Wien* by honouring the visual clues to city of Vienna’s grand, imperial, and *living* history:

IN WIEN LEBT DIE TRADITION. Wer mit offenen Augen durch die Stadt geht, findet noch heute allerorts Zeugnisse, die uns an vergangene Ereignisse erinnern sollen!<sup>664</sup>

The FPÖ demonstrates here that although time may have passed, if one opens their eyes and looks closely at their surrounds, they will see a city that is still very much alive with myth and history. The physical presence of historical monuments is a gateway by which Austrians may re-enter into a living past. The FPÖ are using the

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<sup>659</sup> FPÖ *Wien*, 5

<sup>660</sup> Wodak *Embattled Vienna*, 243.

<sup>661</sup> Wodak *The Politics of Fear*, 39.

<sup>662</sup> FPÖ *Wien*, 5

<sup>663</sup> FPÖ *Österreich*, 24.

<sup>664</sup> FPÖ *Wien*, 54.



traditions associated with these visual prompts in order to take advantage of a human need for identification within a historic culture-community. These modes of identification are thus discursively arranged by the FPÖ as a coalescence of collective memory that forms the basis of national ‘traditions’. In this imaginary, the FPÖ have exploited the powerful legacy their nation’s capital, which is indeed rich in visual clues to the momentous historical events from its imperial past. The city of Vienna is known for the national and local histories that are recorded in both place and street names.<sup>665</sup> The FPÖ employs the more typical ‘tourist’ attractions of the Vienna to demonstrate the living history of the city such as *Schloss Belvedere* and *Der Liebe Augustin* restaurant, but also, more importantly, include the *Prinz Eugen-Reiterstandbild*, a memorial to the Capuchin monk Marco d'Aviano (1631 – 1699), and the Polish/Ukrainian nobleman and soldier Jerzy Franciszek Kulczycki (1640 – 1694)<sup>666</sup>, all of whom were instrumental to the defence of both Christendom and the city in the 1683 liberation of Vienna from the Ottomans.<sup>667</sup>

Vienna’s legacy as a frontier city that lay between the Occidental Christian lands to the West and North, and the Muslim land to the East, is again emphasised by including the *Heidenschuss* statue, which, the FPÖ explains, was constructed to “remind” the Viennese of the first Ottoman siege of 1529.<sup>668</sup> The statue is erected in a place where, according to myth, the legendary baker Josef Schultz heard the Turkish army excavating tunnels underground to gain entrance to the city, thereby preventing the Turkish victory.<sup>669</sup> In the accompanying legend of *der Heidenschuss* in the *Sagenbuch* the reader is told the “furchtbare Ansturm” of the Islamic horde that wishes to plant „den Halbmond auf der Spitze des Stephansturms”.<sup>670</sup> The legend the statue symbolises, therefore, forever places the city (and its population) in a struggle with the forces of Islam. According to the FPÖ Vienna and the Viennese are in peril,

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<sup>665</sup> Schwertberger, Gerald. “ALLA TURCA und Türkenkugeln. Türken-Bezüge im Stadtbild Wiens.” *Gerald Schwertberger. Gerald Schwertberger*, 2007. Web. 10. May 2016. 2.

<sup>666</sup> FPÖ *Wien*, 54.

<sup>667</sup> For Marco d'Aviano see “Mark of Aviano.” *The Holy See*. The Holy See, n.d. Web. 10 Sep. 2015. For Jerzy Franciszek Kulczycki see Morscher, Wolfgang. “Von der Zweiten Türkenbelagerung Wiens 1683” *Datenbanken Zur Europäischen Ethnologie / Volkskunde*. n.p., 2000. Web. 21 Oct. 2012.


<sup>668</sup> FPÖ *Wien*, 54.

<sup>669</sup> Schwertberger *ALLA TURCA*

<sup>670</sup> FPÖ *Wien*, 48 – 49.

and yet remain eternally vigilant, like the simple baker Josef Schultz and noble soldier Kulczycki alike, to that looming Muslim threat. The FPÖ, therefore, are taking Austrian identity beyond the typical cliché of the Alps or Mozart. Instead, they are reminding their audience of the country's long and indeed militant history as a bulwark that defended European civilization from the incursions of the great Ottoman armies.

The FPÖ further diminishes the temporal divide between Vienna's past and present through a focus on the central historical hero of the book Prince Eugen of Savoy (1663 – 1736), who is paraded as the central historical hero in the *Impressum* of *Sagen aus Wien*. In the first substantial text and image combination of the *Sagenbuch*, the FPÖ provides an illustration of two 'national heroes' rising above the city:



**Figure 53.**

Image taken from *Sagen aus Wien*.<sup>671</sup>

<sup>671</sup> FPÖ *Wien*, 5.

The pictorial, as well as symbolic, synergy between history (Prince Eugen), present (Strache and the FPÖ) and their Occidental values (*Stephansdom*) demonstrates a blending of antiquity and modernity – past and present. The constant centrality of *Stephansdom* in many of the FPÖ's illustrations functions as a symbol of cultural and religious identity and therefore indicates that true Viennese can only be Christian.

The reader is also presented with an optical viewpoint that directly faces Strache and Prince Eugen. The close proximity between the anonymous viewer and the two characters creates the illusion that a candid and personal conference is taking place between all three - a 'team meeting', or 'group huddle' of sorts. The symbiotic relationship between Prince Eugen and Strache – between past and present – is the most striking aspect of this illustration. Strache appears to be pulling Prince Eugen up or forward, while the Prince points behind him to the city and *Stephansdom*, a symbolic service to the past and that which has come before. Strache is drawing the past (and the heroes that reside there) into the present, thereby establishing the link between Austria's conception of *Heimat* and the collective nation's historical consciousness. The fact that both Strache and Eugene both use the same speech bubble indicates that they follow the same purpose – presumably the defence of the city from a Turkish invasion (whether as an army from the past or an influx of migrants today).

The choice of attire is further evidence of the interaction between past and present. The opulence of Prince Eugen's seventeenth century attire is starkly contrasted with Strache, who as the contemporary 'Blue Knight' is wearing a decidedly populist<sup>672</sup> hooded sweatshirt, jeans, and boots. Their clothes demonstrate two personae that are clearly from a different time, and yet through the symbiosis of past and present both characters appear as one. The personal deixis of 'wir' in the opening prologue ("Wir wünschen Euch mit dem Gedichte, viel Freud und Spass mit Wiens Geschichte.") also indicates the amalgamation of past and present by linking Strache directly to Eugene to the leader of the FPÖ, thereby establishing one character

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<sup>672</sup> Casual, fashionable, and 'macho' attire is commonplace in the public image of Right-Wing populists. It allows them to appear trendy, fit, and approachable, while maintaining a certain 'cult' status as 'one of the boys'. It appeals specifically to the Right-Wing populist 'cult of celebrity', as 'Robin Hood' style political leaders who truly represent the people and are not hidden in ivory towers or corrupted by the establishment.

that contains both personae.<sup>673</sup> While Strache and Prince Eugen are blended into one singular entity, the reader is also brought into the group. The elevated viewpoint from which the reader perceives Strache and Prince Eugen in the illustration on page five is presumably from the *Kahlenberg* in the nineteenth district of Vienna. It was on the *Kahlenberg* that the Polish relief force arrived to crush the Ottoman armies alongside the Imperial Habsburg forces and lay waste the siege of Vienna.<sup>674</sup> The *Kahlenberg*, then, is the site where a united Christian army repelled an Islamic invader, thus securing Europe and the values of Christendom. By introducing themselves to their audience at this most symbolic site in Austrian and European history, the FPÖ are including the readers of *Sagen aus Wien* in their crusade. Strache and Prince Eugen once more rely on them (and, presumably, their votes) to help defend the core values and identity of Austrians as the Polish forces had done in 1683 from a dangerous ‘Other’. The readers literally become the relief force that will assist Strache to secure the nation and preserve Austrian self-determination from foreign threats. Their inevitable victory is implied on the final page of *Die zweite Türkenbelagerung Wiens 1683*, where the reader is shown the commemoration statue for Prince Eugen’s victory over the Ottomans:

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<sup>673</sup> Wodak *Embattled Vienna*, 243.

<sup>674</sup> Bowles, Edmund A. "The Impact of Turkish Military Bands on European Court Festivals in the 17th and 18th Centuries." *Early Music* 34.4 (2006): 533 - 59. Print. 546.



*Das Reiterstandbild von Prinz Eugen von Savoyen am Wiener Heldenplatz. Errichtet vom Bildhauer Anton Dominik Fernkorn stellt es ihn als siegreichen Feldherrn und Besieger der Türken dar und verkörpert das Haus Österreich als Verteidiger des christlichen Glaubens gegen die Türken. Das Standbild wurde 1865 enthüllt.*

**Figure 54.**

Image taken from *Sagen aus Wien*.<sup>675</sup>

The viewpoint from below the statue gives the impression of a bystander looking up in awe at the great legacy of Prince Eugen and his victory for the Habsburgs. His immortality in Vienna's *Heldenplatz* forever stands as a testament to the victory of the Viennese and Christian belief over the Ottomans and Islam. The FPÖ thus assures Prince Eugen's status as a hero of the *Heimat*, and it is from this perspective that the party expand their thesis.

As an established military leader, Prince Eugen provides a good example of the martial abilities of a hero. It is clearly the military successes of the Imperial general that capture the imagination of the FPÖ. Prince Eugen is introduced in the *Impressum* by Strache himself: "Einer der berühmtesten Feldherren Österreichs, der sich auch beim Kampf gegen das türkische Heer vor Wien im Jahr 1683 große Verdienste erwarb."<sup>676</sup> The historical backdrop whence Prince Eugen is evoked is dramatic, desperate, and combative. The FPÖ explains alongside the image of Strache

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<sup>675</sup> FPÖ *Wien*, 17.

<sup>676</sup> FPÖ *Wien*, 4.

and the Prince that the great siege of Vienna had lasted sixty long days.<sup>677</sup> It is from a background of warfare, conflict, and strife that the FPÖ expands upon the glory of the ancestors. It is under the great military guidance of the Eugene (as well as with the help of the Polish relief force) that the Austrians drove the Turks from the city, and, finally, all of Austria.<sup>678</sup> Such testaments of defiance and total victory provide the reader with the imaginary of ancestors that were superior in the martial arts and warfare. The coalition of Prince Eugen and Strache, furthermore, creates a link between the reality of the 2010 Viennese election and the Turkish threat, as well as battles, machismo and warfare more generally.

The popular myth surrounding Prince Eugen remains prevalent in Austrian society, and his inclusion by the FPÖ is used to pay homage to the general's cult status. Many of the myths about the second siege of Vienna in 1683 are alive in public discourse, school curriculum and commemorations in Austria today.<sup>679</sup> For many in Austria, the leader that commanded the victory of 1683 is more than just a military leader from Austria's past. Rather, Prince Eugen symbolises the 'turning of the tide' in the war with the Turks, and is a man that therefore represents the moment when Austrian self-determination rose above an outside aggressor. The liberation of Vienna from a determined Ottoman siege, more specifically, is a symbol of 'nativism' in contemporary Austria.<sup>680</sup> 1683 was a definitive point in history where Austrians defended themselves and upheld their capital city's independence from an army that sought to dominate them and usurp their national and cultural identity. The success of the Christian alliance and the defeat of the Ottoman army denoted the end of the Islamic presence in both Central and Eastern Europe, and also marked the zenith of Habsburg dominance in the region.<sup>681</sup> The axis of power shifted from East to West, and Austria gained a new confidence in world affairs that subsequently brought forth the kingdom's *Heldenzeitalter*, or new age of heroes.<sup>682</sup> The grandiosity of this historical discourse provides good ammunition for contemporary nationalist rhetoric.

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<sup>677</sup> FPÖ *Wien*, 4.

<sup>678</sup> FPÖ *Wien*, 4.

<sup>679</sup> Wodak *Embattled Vienna*, 232.

<sup>680</sup> Wodak *Embattled Vienna*, 232.

<sup>681</sup> Hochedlinger, Michael. *Austria's Wars of Emergence: War, State and Society in the Habsburg Monarchy, 1683-1797*. Harlow: Longman, 2003. Print. 153.

<sup>682</sup> Hochedlinger 153.

The decisive victory over the Ottomans is an heroic narrative that contains deeply emotive inferences for those whom it represents. The Austrian triumph is aptly used by the FPÖ as a discursive claim to a valiant Austrian past, through which an imaginary of ‘Vienna’ and ‘*Heimat*’ as something possessed, as ‘ours’, and as a great example of Occidental might is realised and maintained.<sup>683</sup>

Far from fading into insignificance behind the legendary figure of Prince Eugen, Strache’s character in the *Sagen* is greatly enhanced by the associations made between the two. By depicting Strache and Prince Eugen together, the FPÖ asserts a prophecy that Strache too will defend the city from the current Turkish ‘siege’ (a reference to Muslim immigration), just like, as the reader is aware, Prince Eugen had done in 1683. As a defender of Vienna (for both 1683 and today), Strache also adopts a decidedly martial demeanour, and this is paraded by the FPÖ as a positive (and essential) aspect of his character. Strache, as a result, assumes the character of ‘the hero’ on the *Sagenbuch*. This is seen, for example, in an illustration from *Die zweite Türkenbelagerung Wiens 1683*:



**Figure 55.**

Image taken from *Sagen aus Wien*.<sup>684</sup>

<sup>683</sup> Wodak *Embattled Vienna*, 232.

<sup>684</sup> FPÖ *Wien*, 12.

The heroic machismo of HC is clearly evident in this example, with HC raising his sword and encouraging the youth of the city to rise up against foreigners and the threat of Islam. In images such as this, Strache is the ‘Schutz’ of our ‘Heimat Österreich’ just like the party’s political programme argues, and is therefore ready to defend the borders of the city, and, indeed, the nation. The symbiosis between the warlike virtues of past figures and the present is significant here. The FPÖ are seemingly demonstrating the methodology that is needed to oppose foreign threats – both past and present. The virtues of machismo, as a result, become valuable in a narrative that implicitly encourages violence against contemporary enemies or dangers. HC, furthermore, assumes the role of a leader in the saga, with this sword characteristically pointed forward as if to lead the way for his band of followers. The depiction of the Left-Wing youth, on the other hand, is anything but heroic or masculine. The two rats in the cartoon exhibit a lack of patriotism and are illustrated as homeless ‘Outsiders’ and inebriated street rats. The cartoon thus depicts Left-Wing youth (Antifa) as a treacherous lot, who have forsaken their nation in the pursuit of hedonism and an indifference, or even hatred for, Austria. The Left-Wing youth are using a slogan that was made popular by *die Grünalternative Jugend* “Nimm dein Flaggerl für dein Gaggerl” and “wer Österreich liebt, muss scheiße sein”<sup>685</sup> The Far Left advertisement suggested that nationalism (in this case the Austrian flag) is only good for picking up your dog’s faeces.<sup>686</sup> Any form of nationalism, in other words, is tantamount to ‘fascism’ or ‘racism’ for the Far Left. The implication, of course, is that the Far Left have lost all respect for Austria, for their own nation, and their lack of decency or will for ‘self-preservation’ in the FPÖ’s comic further disseminates this accusation.

In juxtaposition to the impotence, laziness, and treachery of the Left Wing failures, the heroic and masculine Strache is a powerful image in relation to the current asylum seeker crisis in Europe. During the presidential campaign of 2016, Norbert Hofer took advantage of this self-proclaimed image as ‘defenders’ of the ‘Heimat’ alongside anxieties relating to foreign ethnocultural groups entering Austria illegally, using powerful slogans that evoke militancy, strength, and machismo:

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<sup>685</sup> Winkler-Hermaden, Rosa. “Ohne Gaggerl-Flaggerl, aber mit Kritik am System” *Der Standard*. Der Standard, 10 Mar. 2010. Web. 2 May. 2016.

<sup>686</sup> Winkler-Hermaden.





**Figure 56.**

FPÖ 2016. Image taken from *Nachrichten*.<sup>687</sup>

The change of HC's clothing from populist attire to armour and more antiquated clothing of a 'warrior' is also calculated, as is his over-emphasised muscular physique. Depicting the FPÖ leader as a hero of Vienna and greater Austria attests to his personal description of himself as "ein echter Österreicher", whose favourite film is *Braveheart*.<sup>688</sup> This 'true' Austrian then, must display a pious faith, a relationship to history and the past, as well as the general machismo and combativeness necessary to defend Christendom, the Occident, and above all Austrian culture, identity and, therefore, *Heimat*. The image of Strache as the 'Blue Knight' clad with medieval armour demonstrates a broader initiative by Right-Wing populist groups to evoke the imagery and enmity between West and East that is typical of the crusades. In the past decade the European Far Right has emphasised a common Western identity that is rooted in and strengthened by medieval imagery and rhetoric.<sup>689</sup> This historical discourse persistently spotlights the 'clash of civilisations'

<sup>687</sup> "Hofer mit Klestil-Slogan Macht braucht Controlle." *Nachrichten*. Nachrichten, 24 Aug. 2016. Web. 1 Jan. 2017

<sup>688</sup> Turner-Graham *Austria First*, 183.

<sup>689</sup> Wollenberg, Daniel. "Defending the West: Cultural Racism and Pan-Europeanism on the Far-Right." *Mediacommonspress*. Mediacommonspress, n.d. Web. 1 Aug 2016.

that was endemic in the crusades, as well as the warriors of the Knights Templar.<sup>690</sup> This is also a common theme of the international anti-Islam PEGIDA movement, whose name is an acronym for “Patriotische Europäer gegen die Islamisierung des Abendlandes.”<sup>691</sup> The evocation of medieval and knightly themes is therefore, by its very design, incompatible with the followers of Islam. The threat of Islamisation is drawn from a historical discourse that references the crusades and the siege of Vienna in 1683 in order to demonstrate the supposedly unquenchable Islamic desire to expand and destroy the West.<sup>692</sup> The city of Vienna and the event of 1683, as a result, provide a clear example for many in the Right of the unresolvable and eternal struggle between the values Christendom (the West) and Islam (the Middle East). The evocation of the machismo of knights as examples of Austrian power is a characteristic Right-Wing populist response to the perceived threat posed by the followers of Islam. The FPÖ’s use of *Heimat* depicts a nation that requires men to be as the warriors of antiquity, informed by the martial values endemic of a Western (and Christian) force that is revitalised and growing in strength and numbers.

The ‘cult of the warrior’ motif adopted by the FPÖ in the *Sagenbücher* demonstrates a deliberate move to garner support from males, and in particular, males from the Far Right. The warrior virtue of machismo is a popular identity *topos* for the Far Right. It is a self-applied persona that many Right-Wing Caucasian males, in particular, seek to emulate in their everyday lives. Many have formed Far Right groups in Europe and beyond that claim to be informed by Norse legends as an ancient example of their Far Right imagined community based on the tenants of mythology, *völkisch* nationalism, and racism.<sup>693</sup> The theme of ‘die kriegische Heiden’ dominates various forms of Far Right youth culture, and is usually constructed around Nordic sagas, paganism and the deities and heroes of Norse-Germanic mythology.<sup>694</sup> When participants from the extremities of the Far Right scene adulate gods or heroes,

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<sup>690</sup> Wollenberg.

<sup>691</sup> Taken from the Austrian PEGIDA Facebook page. Pegida Österreich. *Facebook*. Facebook, n.d. Web. 15 Feb 2015.

<sup>692</sup> See Lewis, Bernard. "The Roots of Muslim Rage." *The Atlantic* 1990: 47 - 60. Print.

<sup>693</sup> Donoghue, Heather. *From Asgard to Valhalla: The Remarkable History of the Norse Myths*. London: I.B. Tauris, 2007. Print. 176

<sup>694</sup> Schuppener, Georg. "Strategische Rückgriffe der extremen Rechten auf Mythen und Symbole." *Strategien der extremen Rechten*. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag, 2009. 310 - 31. Print. 320 – 322.

they are, in fact, self-identifying with the virtues of those characters. These virtues are almost always derived from a ‘fighter’ archetype, such as *Kraft*, *Gewalt*, *Macht* and *Überlegenheit*.<sup>695</sup> Such attributes of masculinity and machismo, although important to the scene, are not limited to Far Right imaginaries.

In the FPÖ’s “Die zweite Türkenbelagerung Wiens 1683”, the Viennese defenders of the city also exhibit these combatant attributes:



**Figure 57.**

Image taken from *Sagen aus Wien*.<sup>696</sup>

Although the Viennese army is clearly rallying under the central image of the Christian crucifix, there are some implicit visual signals by which the FPÖ pays homage to ‘die kriegische Heiden’ of the Far Right scene. In the centre of the image, directly under the crucifix, the reader notices a Viking styled horned helmet on one of the Viennese warriors. It is well established that the horned (devil) Viking helmet is historically inaccurate, and is an image usually linked to Christian criticism of the

<sup>695</sup> Schuppener 321.

<sup>696</sup> FPÖ *Wien*, 15.

Viking raiders that was later popularised in Wagnerian opera.<sup>697</sup> However its use by the FPÖ does indicate approval of the Far Right's rapport with Germanic mythology and the machismo of the Vikings. The Viking styled horned helmet is a popular motif among Far Right, such as the recently established Finnish anti-immigration group 'The Soldiers of Odin'.<sup>698</sup> It should also be noted here that the horned helmet was, in fact, found to be symbolic of the Norse god Odin in accordance with certain archaeological finds in Nordic areas. A cast bronze die used to imprint helmets, for example, was discovered in Sweden that appears to depict the god Odin with a horned helmet alongside a *Bezerker* warrior typical of the god's pre-mortem cult:



**Figure 58.**

'Odin as Weapon Dancer' Circa 600 A.D. Image taken from *The Viking Rune*.<sup>699</sup>

The FPÖ also includes a second reference to the cult of Odin in the illustration. Directly in front of the horned helmet silhouette is a helmet with golden wings. This design is another popular classical Wagnerian depiction of the Nordic god, seen for example here:

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<sup>697</sup> Stokstad, Marilyn, and Donald Watkins. "Vikings, Vesterheim, Scandinavian Studies." *Art Journal* 41.2 (1981): 172 - 76. Print. 172.

<sup>698</sup> The Soldiers of Odin use a Facebook page that can be viewed here: "Soldiers of Odin Finland." *Facebook*. Facebook, n.d. Web. 2 Dec. 2015.

<sup>699</sup> "Odin as Weapon Dancer." *The Viking Rune*. The Viking Rune, n.d. Web. 4 Aug. 2016.



**Figure 59.**

The god Odin enthroned on *Hlidskjalf* by Carl Emil Doepler (1882).<sup>700</sup>

Thus while the imagery of Christianity dominates the FPÖ's version of Austrian history and *Heimat*, there is still a recognition of the Germanic mythology that is so important in the extreme Far Right scene. It is not without calculation that the Odinic and Viking helmets are illustrated beneath the Christian crucifix in the FPÖ's image. This symbolically pays homage to the origins of Germanic identity, to the old mythic world of the Norse gods that came before the age of Christendom. The mythology of the Germanic people, as a result, is depicted as the 'roots' of what would later be the collective Christian identity of the Occidental people. The FPÖ proclivity for the mythic and the Germanic even led Strache to reference the worship of the ancient Germanic gods directly. When pressed about the difference between religious freedoms in the West and Islamic countries, Strache stressed that in a free society everybody should be at liberty to choose who they want to worship, "entweder an Jesus Christus, oder an Wotan, den Germanengott."<sup>701</sup> The Germanic gods therefore live on in the FPÖ's conception of myth and *Heimat*: a *living* narrative that embraces

<sup>700</sup> Image taken from Rotan, Edgar. *The Esoteric Codex: Wöden: Odin/Woden/Wotan*. Raleigh: Lulu, 2015. Print. 62.

<sup>701</sup> "Kebab war mit extra scharf: Strache überlebt islamistischen Anschlag." *Die Tagespresse*. Die Tagespresse, n.d. Web. 2 Jan. 2016.



the characteristics of Occidental Christendom as well as the archaism of mythical pagan roots.

The FPÖ's *Sagenbücher* also uses myth and history to practice exclusion. Right-Wing populism typically employs a strategy of exclusionary politics, which is justified by criteria of belonging and territorial boundaries.<sup>702</sup> Belonging, however, is not a concept confined to territorial boundaries, but also the cultural boundaries that nations represent. Exclusion can therefore also be demonstrated by a focus on 'strangers' who are defined not only as foreign geographically, but also due to their cultural and historical incongruities with the native population. To demonstrate the distancing of Austrians and 'Others', and of *Heimat* and the foreignness of 'elsewhere', the FPÖ turns to history as discourse.

The collective memories of the events surrounding the Ottoman sieges of Vienna in 1529 and 1683 (as well as the destruction of the unprotected countryside during these periods) still circulate in present day Austria.<sup>703</sup> This fact is exploited by the FPÖ as a source with which to encourage anti-Turkish sentiment, seen for example in *Sagen aus Österreich*'s "Der Purbacher Türke":




Figure 60.

Image taken from *Sagen aus Österreich*.<sup>704</sup>

<sup>702</sup> Wodak *The Politics of Fear*, 35.

<sup>703</sup> Wodak *Embattled Vienna*, 231.

<sup>704</sup> FPÖ *Österreich*, 10.

The image clearly illustrates the ‘Other’ as Turks through their banners, and the attire of the army with scimitars and turbans appears to maintain chronological accuracy. However, it is through the speech bubbles that the reader is given more information about the excluded Turkish group. The army are referred to as the *Islamisten*, which is a popular phrase in Right-Wing populist nomenclature used to imply distance between the native population and the culturally foreign (and usually criminal) Islamic group. It also suggests a level of danger, as the *Islamisten* are depicted as a menacing foreign army that seeks to invade the village (and has, indeed, already conquered the countryside). The second speech bubble, which warns the reader that this ‘Ostbanden’ will return in a few hundred years over an open border, finally demonstrates that this army is not only an army of history. The *Islamisten*, rather, are the waves of immigrants arriving in Austria from Islamic lands through Turkey. In *Sagen aus Wien*’s “Die zweite Türkenbelagerung Wiens 1683”, the Turkish sultan also threatens the Austrians with a dire warning for the future:



**Figure 61.**

Image taken from *Sagen aus Wien*.<sup>705</sup>

The Sultan’s proclamation that if he is not successful in 1683 his descendants will have to join the European Union demonstrates a blending of the past with the present by insinuating that Turkey’s admission to the European Union (and therefore gaining freedom of movement there) will result in a Muslim invasion of the continent.

<sup>705</sup> FPÖ *Wien*, 8.

The first ‘Other’ in the FPÖ’s *Sagenbücher*, therefore, is not the Ottoman army of 1529 or 1683. Rather the *Islamisten* are a modern Muslim group who seek to enter Austria as either migrants or refugees. The initial face of the ‘Other’ is an Islamic group that (currently) resides outside the *Heimat* and community – but is a group that seeks to break in. Their presence in Austria is compared to an invading army in order to create a symbiosis between an ancient foreign threat, and a modern immigration crisis. This immigration crisis is depicted in such a way as to demonstrate an invasion, with the FPÖ implicitly suggesting that Muslim migrants (whether refugees or otherwise) are a threat to Europeans presumably due to their Islamic terrorist or extremist agenda.

The Right-Wing populist definition of the ‘Other’ as a dangerous Islamic invader is further justified by illustrating Muslims as usurpers. This narrative is usually underpinned by an argument that Muslim migrants aspire to enter Europe in order to take over the continent, and through a process of Islamisation impose Sharia law over all Europeans. The FPÖ depicts this ‘Other’ as the Islamic usurper in *Sagen aus Wien*’s “Die zweite Türkenbelagerung Wiens 1683”:



Figure 62.

Image taken from *Sagen aus Wien*.<sup>706</sup>

<sup>706</sup> FPÖ Wien, 6 – 7.



The FPÖ discursively constructs the image of the Turkish usurper by reminding its readers that Muslims had once before sought to convert Vienna, and will do so if given the chance again. This theme in the *Sagenbuch* relates directly to official Freedom Party platforms, in which the party argues that radical Islamists are influencing and largely controlling the opinions of Muslim migrants in Europe, and that the religion of Islam dictates political domination and violence.<sup>707</sup> In this discourse, the Turkish minority in Austria and those seeking to enter as migrants are both examples of the ‘Other’. Thus the ‘Other’, or ‘Turk’, is depicted as a group that resides both within and without of the national borders. The distancing of ‘us’ and ‘them’ in the FPÖ narrative also allows the party to imply that Turkish minorities, while citizens perhaps, are never truly Austrian – and this ‘fact’ is dictated by history.

The final attribute of the Turkish ‘Other’ is the imminent threat of violence. In Right-Wing populist immigration rhetoric, the native people (who, as we have seen, are usually a community defined as Occidental or Christian) must defend themselves from a dangerous external group.<sup>708</sup> The radical Right usually illustrate the ‘Other’ as immigrant groups that are a threat to national identity, but also, through general violent acts, are argued to be the major cause of criminality and social upheaval.<sup>709</sup> In their political programme, for example, the FPÖ indicates that security is a risk because of the growing problem with illegal immigration and “Ausländerkriminalität”:

Von den insgesamt im Jahre 2012 ermittelten 259.923 tatverdächtigen Personen waren 84.103 nicht im Besitz der österreichischen Staatsbürgerschaft. Von den ermittelten 84.103 tatverdächtigen Fremden waren 8.481 Asylwerber.<sup>710</sup>

In “Die zweite Türkenbelagerung Wiens 1683” the FPÖ uses art and history to emphasise their point of an alleged link between the Turkish ‘Other’, violence, and criminality:

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<sup>707</sup> See for example FPÖ *Handbuch* 2013, 50 – 54.

<sup>708</sup> Wodak *The Politics of Fear*, 21.

<sup>709</sup> Wodak *The Politics of Fear*, 27.

<sup>710</sup> FPÖ *Handbuch* 2013, 237 – 238.



*Auch die Künstler jener Tage beschäftigten sich mit dem Thema Türkenbelagerung. Obenstehende Abbildung zeigt einen originalen Holzschnitt aus der damaligen Zeit. Er vermittelt sehr drastisch, wie die Menschen damals die Bedrohung erlebten.*

## 12 DIE TÜRKENBELAGERUNG 1683

**Figure 63.**

Image taken from *Sagen aus Wien*.<sup>711</sup>

The image depicts the alleged Turkish depravity and violence during the events of 1683, however it is not without contemporary relevance. The ambition behind such narratives is to encourage anti-Turkish sentiment against the modern day minority. The ‘intimidation’ the populace felt in 1683 is, according to the FPÖ’s argument, comparable to a native population that feels ‘besieged’ by the criminality of minorities within their own *Heimat*. This ‘clash of civilisations’ discourse therefore depicts Austrians as civilised, while antagonising immigrants as barbarous philistines. The enslavement of the children has a particularly strong effect here, almost dehumanizing the Turkish ‘Other’ beyond all possible redemption. This theme of the ‘Other’ as uncivilised barbarians is seen in another illustration from “Die zweite Türkenbelagerung Wiens 1683”:

<sup>711</sup> FPÖ *Wien*, 12.



“Kriegschauplatz” wherever the populace is not Islamic.<sup>713</sup> To further reinforce this argument, the FPÖ cites some of the principles of Islamic *Jihad* against the ‘Ungäubige’ directly from the Koran:

Siehe etwa Sure Al-Baqara 2,191: „Tötet sie, wo ihr sie findet“, At-Tauba 9,29: „Kämpft mit Waffen gegen diejenigen, die nicht an Allah glauben, noch an den jüngsten Tag glauben, und die nicht für verboten erklären, was Allah und sein Gesandter Mohammed für verboten erklärt haben, und die sich nicht nach der rechten Religion [dem Islam] richten - von denen, die die Schrift erhalten haben [d. h. Juden und Christen] - kämpft mit der Waffe gegen diese, bis sie die Minderheitensteuer abgeben als Erniedrigte!“<sup>714</sup>

Through this argument Islam is described as an agitator: a dangerous ‘Other’ that is at war with the Christian West, and is therefore not only a threat to the native Austrian populace but also to their very definition of *Heimat* informed by the principles of secularism, Christianity, Germanic identity, religious freedoms and so forth. The illustrations of Austria engaged in battle with an evil foe in the *Sagenbuch* encourages further antagonism between Christianity (nativism) and Islam (Otherness), which results in a symbolic depiction of a friend (Austrians, Christians, and Europeans) versus enemy (Turks, Islam) diagram. All of these combative dichotomies occasion, of course, an influence over perceptions of *who belongs* in Austria as *Heimat*, and who is an enemy of that imaginary.

The final ‘Other’ in the FPÖ’s *Sagenbücher* is what this thesis classifies as the ‘Facilitator’. This designation is reserved for the political establishment (the political Left and their supporters in particular), who the FPÖ accuses of actively expediting the downfall of *Heimat* through their advocacy for immigration, acceptance of radical Islam, and a general rejection of core ‘Austrian’ values. These accusations have been seen particularly under the leadership of Strache, who typically claims that the Viennese mayor Michael Häupl and other Left-wing politicians have purposely abstained from implementing any measures to combat Islamic extremism in

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<sup>713</sup> FPÖ *Handbuch* 2013, 53.

<sup>714</sup> FPÖ *Handbuch* 2013, 53.

Austria.<sup>715</sup> The political Left and the corrupted establishment is therefore the treacherous ‘Other’ in the FPÖ narrative. While they are seriously anathema to *Heimat* and Austrian identity, they nonetheless reside within the borders of the nation. Their ability to influence governance and society within Austria is the primary example of why they are dangerous. This is seen for example in ““Die zweite Türkenbelagerung Wiens 1683””:




Figure 65.

Image taken from *Sagen aus Wien*.<sup>716</sup>

Here the FPÖ introduces the ‘great betrayal narrative’ that is typical of the party’s ‘Facilitator’ *topos*. In the illustration Häupl is derogatorily portrayed through his decidedly opulent clothing. This is typical of Austria’s Right-Wing populist tendency to depict the political establishment and corrupt, ‘out of touch’, or a ‘gang of fat cats’.<sup>717</sup> The fact that Häupl is a ‘cosmopolitan’ and not a ‘racist’ is contrasted with the defenders of the city – the local Viennese – who are described by Häupl as ‘teppetan’ due to their willingness to defend their *Heimat*. Similar arguments are put

<sup>715</sup> Krzyżanowski 142.

<sup>716</sup> FPÖ *Wien*, 10.

<sup>717</sup> Wodak *Embattled Vienna*, 246.

forward by the FPÖ in *Sagen aus Österreich*'s "Die übergossene Alm am Hochkönig", in which the political establishment (as well as the European Union) are seen to be celebrating their luxury with Lexus cars and caviar, while the common folk suffer in increasing poverty.<sup>718</sup> The antagonistic manner by which the establishment laud their wealth at the expense of the common population is an example of their betrayal of *Heimat* in the FPÖ's narrative.

The other visually 'foreign' character in the *Sagenbücher* is also a member of the Left-Wing movement, shown in *Sagen aus Wien*'s "Das Basiliskenhaus":



**Figure 66.**

Image taken from *Sagen aus Wien*.<sup>719</sup>

In the FPÖ's saga the mythological *Basilisk* symbolises the alliance of the SPÖ and the Greens, and the stench it omits is an indication of the supposed general poor hygiene of Left-Wing supporters. Bad health, hygiene, and physical appearance

<sup>718</sup> FPÖ *Österreich*, 10.

<sup>719</sup> FPÖ *Wien*, 25.



characterises the Antifa<sup>720</sup> youth in the illustration, who the Viennese look at with shock and disgust. The youth's complexion is dark, perhaps of North African or Middle Eastern extraction. Elsewhere in the *Sagenbücher*, the Red-Green alliance is personified as a fraudulent 'Other' disguised as a *Teufel* in red clothing, who with false promises attempts to deceive and entrap the Austrian population.<sup>721</sup> Thus the 'Other' is typified in the FPÖ's *Sagenbücher* as either foreign (and dangerous) or politically subversive to the concept of *Heimat* (characterised by their support for immigrants). The 'Other' is always distanced from the native Viennese, and is never at home in the surroundings.

The myths of the *Sagenbücher* are therefore not a simple discussion of Austrian antiquity, but a fictionalisation of the past that is used by the FPÖ to justify a Right-Wing populist narrative of exclusivity and exclusion. Myth and history, as a result, are features in a broader FPÖ *Heimatrhetorik* that defines the homeland as a friendly place accessible to certain demographics (Christians, Far Right, those of German cultural extraction, and those who conform to European values), as well as a fortress that must be impregnable to those that allegedly do not belong (Muslims and their facilitators who have betrayed Austria).

#### **4.9 - Conclusion**

Austrian history is long and complex, making the formation of national identity and *Heimat* conceptions difficult. It is very difficult to formulate one distinct past that can be applied collectively for all people. Austria existed in before the age of nationalism, it was the home to rulers of a great empire, faced defeat in World War 1, and suffered the abdication of a king. It has seen the rise of National Socialism and *Anschluss*, through to the re-emergence of democratic values during the Second Republic. Collective memories about Austria's past are therefore difficult to quantify as a unanimous contemporary national self. It is difficult to connect the modern, smaller Second Republic with the vastness of the Habsburg Empire, just as it is equally unsuitable to imagine Austria as part of a greater German *Reich*. The question of

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<sup>720</sup> A generic term for anti-fascist groups that are usually compelled by an ideology of socialism or anarchism. For example see "Was Sie schon immer über die Antifaschistische Aktion/Bundesweite Organisation wissen wollten." *Antifaschistische Aktion Bundesweite Organisation*. N.p., n.d. Web. 2 Aug. 2014.

<sup>721</sup> For example see FPÖ *Wien*, 50, and FPÖ *Österreich*, 22 – 23.

whether Austria can be truly European without also being ‘German’, in particular, continues to create further conjecture. In light of the ambivalence surrounding Austrian identity from a historical context, the FPÖ have identified firm ground with which to advance their amended Austrian identity position. While the intellectual battle between the Austrian and German perspectives of Austrian national identity endures, the FPÖ has identified the political efficacy of embracing both arguments.

The Austrian Right-Wing populists remain true to their pan-German political origins by emphasising that their definition of Austrian history, culture, and therefore *Heimat* is German. However, designating Austria as a ‘Teil’ of the German ‘Kulturgemeinschaft’ and ‘Geschichte’ allows the members of the FPÖ room with which to manipulate the concept of *Heimat*. By embracing a version of history that is distinctly Austrian (as seen, for example, in the *Sagenbücher*) alongside historical origins and group classification that are informed by German features, the FPÖ encourages a type of *Heimat* patriotism that embraces the exclusivity of Austrian identity, as well as its notable contribution to a broader German community that transcends conventional political borders. History, then, is just as important as any other feature in the FPÖ’s use of *Heimat*, as it conjures a central identity narrative that is supposedly ancient, unbroken, continuous, and, most importantly, maintains a purity of essence that is reflected in contemporary society.

The use of mythology to enhance the *Heimat* concept is by no means unique to the FPÖ. However the adoption of myths into the party’s *Heimatrhetorik* does demonstrate the politicisation and fictionalisation of the past to suit Right-Wing populist political discourse. The FPÖ uses Austria’s history and legends encapsulated in a mythic form to address the questions of similarity and belonging - why Austrians should be a community, why they are alike, and from where they originate. The myths help the FPÖ to depict their version of *Heimat* as both a moral and physical universe, thereby establishing the centrality and uniqueness of Austrians and the Austrian place in the world. The FPÖ’s compendium of myths, therefore, is an example of ethnocentric worldview, because it outlines group solidarity by referring to allegedly exclusive worldviews, cultural distinctiveness and an aura of superiority over outside groups and their different cultural identities.<sup>722</sup> The historic culture that is joined with

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<sup>722</sup> Smith *Ethnic Origins*, 47.



the FPÖ's image of an ancestral *Heimat* demonstrates an example of ethnic nativism, and as a result *Heimat* is defined through the rediscovery of archaism and traditional communal identity.

It is an argument for continuity in history that permits the FPÖ to blend the past with the present. These two worlds combine in the FPÖ's use of *Heimat* to construct an image of what it means to be Austrian. This paradigm of Austrianness is therefore contemporary relevant, while also being connected to the deepest antiquity. The living narrative in the FPÖ's *Sagenbücher* implies that history is instructive, and that much of what came before can still happen today. Past glories, in other words, live on in the emotive sense of *Heimat*, as well as past dangers and past enemies. The continuity of history in the FPÖ's concept of *Heimat*, above all else, indicates that contemporary Austrians are but one link in a very long and ancient chain, and it is therefore their responsibility to preserve that which came before for future generations. The members of the FPÖ 'help' their audience do this, by paying homage to the glorious deeds of Austria's people in history. The purpose of this return to antiquity is to strengthen and restore 'the people' of Austria, and to preserve a 'pure' definition of *Heimat*.

The purity of the *Heimat* as is demonstrated in the *Sagenbücher* through the legacy of the righteous pantheon of heroes that represent it, to which with little modesty, Strache admits himself. Heroes allow communities to imagine their own *Heldenzeitalter* and transmit the finer qualities of these characters to themselves. The past teaches us who we are by providing examples of our ancestors and allowing us to attach ourselves as links in this ever-growing biographical chain. We therefore attempt to re-live the lives of our forebears as if we were directly related to their community by fate. The use of heroes is therefore a process of collective identity formation, which is controlled by historical continuity and guided by the Austrian populist Right. The virtues they wish to resurrect and extol as characteristic of their people are largely martial, as the legends focus primarily on enmity and strife between cultures and nations. The use of both Christian crusader and Germanic warrior archetypes in their *Sagenbücher* assists the FPÖ to reinforce this narrative, as well as to attract young male voters from the Far Right in particular, who typically identify with the virtues of machismo. Vienna's long history of war with the East also allows for a special collective memory to permeate in the audience, as the FPÖ leads

the people back into their collective past in order to ‘rediscover’ their alleged enemies.

The myths, cultures, and *Heimat* in the *Sagenbücher* are sacred, unique, and valued because they are examples of ‘Our’ heritage. The identity and culture of the ‘Other’, however, is either defective or hostile towards native Austrians. This oppositional schematic between friend and foreign, exclusion and inclusion, or ‘Us’ and ‘Them’, is adopted by the FPÖ as a strategy to marginalise Islam and disrupt cultural pluralism from developing in Austria. The ‘Other’ in the *Sagenbücher* is foreign and their customs are perceived as either hostile or perplexing. The ‘Facilitator’, or the Left-Wing ‘Other’, is also distanced from the purity of the community due to their alleged betrayal and subservience to a political doctrine that would undermine the purity of *Heimat*. Both groups, Muslims and the political Left, are therefore denied a place in the FPÖ’s concept of *Heimat*, because the first is not historically ‘one of us’ and the latter has betrayed their people. According to the party’s thesis it is inconceivable that either group will ever be able to (re)assimilate based on their identity being formed from an alien set of historical experiences or a political doctrine that is argued to be poison for the survival of an autochthonous Austrian national identity.

The emotive power of the FPÖ’s *Sagenbücher* in the imagination of national identity demonstrates the widespread attachment to archaism and the supposed values preserved therein. There is therefore an element of nostalgia that is carefully exploited by the Austrian Right-Wing populists in order to pervasively disseminate their political messages. The success of the *Sagenbücher* indicates societies desire to revert to simpler modes of existence, to reconnect with the illusive golden age that is eternally just beyond our grasp. There is an overt desire to reconnect with the ancestors, to understand their lives, and to understand, most of all, from whence and from whom we are derived. The love of *Heimat* speaks to this nostalgic yearning, and lures its audience into a world that is imagined to be possessed, and yet may also be irretrievably lost to the chronicles of antiquity. History and myth in the FPÖ’s definition of *Heimat* functions as this desired well-spring of communal identity, in which descendants meet their forebears, re-live their ancestors’ lives, and finally reassociate themselves with their historical enemies.



## Conclusion

The preceding discussion has demonstrated the manner in which the FPÖ's *Heimat* narrative reveals features of an Austrian national identity abstraction. At a time of great instability brought forth by the migratory flows of foreign ethnocultures into Europe, this research attempts to formulate answers to the rise of the cultural nationalism and ethnocentric populism endemic to the FPÖ's '*Heimat* patriotism'. In particular, this thesis established that in response to the dislocation brought forth by an increasingly globalised world, the FPÖ attempts to diminish the existential divide between their definition of the Austrian social group and an identity of place that is informed by landscapes of cultural significance, linguistic affiliation, and ethnography. Through an examination of the discursively constructed identity that characterises the FPÖ's use of *Heimat*, this thesis has shown that the concept of belonging can transcend the banality of a democratically formed citizenship. The sense of *Heimat*, rather, is shown to be a code word for the FPÖ and their supporters. As a mutually understood euphemism, *Heimat* is loaded with a set of 'innate' sensibilities and a knowledge base that informs an ethnocentric notion of the nation and the collective self in Austria. The FPÖ's use of *Heimat* is characterised by this close proximity to the notion of a homogeneous nation and community. This thesis has therefore attempted to show that maintaining the 'purity' of *Heimat* in FPÖ discourse also means enforcing a restrictive definition of national identity. The exclusivity of *Heimat* confers upon those that belong there a feeling of superiority and uniqueness that nullifies the sense of anxiety and displacement experienced by many in modern Europe. It also, however, facilitates a political programme that promotes exclusion in order to 'preserve' traditionalism and purity within the national community the *Heimat* idea supposedly represents.

Chapter One demonstrated that *Heimat* refers to a concept of belonging and identity dating back centuries in the German-speaking world. It is an ambivalent term that describes a heterogeneous concept informed by a wide-range of contrasting opinions on what constitutes one's homeland, how one identifies with it, belongs to it, and subsequently formulates a group identity with a strong association to place. The chapter cited the potent emotive power the concept of *Heimat* has over those that identify with it, as a love of one's homeland coalesces with expressions of patriotism and the experience of pride. We saw that in order to comprehend the complexities of

*Heimat*, a thematic analysis is the most useful approach. A focus on the historico-cultural framework from which the concept of *Heimat* developed was attempted in order to prove that although *Heimat* is as subjective as the perceptions of those who imagine it, there are certain features that form its catalyst and from which its varied interpretations are formulated.

Of the weft of interconnected features that combine to make *Heimat*, nature established the first. The idea of *Heimat* appears first as the physical landscape, as no homeland can exist without the topography and territory that distinguishes it. The *Heimat* concept then sweeps over the incomprehensible void of nature and transforms it into a landscape that has value and meaning to the group who claim ownership over it. The special landscapes that characterise the *Heimat* idea are relative to the group that imagine them. However it was shown that classical depictions of *Heimat* are usually constructed around forested, rural/agrarian, or mountain topographies. The ‘naturalness’ of *Heimat* assisted in the ‘beautification’ of the nation abstraction, and demonstrated a special terrain that also symbolised the uniqueness of the community that is a part of it. Environmentalism and the preservation of nature thus became an integral part of the *Heimat* movement. Natural landscapes turned into the first feature of identity for *Heimat* enthusiasts, and a way that their homeland was distinguished from the rest of the world.

Beyond the dominion of nature, we have noted that during the nineteenth century the idea of *Heimat* also developed a political dimension. While *Heimat* tended to celebrate local landscapes and community identities, these regional worlds became interrelated microcosms in the greater macrocosm of the nation. *Heimat* therefore demonstrated the regional contribution to the nation, and the importance of local ethnography in the construction of broader national identity narratives. The love of one’s *Heimat* became a simultaneous love for one’s people and country, resulting in the use of *Heimat* to facilitate nationalistic tendencies. We saw that the propensity of the *Heimat* idea to encourage patriotism and nationalism on a state level made it an easily adapted concept in National Socialist ideology. In the Nazi narrative, *Heimat* became a euphemism for racial and cultural superiority. The homeland thus lost its autonomy and innocence, and the term *Heimat* was instead used to describe the biologically derived notions of state typical of National Socialism. The collapse of National Socialism and the retreat of pan-German ideas brought forth a new era of *Heimat* thought in Austria, that was shown to focus primarily on the uniqueness of

Austria alone. Here, *Heimat*'s usefulness in nation building was again demonstrated, however this time the narrative sought a large degree of distance from the cultural relationship the majority of Austrians share with their German neighbours. It is likely that this led to the great schism of opinion in the Austrian nation as to the origins and characteristics of their collective identity. While many claim a distinctly Austrian narrative that is divorced from German history, the Germanist perspective remains and it is from the fusion of these two arguments that the oscillatory pro-Austrian, pro-German populist position has developed.

We have seen that the *Heimat* idea outlines concepts of group belonging and place identity on both a local and national level. From its etymological origins, through to its development as a concept during the nineteenth century, *Heimat* provides answers to the questions of place in the world. Chapter Two returns to nature, and presented the importance of natural landscapes in FPÖ *Heimatrhetorik*. The chapter began with a thorough description of the FPÖ's environmental policies. As was demonstrated, the greening of Right-Wing populism is not new; rather it is formed out of the long-standing Far Right adoration of local nature. Nature preservation is central in Right-Wing (and Far Right) populism because of the believed symbiosis between man and nature. Rightist participants see nature as a formative element in both *Heimat* and identity. Far Right ideology usually calls for a communal ownership of place because of their belief that individual human groups have related territories that they empathise with. Austria's populist Right, who believe that the landscapes of Austria define the national 'In' group, has also adopted this position. Borrowing from typical *Heimat* narratives, it was shown that the agrarian/rural, alpine, and forest landscapes dominate the FPÖ's definition of Austria as *Heimat*. The Far Right tendency to use nature to exemplify virtues of their social group was an important aspect of this argument. Rural and agrarian settings are important to the Right-Wing populist parties because they epitomize a long standing relationship to the land, the hard-working ethics of the rural population, a natural mode of life, and a close-knit sense of community that is informed by an identity of place and a long biographical account of the cultural relationship to the local area from which it originates. This 'salt of the earth' narrative thus typifies the *Heimat* community in a traditional manner, and is a strong oppositional discourse to the cosmopolitan, faceless, and often multicultural or pluralistic image of larger cities. The alpine vistas used by the FPÖ to illustrate *Heimat* also bestow upon Austria and

the Austrian population a uniqueness that transcends other examples of *Heimat*. The Alps characterise Austrian communities as well the virtues of a strong people that are at home in the heights. Images of politicians like Strache ascending the tallest peak in Austria demonstrate his party (and ‘true’ Austrian people indirectly) as a group of powerful, athletic, and determined folk who are capable of overcoming great adversity. The forest as a feature of *Heimat*, however, lures the observer back into a more pan-Germanic world of forest mysticism: to the deep groves of the *Teutoburg* forest from which the original, pure Germanic tribes were first encountered.

The FPÖ’s use of natural landscapes to define *Heimat* was presented as significant because it bestows upon the Austrian people a sense of identity and uniqueness that encourages patriotism and nationalism. In a modern age where communities feel increasingly dislocated from their surroundings and from each other, the *Heimat* narrative reminds the members of the community that they possess a unique territory that binds them together and reveals their exclusive virtues as a social group. The desire to preserve landscapes as clean and intact, however, can also be used to justify organically or culturally derived notions of a human landscape, which, theoretically, must also be kept pure in order to maintain the ‘virtue’ and ‘cleanliness’ of *Heimat*.

The strategies undertaken by the FPÖ to preserve the natural landscapes of *Heimat* were used as the premise to introduce Chapter Three. Chapter Three explored language as the first characteristic of the FPÖ’s human landscape of *Heimat*. It was shown that when all other characteristics are taken away, language endures as one of the primal contributors to a sense of *Heimat*. The preservation of language is a central principle of FPÖ doctrine. For Austria to be *Heimat* it was shown, it must sound Austrian. The chapter demonstrated that the FPÖ’s insistence on language as a formative feature of *Heimat* and national identity signified the prevalence of the German *Kulturgemeinschaft* in their discursive construct of a national self. This was shown to strategically ignore or dismiss Austria’s multilingual past, and is even in many cases hostile towards minorities with long established roots in Austria such as the Slovenes.

Although party programmes and activities such as the removal of bilingual signs illuminated this, it was the introduction of the FPÖ’s *Sagenbücher* and *Der blaue Planet* that made clear in the chapter the efficacy of language and *Heimat* to form a national identity and use it as the justification for exclusionary politics. The

FPÖ used the fictionalisation of current events to demonstrate two opposing realities in modern Europe. First, the national 'In' group was determined through their conformity with the norms of the German language and thus the German cultural group. Central to the Right-Wing populist thesis is the premise that when a social group maintain a purity of language they are also demonstrating the purity and endurance of the values the language supposedly represents. In this context preserving a national language is as much about safeguarding the identity of the autochthonous community as it is about maintaining linguistic norms. The FPÖ demonstrated this through the purity of language that was evident in the *Heimat* community in their *Sagenbücher* and their fictional Blue Planet. The distinctively Austrian example of *Heimat* was also provided through an exploration of dialect forms that typify the linguistic traditions of the various regions of the nation. By using dialect the FPÖ demonstrate that the party conforms to these traditions, and indeed seek to defend them as characteristic of *Heimat* and therefore national identity. The use of ethnolect, conversely, was shown to marginalise or reject ethnocultural minorities in Austria as well as prospective new migrants. The inability of foreign groups to speak German was seen to be an example of their unwillingness (or ineptitude) to conform to Austrian custom and identity. Migrants and foreigners as the 'Other' are therefore illustrated as hostile to native Austrians through their tendency to subvert or damage national identity and *Heimat*. These conclusions were validated by the FPÖ through a typical rhetoric of fear that encourages Islamophobia and xenophobia as the natural responses shown by patriots who are willing to defend their homeland from hostile foreign groups.

Chapter Four examined the FPÖ's strategy of evoking a sense of *Heimat* through references to native history and mythology. We saw that history has been a consistent feature in *Heimat* discourse, connecting people with their past in order to encourage group identity and self-awareness. Central to this thesis was the theory of collective memory, which differs from standardised historiography in that it facilitates a level of empathy from the subject who imagines his or her own past and therefore indirectly experiences it. This process allows history to become emotive for those that seek to connect with it, and can encourage a sense of self-worth based on the character and exploits of one's forebears. The FPÖ employs this strategy of encouraging empathy between Austrians and their collective past. It was shown that history informs the party's *Heimat* imaginary by referring to examples of Austria's



membership of the German *Kulturgemeinschaft*. Although distinctly ‘Austrian’, the FPÖ’s understanding of national identity was thus also revealed to be an example of, and contributor to, the greater German cultural sphere.

The FPÖ’s *Sagenbücher* proved to be instrumental to the chapter, allowing for a deeper analysis than conventional political programmes allow. The use of mythologies in the formation of national identities was shown to be by no means new to Right-Wing populism. However mythology as a stylised and fictionalised form of political ‘art’ demonstrated its susceptibility to the manipulation of those that control the dissemination and meaning of myths. The *Sagenbücher* illustrated the past glories of Austria to the reader, and were argued to be an innovative attempt on behalf of the FPÖ to take advantage of the human tendency to exhibit a deep nostalgia for the past. The *Sagenbücher*, with its references to monumental victories over foreign threats as well as a less complicated, mythic time, addressed the human desire to revert to a golden age or a simpler, earlier lifestyle. In the current age of capitalism and bureaucracy, political squabbling, and the dissolution of traditional hierarchies of identity, it was shown that nostalgia for the past diminishes the modern conditions of estrangement, homelessness, or a lack of group solidarity. The FPÖ provides one such antidote for this perceived existential crisis endemic to Western nations. Their *Heimat* narrative, infused with a patriotic compendium of myths, tells Austrians that they belong to an ancient association of blood and culture, and this gives an otherwise precarious life the semblance of certainty and a fate driven purpose. It was shown that defining *Heimat* through historical features does not only make an anachronistic model of identity, rather an alliance of ‘our kind’ that has specific temporal and spatial boundaries. The link between the past and the present was made evident in this chapter by referencing the *Sagenbücher*’s tendency to associate the contemporary Austrian community with the described past events, thereby showing that all Austrians are but one link in a great biographical chain dating back thousands of years.

The idea of history as instructive, however, was also shown to be a method for stirring enmity between cultures and peoples through the marginalisation of those that do not identify with the FPÖ’s model of Austrian history. In particular, it was argued that the FPÖ selectively picked elements of history in order to create a world where the reader could be reacquainted with old enemies. The Turkish ethnocultural group and the religious followers of Islam, in particular, were demonstrated to be the

principle enemy in the FPÖ's narrative. This was shown to be the negative dual assumption that results from focusing on the centrality and distinctiveness of one's national group. The myths, values, customs, and identity of the Austrian group were shown by the FPÖ to be natural and correct; they had intrinsic value, beauty, and were in unison a demonstration of 'our' national heritage. The 'Other' was conversely defined through a hostile culture (Islam) that was void of any legitimate links to the concept of *Heimat*. The Turks were depicted as strangers that could not speak the language, with customs that were alien because they were derived from a historical narrative that was entirely divorced from the identity of place that is characteristic of the FPÖ's use of *Heimat*. The chapter therefore attempted to demonstrate the prevalent ethnocultural features that typify the FPÖ's definition *Heimat*, which through the paradigm of history marginalises foreign ethnocultures and seeks to deny them a place in Austrian society.

The original purpose of this thesis was to attempt to demonstrate the underlying xenophobia and cultural chauvinism which I believed typified the FPÖ's *Heimatrhetorik*. However, my belief was guided by assumptions that were based on a pre-existing bias surrounding the party's ideological position. What I discovered is a pervasive, underlying issue that goes to the very core of the modern European social imaginary. The declining sense of community felt around the concepts of *Heimat* and nation, the faltering of traditional modes of identity formation due to their perceived unfashionable origins, and the dominance of a consumer culture that dictates how people identify with their new, material societies, have all created a 'spacelessness' in which many people suffer from alienation, anxiety, and a lack of meaning or direction. The Austrian Right-Wing use of *Heimat* provides an image of community with which many Austrians can identify, and is thus offered as an existential antidote to the negative societal conditions that are suffered in the modern age. Their increasing political success, I argue, is due to the emotive power that resonates from the *Heimat* idea, and its tendency to provide the audience with satisfying feeling of belonging to a homeland and a group.

The dangers, however, become evident when one considers 'group based' politics alongside the current migrant and asylum seeker issues facing Austria and Europe. An aggressive group mentality, even if derived from valid justifications, has the propensity to encourage a politics of separatism and perhaps, at worst, societal violence. The refugee crisis brings anxiety around the future of 'traditional' Austrian

identity to the fore, and also allows for empathy among certain demographics for a political platform that consolidates ‘Us’ against ‘Them’. The FPÖ has taken the notion of *Heimat* and used it as their primary tool with which to question the validity of governmental bodies that support multiculturalism over native populations. Through their “Recht auf Heimat” mantra, the FPÖ question the collectivist idea that nations can import large numbers of foreign ethnicities and have no societal problems as a result. *Heimat*, therefore, is consumed into Right-Wing populist nomenclature in Austria, and is used to describe an imaginary cultural border that guards the existential frontier between the national ‘Us’ and the foreign ‘Them’. I conclude this thesis by questioning the justification of a single party claiming ownership over such an emotive, subjective, and heterogeneous concept as *Heimat*. *Heimat* is given value based on the manner by which he or she perceives it and formulates an affinity with it. *Heimat*’s purpose as a political tool that thematically constructs a discursive account of national identity should therefore be questioned on its merits.

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